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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the evolution of Kenya’s Internet communication technology (ICT) 
ecosystem and explores the barriers and subsequent enabling processes encountered when gro-
wing an ICT ecosystem in a resource-scarce context. Drawing upon 12 in-depth case studies of 
Kenyan tech entrepreneurs and 45 interviews with technology experts this dissertation provi-
des a holistic perspective on the barriers and enablers that Kenyan technology entrepreneurs 
encounter across the areas of culture, human capital, finance, policy, entrepreneurial support 
systems, and markets. 
Together with relevant theory on how ecosystems emerge and advance the thesis develops a 
model that explains how ICT ecosystems can emerge in resource-scarce contexts. The model 
shows how locally available enabling processes may be drawn on to substitute and establish mis-
sing condition factors. Furthermore, this dissertation analyzes mobile technology‘s potential to 
tackle unemployment in Kenya and provides a critical evaluation of the embedded economic and 
developmental opportunity.
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Extended Abstract 
Over the past decade the mobile phone and its unfolding possibilities have dominated 
development discourses. The mobile for development stream (M4D) has investigated 
applications in numerous fields, such as finance, education and healthcare. The first part of 
this dissertation evolves a new M4D field, mWork. It investigates the mobile phone as a tool 
that enables poor people in resource-scarce contexts to find and execute work. Through 
empirical case study research conducted in the continent’s internet communication 
technology (ICT) vanguard Kenya, this research surfaces 12 mWork case studies that 
demonstrate potential realms of utilization. The research further critically assesses the 
challenges that mWork firms could face, their possible economic feasibility as well as their 
potential contribution towards development. 
While this study finds that at the time of the study mWork in Kenya was still at a relatively 
early stage, several economically and developmentally promising applications have surfaced. 
For instance, the use of feature phones as tools for market research, crowd journalism and 
courier services, were shown to provide jobs and developmental assets. Further, this 
research observes that mobile recruiting applications may offer a viable alternative to 
personal network recruiting and hence eradicate a key recruiting obstacle. Arguably, some of 
the surfaced challenges and strategies of successful mWork firms are applicable to a wider 
set of M4D initiatives in other resource-scarce contexts. M4D scholars, technology 
entrepreneurs, as well as development practitioners may therefore find the provided 
discussion particularly insightful. 
 
The second part of this dissertation investigates the evolution of Kenya’s ICT ecosystem and 
explores the barriers and subsequent enabling processes encountered when growing an ICT 
ecosystem in a resource-scarce context. Establishing ICT entrepreneurship ecosystems in 
resource-scarce contexts is complicated, as these contexts lack important pre-conditions, 
such as financial resources, established ICT sectors and relevant human capital. Current 
theoretical perspectives and policy prescriptions about them stem mainly from the Global 
North and provide little insight into how to create these conditions “from scratch.” Drawing 
upon the insights of the conducted mWork case studies and in total 45 interviews with 
experts and entrepreneurs, the second part of this dissertation provides a holistic 
perspective on the barriers and enablers that Kenyan technology entrepreneurs encounter 
 
 
across the areas of culture, human capital, finance, policy, entrepreneurial support systems, 
and markets.  
Together with relevant theory on how ecosystems emerge and advance, these insights are 
used to propose a model that offers an explanation of how ICT ecosystems can emerge in 
resource-scarce contexts. The model shows how locally available enabling processes may be 
drawn on to substitute and establish those missing condition factors. Entrepreneurship 
support institutions, for instance, emerge as essential enablers that can kick-start industry 
emergence processes, train human capital, and help establish conducive socio-cultural 
norms. In addition, the establishment of initial market demand through developmental 
stakeholders and the inflow of expatriate entrepreneurs further emerged as enablers. The 
dissertation ends with a call for critically needed research and specific recommendations for 
development stakeholders, governments, and practitioners in tackling current barriers in 
order to help develop ecosystems in resource-scarce countries beyond their nascent phase.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The potential of mobile technology to tackle unemployment in Kenya 
Kenya is a poor country. Its poverty is fueled by HIV/Aids, Malaria, high child mortality, 
malnutrition, illiteracy and a soaring population (World Bank, 2016a; 2016b). 
Unemployment is at the root of these challenges. When the country’s population exploded 
from 6 million in 1965 to over 40 million in 2014 without concurrent economic growth, un- 
and underemployment became a nationwide crisis (Youngblood Coleman, 2015; CIA, 2015). 
With a youth (15-35 years) unemployment rate that stands at a staggering 67% and a 
population that continues to grow by approximately 1 million people a year, the creation of 
employment becomes imperative (Kaane, 2014).  
 
The field of development economics arose to study how less-developed economies, such as 
Kenya, can be transformed from stagnation to growth, from low-income to high-income 
status, and how the ‘well-being’ of the population can be improved (Todaro, 2015). Since the 
2000s, the development community has shown unprecedented interest in the adoption of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for development purposes (ICTD) 
(Thompson et al., 2010). In this timeframe, a revolutionary increase in ICT connectivity 
across the Global South has led to a situation where accessibility to mobile technology, 
especially the feature phone1, mobile payment systems and mobile Internet have set the 
basis for potentially significant changes in local realities (InfoDev, 2012a). In order to study 
this emerging field, numerous academic journals and specialist conferences evolved, 
pointing to the transformative power of ICT applications and their potential to achieve rapid 
economic growth and alleviation of poverty (Aker, 2010; Jack, 2011; Kuryan, 2008). 
Governments, donors and development organizations supplied significant funds for ICTD 
projects (Avgerou, 2010). To date, the World Bank Group invests around US$850m per 
annum in specific loans and guarantees on ICTs and development and US$1-1.5bn per 
annum on projects with significant ICT components (InfoDev, 2012a). 
 
                                                     
1 The term feature phone describes a class of mobile phones and is used as a retronym to 
describe low-end mobile phones which are limited in capabilities in comparison to a modern 
smartphone. Feature phones typically provide voice calling and text messaging functionality.  
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A prominent stream within the evolving field of ICTD research focuses on the use of mobile 
phones for development purposes (Gomez, 2012). In 2016, the African mobile phone boom 
of the last decade has created a situation where, in some African countries, more people 
have access to a mobile phone than to electricity, a bank account, or even clean water 
(World Bank, 2016). In 2015, Kenya had a mobile phone penetration of approximately 84% 
(Communication Commission of Kenya, 2015) and in 2014, 66% of the volume of non-cash 
based transactions were made through mobile money payment systems (GSMA, 2014c). The 
Mobile for Development Stream (M4D) discusses phone applications that provide 
improvements in the areas of healthcare, financial services and insurance, education, 
government and agriculture. Numerous, often text message based applications have been 
proven to show a significant development impact (Aker, 2010; Boakye, 2010). In the 
Maximizing Mobile Report issued by the InfoDev, it is argued that “now is the time to 
evaluate what works and to move toward the commercialization, replication, and scaling up 
of those mobile applications that drive development” (InfoDev, 2012a, p.4). Despite this call, 
leading M4D scholars find that much of the M4D dialogue exhibits a techno-deterministic 
bias that tends to evaluate the potential overly enthusiastic and very seldom executes in-
depth investigations into the soundness of the underlying economic feasibility or the 
investigation of the impact on broader development goals (Heeks, 2010; Thompson and 
Walsham, 2010; Gomez et al., 2012). Further Hellström (2009, 2010) and InfoDev (2012a) 
find a lack of documentation of M4D initiatives to cause uncertainty pertaining to the 
contextual factors for adoption and use, or success factors around the mobile technology 
based initiatives in developing countries. 
 
But what about work? What can this transformative technology contribute to tackle the 
staggering unemployment problem in Kenya and other countries of the Global South (GS)? 
This research is particularly interested in the mobile phone as a tool that enables poor 
people in the GS to execute and find work in order to generate income and defines this new 
M4D field as mWork. While there is little previous theorizing on this topic, two possible 
segments emerged through the literature review, namely the phone as a recruitment 
intermediary and ‘Mobile Micro Work’. The former builds upon the use of mobile phones to 
tackle coordination and information failures that occur between the demand and supply 
sides of the labor market (GSMA, 2014) and that currently present an obstacle in the Kenyan 
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labor market (Central Bureau of Statistics Kenya, 2002; Gachugia, 2014). The latter segment 
evolves around the execution of small digital human intelligence tasks that can be executed 
on a mobile device in return for financial compensation. Examples of such tasks include 
assessing whether two images are of the identical product, transcribing a piece of hand-
written text or entering data into a database (Lehdohnvitra and Ernkvist, 2011). This 
possibility first evolved around 2011 with the publications of Govindaraj et al. (2011) and 
Narula et al. (2011) and later with InfoDev’s Knowledge Map of the Virtual Economy (2012) 
and InfoDev’s Maximising Mobile report (2012a). Even though Mobile Micro Work, and to a 
lesser degree mobile for recruiting (mRecruiting), have been conceptually considered in 
academic literature, to date there is little critical evaluation of the operational and economic 
feasibility of such applications in particular contexts.  This is in line with the techno-
deterministic bias inherent to the wider M4D stream (Thompson and Walsham, 2010, 
Gomez et al., 2012). Further, there are no regionally relevant studies of challenges faced in 
the implementation of such initiatives, so a lack of understanding of the way in which such 
applications actually contribute towards wider developmental goals prevails.  
 
In early 2012, the innovation and entrepreneurship program of the World Bank, InfoDev, 
launched the competition Mobile2Work, which invited developing country entrepreneurs 
and app developers to develop mWork relevant business models. The winning entries 
ranged from smartphone-enabled medical advice to translation of local languages on a 
simple SMS-based application (InfoDev, 2013). Building upon these ideas, the Word Bank’s 
mobile development incubator m:Labs in Nairobi organized an Hackathon to further expand 
the operationalization of such models in a Kenyan context. Significantly for the purpose of 
this research, several promising mWork applications began moving towards implementation 
in January 2013. This research sets out to explore the developmental opportunity presented 
by mWork in a Kenyan context. Given the lack of insight on this topic, the current research 
first explores which segments of mWork exist, noting that the entries submitted to the 
Mobile2Work initiative already go beyond the two currently discussed mWork segments. 
Further, the research determines the operational and economic feasibility of these 
businesses given local context constraints. It provides in-depth insights into the 
technological and economic challenges that these ICT enabled businesses face in a Kenyan 
context and highlights the success strategies employed by entrepreneurs that, despite the 
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significant challenges present, have effectively established mWork firms. Finally, considering 
the techno-determinism the M4D movement has been critiqued for, this research provides a 
critical analysis of the actual and potential impact towards wider development goals that are 
achieved by the respective mWork cases. In-depth case study research was conducted that 
employed over 21 in-depth interviews with mWork entrepreneurs and expert stakeholders 
in order to create 12 case studies, following Eisenhardt’s (1989) multiple case study research 
approach. Two more mWork cases were added from the context of Armenia and Nepal, 
since they offered additional insights into possible business models. To conduct this 
research, the researcher spent four months conducting empirical research in Nairobi. Given 
the novelty of the field of mWork and the lack of previous investigation, theory building 
research was deemed appropriate to answer the research questions. Following Yin’s (1994) 
approach, this study first describes each individual case in order to show the particular 
examples in which mobile technology is used to create “work” and deliver insights pertaining 
to the challenges faced, the successful strategies employed, and the development impact. 
Then an analysis across cases establishes shared challenges and opportunities of mWork in 
order to extend generalizability. In two mWork cases, the research executes an assessment 
of development impact and provides an elaborated analysis of the potential impact of the 
field of mRecruiting. This research understands “development” as a multidimensional 
concept that moves beyond the terms of income and skill generation and sees participation 
and empowerment as equally important drivers of development (Todaro, 2011). 
Accordingly, Heek’s (2010) asset framework for impact assessment of ICTD projects is 
employed for the assessment of the respective cases.  
1.2 Kenya’s emerging “Silicon Savannah” 
In any discussion concerning the benefits of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) for development, the question of agency should be addressed. Which economic agent 
is most apt in translating the alleged opportunities into actual products and services that are 
available to people at the base of the pyramid (BOP)? The entrepreneur is, since the days of 
Schumpeter (1934), widely accepted as the “agent of creative destruction” that challenges 
the status quo and introduces innovation and progress to an economy. Arguably the 
question whether this agent is able to successfully establish new ICT ventures will be pivotal 
for the digitalization of economies in resource-scarce contexts. And the stakes are high. 
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Arguably, the Internet is the most transformative technology in history. What if sub-Saharan 
Africa does not manage the digitalization of its economies’? The Global North will continue 
to leverage the Internet’s transformative power until the entire western economic system is 
built around ICT technology. In such a world a non-digital Africa would once and for all be 
‘the lost continent’ (World Bank, 2016). In 2016 numerous African countries are therefore 
looking towards the continent’s ICT vanguard of Kenya and its gradually maturing ‘Silicon 
Savannah’, asking themselves: ‘How did they do it?’. Hence, the second line of inquiry of this 
doctoral thesis seeks to shed light on the evolution of Kenya’s technology ecosystem and 
asks “What are the barriers and subsequent enabling processes to grow an Technology 
ecosystem in a resource-scarce context?”.  
 
Over the last decades the entrepreneurship domain has seen a shift from investigating the 
entrepreneur himself, his characteristics and motivations, towards focusing on the context in 
which entrepreneurship takes place (Aldrich, 1990; Gartner, 1988, Thornton, 1999). In line 
with these scholars, the current research defines technology entrepreneurship as the 
creation of new organizations (Gartner, 1988), which occurs as a context-dependent, social 
and economic process (Reynolds 1991; Low & Abrahamson 1997; Thornton, 1999), and 
where ICT technology constitutes a core element of the opportunity that enables the 
emergence of the new venture (Beckmann et al., 2012). The focus on ‘entrepreneurial 
ecosystems’ has emerged recently, but rapidly in the entrepreneurship domain (Feld, 2012; 
Isenberg, 2010, 2011; Kantis and Federico, 2012; Napier and Hansen, 2011; Mason and 
Brown, 2014; Zacharakis et al., 2003). The entrepreneurship ecosystem perspective, as 
understood by Isenberg (2010, 2011) and Mason and Brown (2014), provides a framework to 
understand regional contexts’ ability to generate and support new “high-growth” 
entrepreneurship (Miller, 2005). To achieve this, the framework builds heavily on the 
insights of geographic economics, namely cluster theory and regional innovation systems 
literature (Mason and Brown, 2014). Within the stream of cluster theory, geographical 
economists have sought to explain the reasons for the geographic clustering of economic 
activity, the inner dynamics of clusters and the economic benefits that result. The stream of 
regional innovation systems literature offers abundant insights pertaining to the relational 
elements within regions that govern innovation and entrepreneurship. Isenberg’s (2011) 
framework is applied in this research and considers six main conditions for the emergence of 
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“high-growth” entrepreneurship within a particular region, namely: conducive socio-cultural 
norms around entrepreneurship, availability of entrepreneurial support systems, availability 
of qualified human capital, presence of appropriate financing sources, relevant policy and 
venture friendly markets for new products. Researchers and policy makers have increasingly 
adopted this paradigm in order to understand their local entrepreneurship environment, to 
identify relevant barriers and to design an approach to managing those barriers (Autio et al., 
2015; Mason and Brown, 2014; Vogel, 2013; Isenberg, 2010).  
 
Establishing ICT entrepreneurship ecosystems in resource-scarce countries is hard, since 
they lack important pre-conditions such as financial resources, established ICT sectors and 
relevant human capital. In addition, ICT entrepreneurs in resource-scarce contexts face a set 
of contextual challenges, such as low-income consumers, disproportionately higher risk of 
entrepreneurial failure and a low enforcement of formal institutions and contracts (Webb et. 
al, 2009). In addition, Kenyan ICT entrepreneurs face challenges that arise when starting a 
venture in the formative years of a new industry, such as a lack of overall legitimacy of the 
industry, the need to carve out new market structures and to recruit untrained employees 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Arguably the venturing processes, resource-requirements as well as 
the form and strategies of entrepreneurial ventures take a distinct form in order to respond 
to such aggravated challenges (Thornton, 1999). Currently however, much of the insights on 
technology entrepreneurship stem from resource-rich contexts, such as the USA and Europe, 
and thus provide only limited applicability for the relevant geographical domain. Context-
specific research in resource-scarce environments is needed rather than “one size fits all” 
policy prescriptions that emanate from the Global North and play down the pivotal nature of 
the local context (Zoogah and Nkomo, 2013). In this thesis, I account for the contextual 
particularities in Kenya in order to develop adequate and relevant knowledge for Kenya and I 
present a holistic perspective on the encountered barriers and enablers to ecosystem 
maturation along the dimensions of Culture, Human Capital, Finance, Policy, Entrepreneurial 
Support Systems and Market. Moreover, I seek to open up a conversation for further 
research in resource-scarce contexts that sees the hereafter developed insights as a point of 
departure, however, not as a tight cast that sheds only a narrow light on reality.  
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Current insights on why and how such regional systems get started provide little 
constructive insights in resource-scarce contexts, where much of the local conditions for 
technology entrepreneurship have to be established ‘from scratch’. Cluster theory literature 
argues that clusters emerge where certain preconditions make for a ‘fertile soil’ (Mason & 
Brown, 2014). Examples for such preconditions are the presence of advanced knowledge 
institutions that generate both knowledge advancements as well as supply the skilled 
scientists, engineers and professionals that are considered to be at the source of 
entrepreneurial endeavors (Isenberg, 2011; Porter, 1998; Mason & Brown, 2014). Other 
scholars point towards proximities to established industries and government spending. For 
example, the role of defense industry in the early growth of Route 128 and Silicon Valley is 
well documented (Adams, 2011; Leslie, 2000; Saxenian, 1994). Further, the presence of 
successful entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial firms in creating “spin-off” effects that benefit 
the ecosystem across its dimensions is stressed in multiple studies (Mason and Brown, 
2014). Arguably such “fertile soil” is the foundation on which early industry emergence 
processes, such as the rise of activity networks and establishment of a technological base, 
form (Gustafsson et. al., 2015). However, then why is it that we see technology ecosystems 
growing in resource-scarce contexts that generally lack such soil? What substitute 
institutions and processes can ecosystems in such contexts draw upon to emerge anyways? 
The research’s findings concerning the enabling processes that have been at play in the 
Kenyan ecosystem give insight into these questions, for example, by pointing at the pivotal 
role played by the entrepreneurial support institutions in kick-starting ecosystem 
emergence.  
 
Furthermore, with the need to establish much required conditions of the ecosystem 
framework “from scratch”, the question of prioritization arises. Given the unique contextual 
features of resource scarce environments: Which are the components that have to be 
established first to kick-start an entrepreneurial ecosystem? And in what order should the 
other components follow so that high-growth entrepreneurship can be realized?  
Building on the findings from the Kenyan technology ecosystem and from a review of 
literature that investigates how new industries emerge and entrepreneurship ecosystems 
evolve, I employ abductive theorizing (Tavory and Timmermans, 2014) to develop a model 
that provides insight into these question. The developed model of entrepreneurial 
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ecosystem emergence in resource scarce countries of the Global South (GS) shows how 
locally available enabling processes can be drawn upon to substitute and establish missing 
condition factors. Hence it argues that despite commonly assumed antecedents to 
entrepreneurial ecosystem emergence, new ecosystems can successfully emerge in contexts 
where abundant venture capital and highly specialized resources are not yet in place.  
 
The research’s insights were developed drawing upon multiple-case study research that was 
conducted on ten local mWork firms and that provided rich insight into the process of 
starting a new ICT enabled venture in Kenya and the encountered problems and enablers. 
The relatively broad definition of mWork provided a good inter-case variation along the 
dimensions of founder nationality, stage of the venturing process (from very young just 
started enterprises to expanding firms) and sector of operation of the enterprise (e.g. 
logistics, journalism, recruiting service, e-commerce) (Eisenhard,1989). To verify and 
substantiate emerging themes 17 additional interviews with a diverse set of ecosystem 
stakeholders were conducted, including venture capitalists, managers of local incubators 
and seed-funds, as well as university professors and non-governmental organizations. Such 
qualitative research methods are particularly helpful in understanding the “why and how” of 
a phenomenon (Yin, 1994), and they are appropriate when little is known about a 
phenomenon and current perspectives seem inadequate in the empirical context 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In line with Eisenhardt (1989), the research process was characterized by 
a flexible and opportunistic data collection process, in which the semi-structured interview 
guides were continuously refined (Charmaz, 2014, Glaser, 1992). The conducted interviews 
were recorded, coded and analyzed for the relevant barriers and enablers in Kenya’s nascent 
technology ecosystem. In line with grounded theory methods, cyclical coding processes were 
applied (Glaser, 1992) to derive main barriers and enablers, grouping them into the 
framework and assessing their interrelation and relative importance. The model of nascent 
ecosystem emergence was then developed in a process of abductive theorizing (Tavory and 
Timmermans, 2014), as an iterative process between the empirical material and extant 
literature on how new industries emerge and ecosystems evolve. The research has further 
benefitted from ethnographical observations made over a four-month period, during which 
the researcher lived and worked among Nairobi’s tech community. The research method of 
ethnography is especially valuable when attempting to grasp often tacit beliefs, norms, 
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values and cultural artifacts and behaviors within a particular social setting (Atkinson, et al., 
2001). Due to the importance of social processes and the wider cultural norms to the 
establishment of new enterprises and emergence of the ecosystem as a whole, the 
researcher found these ethnographical insights to be very valuable. While the ethnographic 
observations do not form part of the current study as a means of a primary data source, e.g. 
by providing a detailed holistic cultural portrait, the insights enabled the author to better 
contextualize, interpret and understand the interviews and to better conduct the current 
analysis within the cultural context of Kenya. In order to answer the posed research 
questions, the research needs to take a holistic perspective on encountered barriers and 
enablers instead of providing an in-depth discussion of one ecosystem dimension in 
particular. In line with the limitations of a one-person research on an entire ecosystem I do 
not claim to provide an exhaustive view of all factors at play and encourage the reader to 
critically assess the presented findings and to use them as a starting point for debate and 
further analysis. 
 
Finally, the research develops recommendations that are addressed to governments, 
development stakeholders and practitioners from resource-scarce countries that seek to 
move their young technology ecosystems towards maturation. Research into such an 
endeavor can deduce pivotal policy prescriptions that account for context and stage. The 
dissertation will therefore conclude with implications for further research. 
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides an 
introduction into the empirical context by briefly introducing the political and economic 
situation of Kenya and providing an analysis of the faced unemployment problem, its causes 
and consequences. Hereafter the Kenyan ICT entrepreneurship ecosystem and the relevant 
developments from the establishment of ICT infrastructure to the emergence of first ICT-
enabled ventures are introduced. The following chapter begins by elaborating the underlying 
theory and introducing and defining important underlying concepts. Section 2.2 then 
provides an overview of the literature from the mobile for development stream, presenting 
current applications of mobile technology for development and introducing the critique that 
has been raised in regard of this research stream. Finally, current insights on mWork, namely 
the segment of Mobile Micro Work and its foundations, as well as the segment of 
mRecruiting, are treated in detail. In 2.3 the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem (EE) perspective on 
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entrepreneurship and its theoretical roots are explored. Here the actors and factors that 
constitute an EE, how they interact, as well as the dynamics of emergence of  EE systems as 
a whole are treated and important implications for the design of entrepreneurship policy are 
discussed. The last section of chapter 2 first reviews the particularities of entrepreneurship 
in the context of resource-scarce countries and then presents what is currently known about 
the challenges to technology entrepreneurship in Kenya. Chapter three elaborates upon the 
methodological approach employed in this study. Chapter four is dedicated to mWork in 
Kenya, and 4.1 presents the collected case studies of mWork firms, by segment. Section 4.2 
then presents the analysis of each case and section 4.3 presents a cross-case analysis. 
Section 4.4 then analyzes the impact on development achievable through mWork. Chapter 
five begins by presenting the empirical findings pertaining to barriers and enablers to 
technology entrepreneurship and the particularities of technology entrepreneurship in 
Kenya. Section 5.2 then situates the research’s empirical findings in the wider research 
context and compares them with previous studies.  The remainder of the chapter discusses 
the particularities of technology entrepreneurship in Kenya, prioritizes the main barriers and 
enablers to ICT EE  in Kenya and explores their interrelation and their applicability to other 
GS contexts. In 5.6, the theoretical model for ICT EE  emergence in GS contexts based on the 
insights gained in Kenya is developed. Finally, chapter 6 draws a conclusion on the research 
and provides a brief overview of the main findings of the research, discusses theoretical and 
practical implications, treats the research’s limitation, makes suggestions for further 
research. Ultimately derives concrete recommendations for development stakeholders on 
both the potential of mWork for development, as well as suggesting an approach to foster 
ICT entrepreneurship ecosystem development in resource-scarce contexts.  
 
1.3 Introduction to the research context 
1.3.1 Country Context: Kenya the East-African economic hub and its unemployment challenge 
This section provides the reader with a short introduction to the empirical context of Kenya, 
its political and economic situation and a more detailed account of the issue of 
unemployment, its causes and its consequences.  
Situated in Eastern Africa, Kenya is bordering the Indian Ocean, between Somalia, Ethiopia 
and Tanzania. In 1895 Kenya came under British control and gained independence from 
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Britain in 1964 becoming the Republic of Kenya. De facto the country was a one-party state 
from the outset. Founding President Jomo Kenyatta led the republic from 1963 until his 
death in 1978, and was followed by Daniel arap Moi who remained in power for 24 years. 
President Moi gave in to the internal and external pressure for political liberalization in 1992, 
when the country held its first multiparty elections. However, divisions in the opposition 
helped Moi to retain the presidency in 1992 and again win the 1997 election (Youngblood 
Coleman, 2015). In 2002 President Moi stepped down after fair and peaceful elections, and 
the candidate of the coalition of opposition parties the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
Mwai Kibaki, was elected. Kibaki’s re-election in 2007 was marred by serious irregularities 
and violence erupted in different parts of Kenya when supporters of opposition candidate 
Raila Odinga and supporters of Kibaki clashed with police and each other (Youngblood 
Coleman, 2015). The United Nations estimated that up to 1,000 people were killed and more 
than 350,000 displaced as a result of the 2007 post-election conflict in Kenya (United 
Nations, 2008). In order to end the ongoing ethnic conflict President Kibaki and Raila Odinga 
signed a power-sharing agreement in February 2008, which provided for the establishment 
of a prime minister position, and on April 17, 2008, the new coalition cabinet and Prime 
Minister Odinga were sworn in (Youngblood Coleman, 2015). Hereafter the political 
situation remained relatively stable and in 2013 Uhuru Kenyatta was elected President of 
Kenya without significant disruptions. However, in September 21 of the same year a terror 
attack of Somalia-based terror group, al-Shabab, on a popular shopping center killed over 70 
people, leaving more than 175 wounded (Youngblood Coleman, 2015). This terror attack 
marked the first in a row of similar attacks carried out by the same extremist Islamist terror 
group, that targeted Universities, restaurants, public transport and tourist resorts and have 
so far have killed hundreds of people (Youngblood Coleman, 2015).  
Economically, Kenya is one of the most diversified economies in sub-Saharan Africa, with 
agriculture, manufacturing, and services serving as the main sectors (Youngblood Coleman, 
2015). Tourism and the export of tea and coffee are major sources of foreign exchange, but 
as a result, fluctuations in the world prices of tea and coffee strongly impact the country’s 
economy. It is commonly viewed as the economic hub un East Africa and hosts the Africa 
headquarters of many prominent NGOs, which has earned Nairobi the title of Africa’s “NGO-
Capital” (World Bank, 2016). The country experienced strong economic performance from 
2004 to 2007. Nevertheless, as a result of a series of shocks that include the global economic 
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crisis, the economic growth encountered previously slowed in 2008 and 2009, before 
rebounding in 2010 and 2011 (Youngblood Coleman, 2015). Development challenges of 
Kenya include high poverty (with a national poverty headcount of 45,9% against the national 
poverty line in 2005) and inequality as well as the soaring population and staggering 
unemployment (World Bank, 2011; 2016). For more than four and a half decades now, the 
Kenyan government has left no doubt that unemployment and underemployment are 
among the most difficult and persistent problems faced by the country (Republic of Kenya, 
2008). Over the last half a decade Kenya has experienced an explosive population growth, 
from about 6 million inhabitants to over 40 million in 2014 (CIA, 2015). The resulting 
demographic structure is that over 80% of the Kenyan population is under 35 years old 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2013). While the high population growth 
numbers have dropped over the last decades from a maximum of five percent in 1970 to 
close to three percent in 2014, the country continues to grow by appr. 1 million persons 
each year (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). The excessive population 
growth of the past has created an immense (youth) unemployment problem (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2013). According to the Central Information Agency (2014), 40% 
of Kenyans in the labor force do not have formal employment.  The United Nations 
Development Programme (2013) and Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) distinguish 
between formal and informal or traditional jobs with the latter being for example 
agricultural jobs. People who work in the informal or traditional sectors are considered 
employed, even though it is noted that these people are more likely to be underemployed or 
unpaid family workers than those employed in formal sectors.  Therefore, the 
unemployment figures published by the KNBS are significantly lower, namely with overall 
unemployment at 12.7 %. Within this definition the disparity in unemployment between 
urban and rural areas becomes evident with rates of 19.9 % and 9.8 % respectively (KNBS, 
2007). Significantly young people, as defined in a Kenyan policy context as aged between 15 
and 34 years old, constitute more than a third of the entire population, while nearly 80 
percent of Kenyans are less than 35 years old (United Nations Development Programme, 
2013). Unemployment in Kenya is both structural and frictional in nature (Republic of Kenya, 
2008). Slow growth and weak labor absorptive capacity of the economy, a mismatch in skills 
development and demand, imperfect information flow between job seekers and employers 
and inherent rigidities within the country’s labor market are listed as main reasons for the 
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staggering unemployment (Republic of Kenya, 2008).  These findings are in line with 
Gachugia et al.  (2014, p.3) who find unemployment mainly related to ”rapid growth of the 
population and the labor force, skill mismatch, information problems in the labor market, 
structural adjustment programs, slow or declining economic growth, and the labor market 
setup”. Gachugia et al.  (2014, p.3) argue that the education system in Kenya produces skills 
that are not valued by employers, while at the same time raising the expectations of those 
who acquire them. The author finds that as a consequence the unemployed do not take up 
existing job vacancies, and employers are not willing to hire the candidates available. 
Furthermore, Gachugia et al.  (2014) find this mismatch to be more marked for school 
leavers and graduates who have just finished school, partly providing an explanation for the 
high unemployment rate among youth and new entrants into the job market. Coenjaerts et 
al.  (2009) therefore suggest to reform the education system and increase focus on technical 
education and vocational training and thus match them more closely to the needs of the job 
market. The lack of labor market information can also be considered a constraint in 
searching for a job. The Central Beurau of Statistics (2002) contends that absence of an 
active job placement bureau contributes to such misinformation. Especially the discrepancy 
between labor demand and supply of particular types of skills can be expected to widen 
without an appropriate and updated labor market information. Lack of information is 
considered a cause of the apparent mismatch of job seekers’ qualifications with employer 
needs (Pouget et al. , 2009). 
 The observed excessive unemployment has grave social, economic and political 
repercussions. Firstly, the foregone national productivity, meaning the value the 
unemployed could be adding to the economy. Secondly, the unemployed constitute an 
economic burden on those in employment. The dependency rate2 in Kenya stands at 84%, as 
Gachugia et al.  (2014) find in citing the Kenyan Integrated Households Budget Survey of 
2005-2006. This in turn results in low saving and consequently low levels of investment. 
Finally, youth unemployment is commonly related to high-risk behavior such as drug abuse, 
spread of HIV/AIDS and illegal grouping (Gachugia et al. , 2014). Since its independence the 
country’s government has undertaken numerous initiatives to address these problems, 
                                                     
2Economic dependency burden or ratio describes nonproductive members of society (e.g. 
older or children) that must be supported financially by a country's labor force. It is used to 
measure the pressure on productive population (Todaro, 2015, Chapter 2). 
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including: unemployment related policies, National Unemployment Alleviation Initiatives, 
Community Development Trust Fund (Gachugia et al. , 2014)3. 
 
1.3.2 The “Silicon Savannah”: Kenya’s ICT entrepreneurship ecosystem 
Over the last decade Kenya’s ICT infrastructure has seen significant advancements. The 
Kenyan government has prioritized ICT issues since the appointment of Bitange Ndemo as 
permanent secretary to the ministry of information and communication technologies in 
2005 (Economist, 2012). The formation of the Kenya ICT board in 2007 is a governmental 
initiative to increase foreign ICT investments in Kenya, foster the domestic ICT industry, and 
enhance Internet access for all Kenyans (Economist, 2012). The first of four undersea 
Internet fiber cables were installed in 2009 and caused a drop in Internet charges and an 
explosion of bandwidth. This fiber backbone further connects the major cities to be 
prepared for and enable high-capacity usage also outside Nairobi. Kenya’s Internet 
penetration rate of 43% in 2014 is very strong, compared to its East African neighbors 
(Data.un.org, 2016). The ICT development index (IDI) developed by the United Nation’s (UN) 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) gives an indication of the accessibility and use 
of ICT in Kenya, by investigating three different factors: (1) ICT access, (2) ICT use, and (3) ICT 
skills (ITU, 2012). Globally Kenya lands on place 116 in 2012. With that score Kenya is below, 
e.g.,  South Africa (84) and Ghana (115) but before Tanzania (142) and Nigeria (122) . While 
neither the use or skills sub-section of the index deviate significantly from Kenya’s overall 
position in the IDI ranking, it is remarkable that Kenya leads the African continent in the 
access sub-section. Kenyan Internet bandwidth per user has seen a very strong increase in 
Bit’s per user from 4500 Mbit/s in 2011 to 24000 Mbit/s in 2012 (ITU, 2013). This is the 
strongest increase in the sub section of ICT access globally in that time frame and is 
attributed to the connection of the fourth undersea cable LION2 in April 2012 (ITU, 2013). 
Furthermore, Kenya possesses one of the highest mobile phone penetration and usage in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as well as a well-established mobile payment system. In June 2015 there 
were approximately 36.1 million mobile subscriptions in Kenya resulting in a mobile 
penetration of 83.6% (Communication Commission of Kenya, 2015). Given that Kenyan users 
                                                     
3 For a detailed review of employment related policy action refer to Gachuiga et al., 2014). 
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often possess multiple subscriptions the GSMA finds a unique user penetration4 of 
approximately 31% in 2012 in Kenya (GSMA, 2014). InfoDev find that due to the local habit 
of phone sharing more than 60% of the Kenyan population living on less than USD 2.5 a day 
had access to a mobile phone in 2012 (InfoDev, 2012). The mobile phone is also crucial as a 
tool to access the Internet, as according to GSMA research (2014) approximately 99% of all 
Internet subscribers in Kenya employ mobile devices to access the Internet. The mobile-
payment pioneer M-Pesa that was started by the network operator Safaricom in 2007 in 
close cooperation with the Kenyan National Bank and the UK’s Department for international 
development (DFID) (Huges and Leonie, 2007), has enabled Kenyans to pay fast and in small 
amounts (Maximizing Mobile, 2012). In 2015 mobile money is a widely spread payment 
mechanism, with in total 27 million mobile money subscribers served by a nationwide 
network of in total 129 thousand mobile money agents of in total six different providers 
(Communication Commission of Kenya, 2015). In March 2014 the values and volumes 
executed by the mobile money providers reached 192.69 billion KES and 73.98 million 
transactions respectively, showing an increase of 43.32% in value and 41.20% in volume 
from the year before (GSMA, 2014,a).  
 
In 2009 the iHub was the first open technology hub to be established in Kenya (iHub, 2009). 
In 2014 Kenya possesses a total of eleven technology innovation spaces and thus shares a 
second place with Nigeria after the significantly more economically developed South Africa 
(InfoDev, 2014). Since then a lively technology scene has emerged around the technology 
hubs, accelerators and entrepreneurship competitions and conferences that have settled 
around the Bishop Magua center and along the sides of Nairobi’s Ngong road. Together with 
the significant advancements in ICT technology and mobile payment mechanisms, these 
developments have spurred significant global attention from both media and international 
development stakeholders. The World Bank has for example provided the Kenyan ICT Board 
with a grant worth USD 55 million aiming at the support of local software developers and 
technology entrepreneurs (World Bank, 2012b). International media have started lively 
discussions on technology in Kenya and enthusiastically dubbed the emerging space the 
“Silicon Savannah” (Economist, 2012; Uhl, 2013; Mannske, 2014). Being born around 2010 
the ICT entrepreneurship ecosystem is still very young compared to others in the global 
                                                     
4 People who own at least one mobile phone SIM-Card. 
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North (Mannske, 2014). However, in 2014 a total of 22 ICT-enabled ventures managed to 
close seed funding and further ten firms closed growth capital deals (Hersman, 2014). In 
2016 several innovative and expanding ICT ventures inhabit the ecosystem, for example 
Sendy, which uses mobile technology to enable local motorbike taxis to execute courier 
services and Bitpesa, which disrupts the international remittances market by combining 
Bitcoin with the mobile money infrastructure5.  Finally, important signals of approaching 
ecosystem maturation have been the recent million-dollar exit of the mobile commerce firm 
Weza Tele (Disruptafrica.com, 2016) and the latest funding round of solar company M-Kopa, 
which raised over 19mln dollars in equity capital (pv-magazine.com, 2015).  
The emergence of the Kenyan “Silicon Savannah” is by no means a unique phenomenon on 
the African continent. Numerous African countries are attempting to lay the basic structures 
to foster the emergence of technology entrepreneurship. The number of open technology 
hubs, such as Kenya’s iHub, can be taken as an indicator for this. According to World 
Development Report: Digital Dividends by The World Bank (2016c) there are as of 
September 2015 over 110 ICT technology innovation spaces in Africa, including most 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Information and Communications for Development, 2014).  
  
                                                     
5 See Sendyit.com; bitpesa.co. 
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2. Literature chapter 
 
2.1 Basic theoretical concepts 
 
Development 
The concept of “development” is somewhat contested. Traditionally a strictly economic 
definition of the term prevailed, which understands development as sustained economic 
growth rates of income per capita to enable an economy to expand its output at a rate that 
is faster than the growth of its population. Levels and rates of growth of “real” per capita 
gross national income (GNI) are then used to measure the overall economic well-being of a 
population. Economic Development has also been understood in the alterations of the 
structure of production and employment, where agriculture’s share of both declines and the 
relative shares of manufacturing and service industry increase. Strategies for development 
have hence often focused on rapid industrialization deemphasizing agriculture and rural 
development (Todaro, 2015).  
This economic understanding of the concept of development entails that rapid gains in 
overall and per capita GNI growth leads either to a “trickle-down” to the masses in the shape 
of jobs and other economic opportunities or creates the required conditions for the wider 
distribution of the economic and social benefits of growth. Therefore, in this view, issues 
around poverty, discrimination, unemployment and income distribution are secondary to 
the goal of “getting the growth job done” (Todaro, 2015, p. 17). In this vein the indicator 
measuring the overall output of an economy, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is indeed 
often emphasized (Todaro, 2015).   
In the 1960s and 1970s a number of developing countries experienced relatively high rates 
of growth of per capita income, but showed very little improvements or even actual decline 
in employment, equality and the real incomes of the bottom 40% of the population (Todaro, 
2015), causing critics of the before mentioned definition of the concept of “development” to 
emerge. Therefore, a new view of development has emerged over the last decades, that is 
held by many leading economics scholars today (e.g. Todaro, 2015; Madon, 2005). In this 
view poverty needs to be the natural point of departure, understanding development as the 
actual improvements in the lives and the well-being of people in developing countries. While 
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in the traditional view 'poverty' is synonymous with low income it has lately been recognized 
as a multi-dimensional concept. The Noble prize in economics laureate Amartya Sen (1999) 
identifies four levels of poverty. These are firstly opportunity, the access to markets and 
employment. Secondly capability, the access to health and education. Thirdly security, the 
vulnerability to economic risks and to all forms of violence. Finally, empowerment, the 
power within and beyond the household. Sen criticized the aforementioned economic view 
of development as too narrow and proposed instead his “development as freedom” 
approach, with a focus on capabilities for people to attain what they themselves believe to 
be valuable. The scholar defines these capabilities as “the freedom that a person has in 
terms of the choice of functionings, given his personal features (conversion of characteristics 
into functionings) and his command over commodities” (Sen, 1999; p.13). In line with Sen 
(1984, 1993, 1999), this study views “development”, as the departure from poverty, towards 
the well-being of people in poor countries. Here the author understands ‘being well’ in line 
with Todaro’s (2015) definition in the sense of living in health, well-nourished, well-clothed, 
being literate, and long lived and further being able to take part in the life of the community, 
being mobile and having the freedom of choice in what one can become and can do6.  
 
Internet and Communication Technologies  
Admittedly, there does not exist a clear and unambiguous agreement on the definition of 
ICTs or what sectors should be termed ICT sectors  (Johansson et al., 2006, Schwartz 1990). 
In this research we understand ICT in line with Johansson et al. (2006) at its face value, 
namely as a collection of technologies and applications which enable electronic processing, 
storing, retrieval, and transfer of data to a wide variety of users or clients. Choen et al.  
(2002; p.35) find the following list of attributes to characterize ICT technologies, namely: 
“dynamic technological changes, with rapid penetration and adoption rates; decreasing 
costs for new equipment and features; a rapidly increasing range of applications and 
penetration in many realms of professional and personal life; an intertwined institutional 
market place, with the private sector acting in a decreasingly regulated environment;  a 
production and services package dependent on a range of qualities of skilled human 
resources, and a convergence of technologies”. 
                                                     
6 The operationalization of this view of development in the measurement of the impact M4D 
development interventions is elaborated upon in section 3.4 (Measurement of mWork 
development impact). 
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ICTs for development 
Research on the development impact of ICT technologies in developing countries (ICTD) is a 
multidisciplinary field. Avgerou (2010) shows that disciplines that contribute are Information 
Systems literature (Walsham et al.  2007), Human Computer Interaction (Dearden, 2008), 
Communication Studies (Mansell, 2002) and to a lesser degree Development Studies (Wade, 
2002). The enormity of the growth in the field of ICTD is unquestionable. Between 2000 and 
2010 thousands of academic articles were published, new journals created, conferences held 
and projects launched (Gomez et al. , 2012). Richard Heeks (2010) suggests that there was a 
2000% increase in publications concerning ICTD between 1999 and 2008, and concludes that 
the ICTD research area is growing significantly faster than other cognate areas.  
Attempting to give an overview of this rapidly growing, relatively young field several authors 
have conducted comprehensive ICTD meta analyses. Patra et al.  (2009) provide an overview 
of some prominent trends in the field, by drawing upon on an extensive literature review 
and a survey of 50 researchers and practitioners. The authors find that the field of ICTD is 
reaching maturity, centered mainly around the fields of agriculture, education, (technical 
and social sciences) communication, governance, healthcare, design and business of ICTD 
(Patra et al. , 2009). Toyama (2010) investigates the evolution and growth of the ICTD field, 
and finds a transition from before ‘telecenters’ to a current “enthrallment” with mobile 
phones. Gomez et al.  (2012) reviewed over 948 ICTD articles and found a dynamic tension 
between a focus on business and economic development and a focus on empowerment and 
community development within the field. The author further identifies a strongly growing 
interest in mobile phones as a new technology with high promise for the field of ICTD. On 
the technology objects of study Gomez et al.  (2012) further note that approximately half the 
papers in his study cover the rather fuzzy “ICT in General” without actually having a clear 
object of study corresponding to the available options. Despite the excitement that ICTD has 
caused within the development community, a recently evolving body of literature raises 
criticism on the thriving field. For one, these critics point to reportedly high failure rates of 
ICTD projects (Heeks, 2010a, 2012). Here especially a stream is noteworthy that criticizes the 
mostly disappointing outcomes of the ‘telecenter’ initiatives, an early ICTD flagship project 
where community ICT centers were set up in rural areas across developing countries to 
provide information access to the rural communities (e.g. Parkinson, 2008; Bailur, 2007).  For 
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two, critics allude to the immature notion about the ways in which ICTs actually contribute 
to development and the resulting lack of evidence of such impact (Avgerou, 2008, 2010; 
Brown and Gant, 2010; Gomez et al., 2012; Heeks, 2010a). The latter critics argue that to 
date most ICTD studies discuss the application of ICT projects in an African context, taking 
the beneficial developmental contribution of these projects as a given, implicit assumption. 
Therefore, most studies provide discussions on design and diffusion challenges of ICT in 
developing countries rather than critically investigating the ways in which ICT can serve 
broader developmental goals (Heeks, 2010; Thompson and Walsham, 2010; Gomez et al., 
2012). Several authors highlight the duality of streams in ICTD literature distinguishing 
between those that are mere descriptions of ICT in developing countries and those that 
actually engage with the question of what ICT can do for development. A prominent 
example of a meta analysis coming to that finding is the work of Brown and Gant (2010), 
who find that out of 184 reviewed ICTD articles less than 30% of the articles actually discuss 
the developmental implications of the ICT projects in their study.  The resulting lack in 
notion of the ways in which ICT actually engages with development leads Thompson and 
Walsham (2010) to call “for a more strategic development focus […] in ICT research in 
Africa”. 
Gomez et al.  (2012) identify the multidisciplinary nature of the stream, with very few 
scholars actually stemming from the field of development studies, as a possible reason for 
this bias. Furthermore, scholars such as Avgerou (2010) point towards the contested nature 
of the concept of development per se, which causes most ICTD studies to avoid engaging 
with controversies on ‘development’. Given this bias in the ICTD literature, the named ICTD 
scholars call for more critical impact assessment studies of ICT projects, which employ a 
theoretical foundation that has currency within the development field. This is deemed 
critical not only to establish a sounder theoretical foundation of this literature stream, but 
also to deliver evidence on the impact of ICTD projects and thus inform increasingly critical 
policy makers and international donor agencies. Furthermore, insight is needed into the 
different contexts of ICT applications in developing countries to further the understanding of 
the local problematic in order to provide insight into the ways in which ICT can be supported 
by policy and public stakeholder and further to provide learnings for entrepreneurs in the 
field of technology entrepreneurship in developing countries. 
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Entrepreneurship  
The field of study ‘entrepreneurship’ is a relatively young one (Cooper et al., 1997). Two 
dominant schools of research populate the field, the supply-side perspective and the 
demand-side perspective (Thornton, 1999). The field originates from the supply-side 
perspective and its traits oriented approach, which argues that special types of individuals 
create entrepreneurship. Therefore, the individual itself is at the focal point of research, 
asking which psychological traits and backgrounds differentiate the entrepreneur from other 
individuals, such as the manager (Thornton, 1999). In recent years a context or demand-side 
perspective on entrepreneurship has become increasingly popular among entrepreneurship 
scholars (Rocha, 2004). This school draws upon the context factors surrounding the 
entrepreneur that determine how, where and why new organizations are created. Drawing 
from ecological and institutional theories in organizational sociology (Gartner 1988, Aldrich 
1990, Bull & Willard 1993) the scholars investigate context factors such as the influence of 
firms, markets, available resources and economic opportunity structures on an individuals’ 
decision to found new ventures (Thornton, 1999).  
Thornton (1999) argues that the integration of both schools promises to advance difficult 
questions about which explanatory factors are universal across time and contexts and which 
factors are particular to time and context. The author argues that such integration can be 
achieved through employing sociological frameworks, an embeddedness perspective, 
institutional and ecological theory, or multilevel models. As stated in the introduction, this 
research defines “entrepreneurship” as creation of new organizations (Gartner, 1988), which 
occurs as a context-dependent, social and economic process (Reynolds 1991; Low & 
Abrahamson 1997; Thornton, 1999). Following this understanding I employ the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem perspective that has originally been introduced by Isenberg 
(2010, 2011) and has since then seen fast adoption on behalf of scholars and policy makers 
alike.  
Notably there are many different perceptions of the term entrepreneurship. One important 
nuance in the meaning is the difference between “aspirational entrepreneurship” (Isenberg, 
2011; Miller, 2005) versus entrepreneurship as the owner and manager of a small or 
medium enterprise. The former view expects the entrepreneur to aim towards the 
establishment of fast-growth organizations, engaging in continuous innovation and ongoing 
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expansion, long after the individual resource requirements of the entrepreneur have been 
fulfilled (Drucker, 1985). This kind of intrinsically motivated “empire-building” mentality 
contrasts the understanding of entrepreneurship as “self-employment” where 
entrepreneurs are viewed as the founders and later managers of a small enterprise and 
primarily motivated by the independent generation of income (Leibenstein, 1968). The latter 
view is captured nicely in the Oxord English Dictionary of 1996, which defines the term 
‘entrepreneur’ as “the person in effective control of a commercial undertaking” (as cited 
from McQuaid, 2002; p.92).  
The encouragement of “aspirational entrepreneurship” has been related to the creation of 
‘high growth firms’, which in former studies have been shown to significantly contribute to 
new job creation (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2009; NESTA, 2011) and to provide significant 
spillover effects for the wider entrepreneurial ecosystem (Mason et al., 2009; Du et al., 
2013; Isenberg, 2011; Mason and Brown, 2014). In line with most authors that engage with 
the ecosystem paradigm of entrepreneurship and understand entrepreneurship as a means 
to create economic growth, if not otherwise specified this research understands 
entrepreneurship as “aspirational entrepreneurship” rather than as “self-employment”.  
 
Technology entrepreneurship 
The discovery and creation of novel opportunities is central to the study of 
entrepreneurship. Beckman et al.  (2012) define technology entrepreneurship and 
distinguish it from mainstream entrepreneurship by its focus on how these opportunities are 
fostered through the employment of science and engineering. As such, they relate 
technology entrepreneurship to technical innovations and the nascent markets and novel 
products they often facilitate. In this research ‘technology entrepreneurship’ is defined as in 
line with Beckman et al.  (2012). Therefore technology entrepreneurship exists when ICT 
technology related innovations constitute a core element of the opportunity that enables 
the emergence a new venture, market, cluster or industry. Numerous scholars have 
investigated the phenomenon of ‘High-Tech’ ‘Technology’ or ‘ICT-enabled’ entrepreneurship 
in developed economies and have stressed its particularities compared to mainstream 
entrepreneurship. Examples for such particularities evolve around, but are not limited to, 
the required (technological) know-how of founders (Colombo & Grilli, 2005), importance of 
networks in innovation processes (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2007) equity financing 
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(Avnimelech, 2007; Colombo & Grilli, 2010) particularities in firm’s growth-trajectories 
(Autio, 1997), or competitive strategies (Rindova et al., 2012). 
 
Entrepreneurship and economic development 
Scholars that have analyzed the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic 
development define entrepreneurship as either the creation of new economic activity (Low 
and MacMillan, 1988; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), often leading to the creation of new 
ventures (Schumpeter, 1934; Gartner, 1989), or the pursuit of innovation (Schumpeter, 
1934; for a review, see Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). 
Todaro (2000, p.78) distinguishes five leading theories of economic development, namely 
stages of growth, structural patterns of development, dependence, neoclassical, and new 
endogenous growth theory. The endogenous growth theory includes entrepreneurship as it 
includes technological innovation and human capital as endogenous variables in the model 
that explains economic growth (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, p. 36; Todaro, 2000, p. 101).  
Endogenous growth theory arose to overcome limitations of the traditional neo-classical 
theory. Neo-classical theory attributes economic growth to both labor and capital, but leaves 
a large extent of historical growth in the industrialized nations unexplained. This 
unexplained growth proportion is called the “Solow residual”. Hence neo-classical theory 
attributes a large extent of economic development to an independent or exogenous  
technological process (Todaro, 2000, p. 99).  Schumpeter’s work builds the foundation of the 
endogenous growth theory. The scholar famously introduced the idea that entrepreneurs 
initiate changes in technology through a process of “creative destruction”, through which 
they drive economic development (Schumpeter, 1934). With reference to Solow’s finding 
that technical change caused variations in gross output of man hours (Solow, 1957), Baumol 
(1968) argues that despite the important role of the entrepreneur in driving the innovations 
that cause this technical change, formal economic models remain “entrepreneurless” 
(Baumol, 1968, p. 51). Baumol reasoned that in order to stimulate economic growth it is 
central to examine the determinants of the payoff to entrepreneurial activity and to 
encourage it.  Later the author concludes that the entrepreneur behaves in response to the 
prevailing “rules of the game”, namely the reward structure in the economy, and that those 
rules undergo substantial changes from one period to another and help to shape the effect 
on the economy through the allocation of entrepreneurial resources (Baumol, 1990, p. 25).  
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Kent (1982) and Kirzner (1982) endorse this line of reasoning. Kent views the influence of the 
entrepreneur on economic development to lie not only in his influence on both the supply 
and demand sides of the growth equation but also in his influence on the phases of the stage 
theories. Kirzner states that entrepreneurship will most thrive where rewards are paid to 
those with sufficient insight to exploit opportunity. 
The link between entrepreneurship and economic development has also been explored and 
demonstrated empirically. The pioneering work of Birch (1981) shows through a longitudinal 
analysis that SMEs were the main factor of job creation in the U.S.A. Multiple successive 
studies on the topic confirm Birch’s findings and extended them to the creation of new 
enterprises as well as the “creative destruction” of established ones (Reynolds, 1999). These 
studies employ not only cross-sectoral and cross-national analyses (Brock and Evans, 1989; 
Arzeni, 1998; Audretsch and Thurik, 2000), but also longitudinal ones (Audretsch and Fritsch, 
2000, cited in Wennekers and Thurik, 2001). In conclusion, the central role that 
entrepreneurship plays for the economic development of a country can be considered as 
theoretically as well as empirically well established.  
 
Entrepreneurship and trust 
In recent years, entrepreneurship scholars have exhibited a growing interest in the role of 
trust (Höhmann and Welter, 2005; Welter and Smallbone, 2006). Trust is understood to 
assist in lowering transaction costs of commercial undertakings and the risks inherent to 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, trust stems from characteristics of a community or an 
organization (Welter, 2012). This comprises, for instance, ethnic groups, professions, 
networks, firms, associations or entire industries. Such collective trust stems from the 
recommendations of other members of this group (Williamson, 1993). Here reputational 
effects are found important. They refer to information held by individuals about a potential 
partner pertaining to her behavior in prior network relations, or on shared rules or codes of 
conduct within groups and professions (Welter and Smallbone, 2006). In her critical review 
of the concept of trust and entrepreneurship Welters (2012) distinguishes between 
institutionalized, collective high and low-trust contexts and relates them indirectly to the 
development of entrepreneurship and business growth. Research demonstrates that formal 
and informal institutions that promote or allow for institutional trust can foster national 
economic growth and socio-economic development (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and 
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Knack, 2001). Fukuyama (1996) introduced the notion of high-trust and low-trust milieus and 
argues that both milieus are self-enforcing cycles, with high-trust environments fostering 
market entry, enterprise growth and productive entrepreneurship (and vice versa). A 
suggested response to the uncertainty and the risk that come in an environment with such a 
high risk, is the “octopus organizational” form (Koop, de Reu and Freese, 2000). In this 
strategic, but costly response, an entrepreneur engages in several unrelated businesses 
simultaneously instead of investing and expanding a single firm in a clearly defined line of 
business. It is somewhat unclear, however, whether or not the practice of octopus 
organizational forms is a particularity of micro and small scale enterprises or informal sector 
entrepreneurship or whether it can also be found in aspirational entrepreneurial endeavors. 
 
Open technology hubs 
In the sparsely available literature several definitions of the term ‘innovation space’, ‘lab’ or 
‘hub’ have been attempted (Bloom, 2015). iHub_Research’s report comparing several 
African tech-hubs defines ‘innovation spaces’ as “Hubs, labs, libraries, hackerspaces, 
makerspaces, telecentres, co-working spaces […] all [of which] provide opportunities to (1) 
engage with people, ideas, and technologies, (2) experience participatory culture, and (3) 
acquire the literacies and skills needed to prosper in the 21st century” (Gathege and Moraa 
(2013) as translated from Audette-Chapdelaine, (2011)). This research adopts such a 
definition and views ICT hubs as components of ICT entrepreneurship ecosystems that form 
a part of the Support Dimension of the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem paradigm (Isenberg, 
2011).  
 
Feature phones versus smartphones 
The term feature phone describes a class of mobile phones and is used as a retronym to 
describe low-end mobile phones which are limited in capabilities in comparison to a modern 
smartphone, such as an Android or Apple iPhone. Feature phones typically provide voice 
calling and text messaging functionality, but are increasingly also able to provide mobile 
Internet as well as touch screens and access to popular social networking services. 
Nevertheless, the functionality and support for third-party software remain relatively limited 
in comparison to smartphones (InfoDev, 2012; Grundberg and Connors, 2014).   
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2.2 Mobile for development  
In the last decade the mobile for development (M4D) stream developed as the most 
important sub-stream of the ICTD stream. The premise for this stream lies in the 
unprecedentedly fast spread of mobile phone technology throughout the globe during the 
last 15 years. Between 2000 and 2012, the number of mobile phones in use worldwide grew 
from less than 1 billion to around 6 billion, a majority of this growth being realized in 
developing countries (InfoDev, 2012a). In 2015 mobiles are therefore without a doubt most 
ubiquitous modern technology (World Bank, 2016c). Gomez et al.  (2012) find in their 
comprehensive meta review of the ICTD stream that the popularity of the mobile phone as a 
development tool started in 2006. In the first year the international ICTD conference was 
held, one third of the papers presented touched on mobile phones. In the following years 
mobiles continued to receive augmenting attention, particularly in the ICTD conference, in 
the Information Technology for International Development Journal and, more recently, in 
Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries as well (Gomez et al., 
2012).  While in the developed world mobile communications have increased the value of 
legacy communication systems and have supplemented and extended existing information 
flows, the developing world follows a dissimilar, “mobile first” development trajectory. 
These economies have been shown to leverage this widely installed infrastructure in order 
to contribute to social, economic, and political transformation (InfoDev, 2012a).  
 
In their reflection on the academic discourse on M4D Svensson and Wamala (2012) 
demonstrate two different views on the impact of mobile phones. On the one hand the 
authors point towards those scholars “who claim that the impact that mobile phones have is 
as revolutionary as roads, railways and ports, increasing social cohesion and releasing the 
entrepreneurial spirit that stimulates trade and creates jobs (see Duncombe, 2010)” (p.15). 
These scholars lean more towards a technological deterministic view on M4D. On the 
opposing side are those scholars who find that technology by itself cannot lead to social 
change; that people determine in what way a particular technology will be employed (Hafkin 
and Huyer, 2006) and, depending on their personal political and socio-economic 
environment, adapt it accordingly (Banks, 2010). Showing these opposing sides Svensson 
and Wamala (2012) find that the truth is probably found in the middle of both extremes. 
Nevertheless, they further observe that much of the research field of M4D has fallen prey to 
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the technological deterministic view. Given the young state of development of the field of 
M4D as well as the fast pace technological change it is without a question that many areas of 
potential benefit still remain to be explored, tested for their impact, and scrutinized for their 
ability to contribute to development in their specific local contexts. There are however 
already some sectors in which mobile for development applications have emerged and have 
allegedly proved to provide a positive benefit to development. The following section 
provides a broad overview of different fields of M4D applications and studies on their impact 
on development. 
 
2.2.1 Mobile for development fields 
Mobile for agriculture 
Seeing the dominance of primary commodities in many developing economies the quest to 
improve incomes, productivity, and yields within the agricultural sector is an all-important 
issue. Abraham (2006) already finds that to date voice calls and SMS text messages have 
proven extremely valuable in increasing efficiency in smallholder agriculture. They are able 
to, for instance, provide real-time price information and enhance the flow of information 
along the complete value chain, from producers to processors to wholesalers to retailers to 
end-consumers (UNCTAD, 2008). Even though the basic functions of the mobile phone will 
also in future remain important for reaching the widest number of people, the focus of 
applications to? development shift as the underlying technologies are evolving (Matotay & 
Furuholt, 2010). Increasingly specialized mobile services are catering to specific agricultural 
needs, while at the same time multimedia imagery is being used to overcome illiteracy and 
convey complex information regarding weather and climate, pest control, cultivation 
practices and agricultural extension services to potentially less tech-savvy farmers (InfoDev, 
2012a). Further, different examples of emerging satellite technologies exist that assist in 
food traceability, sensory detection, real-time reporting and status updates from the field 
(InfoDev, 2012a).  
Concluding on the potential of mobile for agriculture projects the Maximising Mobile report 
(InfoDev, 2012a) stresses on the one hand the technology applications’ ability to improve 
livelihoods in developing countries while at the same time pointing towards the pillars on 
which such applications are resting, namely: business models, ICT skills and supporting 
infrastructure. The first of these points stresses the dependence of many mAgriculture 
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projects on public funding, especially in the early stages of their development. Secondly the 
report notices that the present examples for mAgriculture applications stem mostly from 
India and Kenya, two countries that are, to varying degrees, in possession of ICT-skilled 
labor. This is an especially important prerequisite since mAgriculture apps usually have to be 
designed locally to cater to specific target market needs, with localized content specific to 
the languages, crop types, and farming methods. Lastly the supporting infrastructure caters 
to the government’s role in ensuring that the private sector is encouraged to offer mobile 
broadband services at affordable prices, e.g. in an environment where competition between 
telecommunication providers is robust (InfoDev, 2012a).  
 
Mobile for health care 
In the beginning of mHealth the term was narrowly defined to signify wireless telemedicine 
evolving around the use of mobile telecommunications and multimedia technologies and 
their integration into mobile health care delivery systems (Istepanian and Lacal 2003). 
Nevertheless, today this definition cannot do justice to the broad variety of stakeholders and 
types of uses that mHealth encompasses today. Qiang et al.  (2011) therefore propose a 
definition of mHealth that “encompasses any use of mobile technology to address health 
care challenges such as access, quality, affordability, matching of resources, and behavioral 
norms [through] the exchange of information” (Qiang et al., 2011). In several pilot studies 
mobiles have been employed to improve management and decision making by health care 
professionals (Celi et al., 2009), real-time and location based data gathering (Quiang et al. , 
2011) and awareness building and health education as a mass tele education tool. These are 
just some examples for the ways in which the supply of public health services is enhanced 
through mobile phone usage. 
 
Mobile Money 
Mobile financial services are without a doubt among the most promising mobile applications 
in the developing world. At the very basic level, mobile money describes the provision of 
financial services through a mobile device. This definition encompasses a variety of services, 
including payments (e.g. peer-to-peer transfers), finance (e.g. insurance products) and 
banking (e.g. account balance inquiries) (InfoDev, 2012a). Mobile money applications are 
characteristically small pieces of software saved on a SIM card or accessible over a mobile 
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network. A customer can employ an inexpensive low end mobile phone to transfer value to 
someone else, just like sending an SMS. In order to exchange this virtual value into cash, a 
user visits a retail agent who authenticates the user’s identity and makes the exchange. 
Through this system money can be transferred across huge distances at the speed of a text 
message (InfoDev, 2012a). 
As a general platform and critical infrastructure mobile money is underpinning other 
economic sectors. In Kenya, where mobile-facilitated payments equate to a fifth of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 (InfoDev, 2012a) mobile money has strongly 
impacted the economy, as it is adopted across commerce, health insurance, agricultural 
banking, and other sectors. It is the potential and evident ability of mobile payment systems 
to “bank the unbanked” and to empower the BOP through enhanced access to finance and 
lower transaction costs that is generating increasing enthusiasm (Jack and Suri, 2011). 
Further, in countries where they are established, mature mobile money systems have 
proven to spin off innovative products and services in insurance, credit, and savings and can 
therefore be considered a crucial infrastructural platform for start-ups to build upon (Kendall 
et al.  2011). Such innovations entail for example bill payment services that evade lengthy 
queue times or more striking examples such as efficient conditional cash transfers for 
drought relief or compensation7. A growing number of studies are establishing its impact in a 
variety of areas (Aker, 2009, 2010; Mbiti et al.  2011; Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009). For 
instance, data collected in Kenya evidences that households with access to mobile money 
were abler than those without to deal with negative shocks (including job loss, death of 
livestock, or problems with harvests) (Jack and Suri, 2011).  
 
Mobile for government 
Mobile telephones have become significant tools for citizens to voice their opinions, 
mobilize groups, and report on events as they unfold (World Bank, 2016b). Mobile 
government (mGovernment) evolves around the use of mobile tools to change either the 
interactions among users and government or governmental processes. The importance of 
mGovernment lies in its potential to liberate users from the physical or location-related 
constraints inherent in conventional service delivery and traditional electronic government 
                                                     
7 For an example of the latter see the World Bank–funded initiative to employ mobile phones 
to reimburse ex-combatants in the Democratic Republic of Congo at: http://www.mdrp.org/ 
PDFs/In_Focus_3.pdf. 
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(eGovernment) services (InfoDev, 2012a). The Maximising Mobile (InfoDev, 2012a) report 
structures the different forms of mGovernment into three main types. First, mobile tools can 
serve as a supplement to existing eGovernment applications, which are based on personal 
computers (PCs). This way an additional channel to reach citizens or manage processes of 
governance is established and thus adds the dimension of mobility to established electronic 
services. Secondly, mobile tools can be used to expand the reach of conventional public 
services to citizens who otherwise are unserved or underserved, because they live in remote 
locations or the non-availability of PCs and Internet access. The widespread mobile coverage 
and broad access to mobile telephones, enable governments to reach people who otherwise 
may not have access to these public services and processes. While these first two types—
supplementary and expansionary— focuse especially on the “mobile” in mGovernment and 
are therefore more instrumental, a third category, innovation, captures the government’s 
ability to use the widespread mobile tools to innovate new ways for governments to interact 
with and involve constituents and therefore create novel services and governance processes.  
An example for such a service is mobile-enabled mapping by urban slum dwellers that could 
actually transform governments’ design process for urban development programs by directly 
involving beneficiaries (InfoDev, 2012a). The perhaps most prominent example for an 
innovative mobile eGovernance service is the Ushahidi platform, that emerged in Kenya in 
response to the violence that followed the 2007 election. Ushahidi has since then become an 
open source platform in order to create an incident reporting system, by crowdsourcing 
information stemming from multiple channels such as SMS, e-mail, Twitter and the web. 
Possibilities such as these ones show profound implications for innovative mGovernment. 
Nevertheless, the mere introduction of mobile tools can by no means be a panacea for 
structural deficiencies in governmental capacities or processes. Only when needed 
institutional reforms and process redesigns are executed in congruence with a supported 
technological transformation can governments expect to benefit from mGovernment 
initiatives (see Hellström & Karefeldt, 2012).  
 
Mobile for education 
Due to its portability, simplicity and affordability the mobile phone is an attractive tool to be 
employed in education (Donner, 2008). Gunzo and Dalvit (2012) find that in certain 
townships in South Africa twice as many school kids own mobile phones in comparison to 
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PCs, rendering the phone an attractive tool for educational applications. Communication on 
mobile phones could offer access to education in remote locations or nomadic and displaced 
communities and supplement in-class teaching through the recording of lectures, synching 
with a television or employing the mobile as a calculator (Traxler, 2006). The author further 
finds that the phone cannot only amplify local modes of knowledge transmission, but may 
also be used to support educational administration processes. Additional examples of 
mLearning tools are so called ‘edutainment’ apps, such as quizzes to inform about HIV and 
Tuberculosis (see Khanna et al., 2012).  
 
The mobile telecommunication sector as provider of employment 
The global mobile industry constitutes, given its significant recent growth, a significant 
source of employment opportunities on both the supply and demand side. The employment 
opportunities in this industry can be categorized into direct jobs and indirect jobs, each 
category supplied by a diverse labor force. Direct jobs are professions stemming from mobile 
operators and manufacturers and range from engineers to managers to sales support staff. 
According to an estimate by The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
approximately 1.5 million people worldwide are directly employed in the mobile industry 
(InfoDev, 2012a).  
The number of jobs which fit into the somewhat narrow “direct” description can be 
expected to continue to increase slowly but may start to decline when the industry becomes 
commoditized8. Indirect jobs, on the other hand, show a large potential for new sustained 
growth, in professions that are broadly associated with the mobile industry such as content 
provision, application development or call center operations. Therefore, these indirect jobs 
can be created by several stakeholders: mobile operators, manufacturers and also by third-
party content and device producers, including entrepreneurs (InfoDev, 2012a). Since this 
research is particularly interested in Mobile Micro Work, which is located towards the 
                                                     
8 With increasing maturity some formerly differentiated industries become commoditized. A 
commoditized industry is characterized by competitors offering increasingly homogenous 
products to price sensitive customers who incur relatively low costs as a result of changing 
suppliers in stable industries (Reimann et al., 2010) 
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indirect side, the ways in which mobile phones can be drawn upon to bring people into 
employment or to earn a supplementary income are discussed in more detail in Section 
‘mWork’.  
 
2.2.2 Critics of the M4D stream  
The abovementioned examples evidence the wide array of possibilities and uses of mobile 
phones. Nevertheless, taking an academic perspective, Duncombe (2010) calls for a greater 
conceptual and methodological rigor in the conduct of research and further advocates for a 
stronger theoretical and methodological development in the research of the mobile for 
development stream. This critique is in line with the critics of the wider ICTD stream outlined 
earlier.  Svensson and Wamala (2012, p.34) find that the field is young and still suffers from 
techno-determinism and quote Richard Heeks’ key note statement that “we are too ready to 
the merry-go-round of novelty”. With that quote Heeks implies that in the case of the 
mobile phone the development community has been so fascinated by technology, amazed 
with what could be achieved with it, that they forget to critically scrutinize it and most 
importantly to forget to carefully account for contextual factors for adoption and use 
(Svensson and Wamala, 2012). Duncombe (2011) emphasizes that given the previous 
experience of a high level of project failures associated with ICTD projects the m-
development stream has to convince an increasingly critical development community by 
providing independent and reliable proof-of-concept analyses. Given this context Duncombe 
(2011) deems it especially unfortunate that the kind of research which could inform policy 
and decision-making in this area is currently hardly available (see also Banks (2013), 
Hellström, 2010). In the extensive literature review conducted for this research the author 
also finds a lack of academic literature that analyses M4D projects, their challenges and their 
impact and hence a lack of actionable insights for practitioners and development 
professionals. 
 
2.2.3 Contextual challenges faced by M4D initiatives 
Drawing upon available literature several general challenges faced by M4D projects are 
considered to be among the most important and will be elaborated in the following. Most of 
 33 
the reviewed literature does not stem from a Kenyan context, but mainly from an Asian or 
Indian context (see Hellström, 2009, 2010). 
  
Establishing a sustainable business model (revenue model) 
A major obstacle of M4D projects, which holds across its different sectors of application, is 
the establishment of sustainable business models. With the very low amount of disposable 
income of the users the development of effective monetization models is hard and thus 
many projects need to rely upon public or donor funding (Hellström, 2010; InfoDev, 2012a). 
Furthermore, even M4D applications with robust business models often need to derive a 
minimum of scale in order to break even and thus are initially dependent on external 
funding. The InfoDev (2012a) report therefore suggests to apply public funding through pull 
mechanisms and results-based financial incentives such as challenge funds in order to 
provide grants and soft loans to innovators which are experimenting with novel technology 
and innovative business models until they can develop into financially viable businesses.  
 
An enabling ecosystem to support M4D initiatives  
Related to the viability of M4D applications Hellström (2010) and InfoDev (2012a) stress the 
importance of establishing a strong mobile ecoystem of actors. As Hellström puts it (2010, 
p.63) “Applications do not work in isolation, the more services available, the more active 
end-users and transactions, the better the mobile ecosystem of stakeholders will be. This is a 
mutually re-enforcing process [and crucially needed] in order to avoid the ‘forever pilot 
syndrome’ that most ICT4D projects battle.” As part of this ecosystem he also regards the 
availability of developers and entrepreneurs with sufficient ICT skills, financing, management 
education and support services9.  
 
Technology first: Falling in love with technology 
Another challenge raised repeatedly is the strong tech focus inherent to much of the M4D 
discourse. Banks (2013) as well as Smertnik (2012) both state that many entrepreneurs in 
                                                     
9 For an in-depth elaboration on Technology entrepreneurship ecosystems, their 
composition, and the ways to overcome faced barriers as suggested by academic discourse 
please refer to section 2.4. 
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the field have ‘fallen in love with technology’ employing a ‘technology first’ approach that is 
more concerned with what is technologically possible rather than what actually is needed by 
or most impactful in the users’ specific context.  
 
Lacking ICT skills of users 
Scholars such as Isabalija (2011) have shown that an initial lack of experience and comfort 
around ICT technologies can prove a powerful obstacle to product adoption and thus the 
success of mobile for development programs.  
 
Affordability of ICT technologies  
 As Hellström (2009) points out affordability remains a main challenge to mobile access for 
the poor, since even though the prepaid contracts and micro top-ups have enabled the poor 
to access mobile communication, the costs of using such services are often still forbiddingly 
high. 
 
Infrastructure  
Naturally in many developing countries infrastructural issues limit the potential of mobile 
technology, among the most important are access to electricity and limited network 
coverage (especially in rural areas), actual network quality and also unreliable SMS due to 
rising traffic loads causing network bottlenecks and disrupting SMS service (Hellström, 
2009). 
 
Lack of publishing and local contextual know-how 
Several scholars complain that there is not sufficient transparency and documentation 
concerning mobile development projects, leading to a lack of insights into why some 
applications failed or succeeded, which could greatly benefit other projects in the field. In 
addition Hellström (2009) maintains that for many M4D development projects good insight 
into local contexts are needed in order to create successful programs. 
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2.3 Mobile for work (mWork) 
This research is in particular interested in the ways that mobile phones can be drawn upon 
as a tool to enable people to earn a livelihood. This can be either through the execution of 
small micro tasks on a mobile device in return for financial compensation, defined as Mobile 
Micro Work (InfoDev, 2012a, Govindaraj et al., 2011, Narula et al., 2011) or any other way in 
which the mobile phone is employed as a tool to provide people with the opportunity to find 
employment or earn a supplement income.  This includes uses, where the mobile phones act 
as an intermediary, e.g. in recruiting or sales processes. This research does not investigate 
e.g. efficiency gains that existing professions have experienced through the use of SMS and 
voice calls, e.g. the reduction of information asymmetries experienced by farmers in Kenya 
(see mAgriculture). Instead this research treats those mobile applications that enable people 
to execute work, which has been made possible through the dawn of mobile technology. 
This use of the mobile phone as a tool to find and execute work will be called mWork in the 
following.  
 
While the use of mobile phones in different sectors is somewhat well established and 
researched, the role of the mobile phone as a tool to provide work is still in its infancy and 
hence very little research concerning this topic was uncovered. Given the early stage of 
development of the field and a lack of insights a meaningful segmentation is not yet 
possible. This research shows the current insights along two streams, namely along Mobile 
Micro Work and mobile recruitment.  
 
2.3.1 The Virtual Economy: A market for virtually traded scarcities  
The term VE was coined by Edward Castronova (2006) in order to describe artificial 
economies inside online games, especially where the artificially scarce goods and currencies 
of these economies were traded for real money. Subsequently game scholars and the game 
industry adopted the phrase. As virtual currencies have, in recent years, been increasingly 
used on social networking sites (SNS), crowd sourcing platforms and other non-game online 
services, the application of the term VE has widened. This research adopts the definition of 
VE as employed by Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist (2011), which further expands the term VE by 
acknowledging that virtual goods and currencies are not the only scarce and tradable 
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commodities within digital marketplaces, but also includes other intangible commodities, 
such as human effort.  
 
The interaction between the physical ICT infrastructure, the digital economy of services 
supported by the infrastructure, and the virtual economy that emerges from the digital 
services, can be visualized as a model with three layers (Figure 2). Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 
(2011) argue that up-to-date studies, which have investigated ICT through a development 
economic lens, have focused on the bottom two layers only. Within the first layer scholars 
discuss how to produce and maintain ICT infrastructure in the context of developing 
countries or the ways in which hardware manufacturing generates jobs. The second layer 
evolves mainly around the ways in which digital services can be employed in order to 
enhance productivity in sectors such as agriculture, trade and healthcare (e.g. UNCTAD 
2018; Fuchs, 2008). Simultaneously, however, the strong proliferation of digital services 
ranging from e-commerce to SNS in both developed as well as developing countries has 
caused new digital needs and problems to rise. The demand for these digital tasks and 
problems created by digital services, the supply that aspires to meet it, and the markets 
where this demand and supply meet collectively comprise the third layer, the virtual 
economy (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Three-layer model of ICTs and economy. Source: Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist (2011) 
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The VE can be differentiated from traditional digital content markets in several ways. 
Traditional digital content markets trade such things as music, video, images, news articles 
and any other good, which can be represented in digital form. These goods are referred to as 
information goods by Economists as they diverge from most ordinary goods in two central 
ways (Shapiro & Varian 1999).  Firstly, taking a producer’s perspective, information goods 
tend to involve high fixed-costs but low marginal production costs. While creating the first 
copy of an information good may require substantial effort and investment, the costs of 
producing additional copies are very low. 
 
Secondly, taking a consumer’s perspective, information goods are “experience goods” 
meaning their value is derived from experiencing them and absorbing their content. This 
stands in contrasts to the virtual goods spanned by the virtual economy. Virtual goods 
involve, much like ordinary goods, significant marginal costs. For instance, micro work is 
based on the natural scarcity of human effort, as each individual task needs to be 
handcrafted. Consequently, despite the abundance of the bites that compose the “raw 
material inputs” marginal cost of production are imposed. In other cases, artificial hurdles 
are imposed by the designers of the platforms and need to be overcome by the producer in 
question. These hurdles are a necessity in order to ensure the value of the goods. In online 
games, where virtual items could easily be duplicated at no costs, the goods are made 
meaningful and valuable by requiring the player to expand significant effort in order to 
obtain them (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 2011). 
 
Lehdonvitra and Ernkvist (2011, p. 67) regard the following key characteristics as 
representative for the VE: 
 Centers around commodities that are digital yet scarce  
 Demand arises from the increasing use of digital services in business and leisure  
 Supply is created through the expenditure of human effort, and doing so requires relatively 
few specialized skills or resources 
 
Consumers derive value from virtual goods in multiple ways (Lehdonvirta 2009a). While 
some virtual goods are aesthetically pleasing and consumed like information goods through 
experiencing them (Denegri-Knott & Molesworth 2010), most virtual goods exude a tangible 
use and function in the games and digital environments where many people nowadays play 
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out parts of their social lives. In the same way as material consumption commodities, virtual 
goods are employed to signal social distinctions and bonds (Martin 2008).  
The scarce nature of virtual goods makes them suitable as a means to signal status in the 
digital environment. Information goods, which can be reproduced infinitely, are not suitable 
for this end. Therefore, digital consumers are no less materialistic than material consumers, 
the difference here is that the material in question has become digital (Lehdonvirta, 2010).  
For corporations the value of virtual commodities produced by micro work are likewise 
functional goods rather than informational: they form part of a large machinery of tasks and 
processes.  
 
Due to the abovementioned differences, the markets and value chains of the VE differ 
fundamentally from traditional digital content industries. While the traditional content 
industry employs a small number of very skilled workers, suppliers of the VE employ a large 
number of relatively low skilled labor. Traditional digital content diminishes in value with 
passing time, as its novelty wears out, whereas goods in the VE may be more valuable years 
after their production. In practice, however, the distinction between the VE and traditional 
content industries are not always equally clear-cut. For example digital music and film 
distributors employ digital rights management technologies (DRM) to entail media files to 
artificial scarcity, thus bringing them conceptually closer to virtual goods (Lehdonvirta & 
Virtanen 2010). Another example are online retailers offering loyalty programs based upon 
virtual currency.  
 
In their “Knowledge Map of the Virtual Economy” Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist recognize four 
commercially viable segments of the Virtual Economy, namely micro work, third party 
gaming, cherry blossoming, and user created virtual goods production. Lehdonvirta and 
Ernkvist’s (2011) research into the matter comes to the conclusion that the latter two 
segments show only limited developmental potential. Concerning third party gaming this 
research comes to the conclusion that countries such as Kenya or other East African 
countries will hardly be able to compete with Asian developing countries since unlike African 
countries the Asians possess cheap high speed Internet, a strong gaming culture and low 
marginal costs of labor as well as an already established third party gaming sector 
(Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist, 2011; Kieger, 2010) Given the recent spread of mobile technology 
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in Kenya as an almost ubiquitous technology this research proceeds with an investigation of 
Mobile Micro Work and it’s development potential in an African context in the following 
section.  
 
2.3.2 Mobile Micro Work 
Micro Work is the execution of small digital human intelligence tasks, which can be executed 
in a short time by a person without special skills or former training. Examples for these tasks 
are assessing whether two images are of the identical product, transcribing a piece of hand-
written text, entering data into a database and search engine optimization (Ledohnvirta and 
Ernkvist, 2011, p. 44ff.). This work often resembles BPO activities and has a clear IT 
foundation as all these types of work are IT-based and IT-focused (Heeks, 2012a). The 
demand for these services stems from companies, such as Amazon, CISCO and Google, 
whose business models rely heavily on digital technology and which find that computers are 
not yet able to execute all of the tasks required of them (Accenture, 2012).  
 
Mobile Micro Work is the execution of such micro work on a mobile device and first evolved 
around 2011 with the publications of Govindaraj et al.  (2011) and Narula et al.  (2011) and 
later with InfoDev’s Knowledge Map of the Virtual Economy (2012). 
 Since the recent African mobile phone boom has created a situation where a large 
proportion of the African BoP population may be reached via mobile devices, the World 
Bank’s report Maximising Mobile (2012) mentions the use of Mobile Micro Work as a 
potentially powerful way to tackle economic isolation of impoverished rural populations. The 
report gives the example of Jana, a service developed by Nathan Eagle, which aggregates 
different micro work tasks and relies on SMS technology in order to connect the users to a 
range of more complex media and communication technologies. The workers are 
compensated for the execution of these micro-tasks with mobile money or airtime. As 
opposed to micro-work business models, where the BoP worker may be employed full time, 
Mobile Micro Work is mostly an activity in addition to daily activities providing a supplement 
income source (Gupta et al., 2012; Narula et al., 2011). Research on Mobile Micro Work is 
still very much in its infancy and most literature to date is in the form of case studies, which 
introduce different, often hypothetical, case applications and discuss their potential 
functionalities in a local context (see for example Narula, Gutheim & Rolnitzky, 2011; Gupta, 
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Thies and Cutrell, 2012; Govindaraj et al., 2011; Morris, et al. , 2012). These studies 
exclusively take place in an Indian or Asian context and stem from a clearly technical 
perspective, discussing what could be achieved by technology. Govindaraj et al.  (2011) state 
that given the current context of developing countries, MMW activities need to build on 
SMS/USSD technology and need to be suitable for low-end mobile devices to effectively 
reach BOP populations. The authors further discuss several of such potentially viable MMW 
tasks. These often build upon a crowd sourcing approach such as the translation of local 
languages, the execution of market research and consumer surveys and mobile app testing. 
Furthermore the authors name human intelligence tasks, such as image tagging and 
digitalization of written text documents as well as peer-to-peer tasks, where real people can 
give real time advice on e.g. shopping options and traffic conditions as potential uses of 
Mobile Micro Work (MMW). Additionally, collective information gathering applications, 
where applications aggregate feedback from a wide audience for example for citizen 
journalism and passive network monitoring is suggested (Govindaraj et al., 2011). Finally, the 
author suggests that through micro work the respective organizations can mine valuable 
data to learn about the worker, e.g. from her answers on consumer surveys, which could be 
used to execute well targeted consumer marketing. The authosr employs a clearly 
technological perspective discussing potential uses and no more detailed discussion of the 
different businesses, e.g. a perusal of the underlying business models, is provided. Further, 
there is no discussion of the ways in which such applications could impact users at the BOP.  
 
Given the overall lack of academic discourse in this field, this research draws upon the 
accounts of several practitioners, which provide valuable insights. Leila Chirayath Janah, the 
founder of the micro-work enterprise Samasource, indicates that currently Mobile Micro 
Work is impeded by the still sizable mobile bandwidth costs in many DCs as well as the loss 
of efficiency due to the relatively small keyboards of mobile phones and faces competitive 
pressures from other BPO outsourcing providers (InfoDev, 2012a). During the critical perusal 
of the literature, this research further finds that Nathan Eagle’s company Jana in 2013 no 
longer applies the business model of executing translation services, but instead has moved 
to mobile-based market research and promotions (BBC future, 2012; Jana.com, 2012).  
While the exact reasons for this change could not be uncovered in this research, this change 
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of business model might serve as an indicator that the necessary conditions for a feasible 
application of Mobile Micro Work are still lacking.  
 
No literature could be found that treats the opportunity of employing data enabled 
smartphones as a channel to execute Mobile Micro Work in a developing country context. In 
early 2012 the innovation and entrepreneurship program of the Word Bank, InfoDev, has 
launched the competition Mobile2Work, which invites developing country entrepreneurs 
and app developers to develop Mobile Micro Work business models. Interestingly, several of 
the suggested businesses build upon the usage of data enabled smartphones. An 
investigation into these entries yields a variety of micro-work business models, of which 
some seem to surpass the mere BPO nature of PC based micro-work tasks. Some of these 
business models pose value-adding extensions to other digital services. For instance, the 
entry “Smart Rickshaw”, where BoP rickshaw drivers from developing countries serve as 
micro-workers to provide real time traffic, landmark and tourist hot spot updates, and also 
act as an advertisement medium (InfoDev, 2012c). In September 2012, the regional winners 
of the challenge were invited to several Hackathons conducted by the Word Bank’s mobile 
development incubator m:Labs in Nairobi, where programmers from different fields and 
organizations come together with the aim of developing functional applications. Significant 
for the purpose of this research, the Hackathon conducted in Kenya has produced several 
potentially promising Mobile Micro Work applications, some of which again surpass a mere 
BPO nature and of which several have been moved towards implementation in January 
201310. Given the novelty of these applications no further information on these Kenyan 
Mobile Micro Work applications could be uncovered in this research.  
 
In summary the literature review has shown that numerous MMW uses are suggested by the 
literature. The discussion is limited to technical feasibility and in general pertains mostly to 
relatively vague “ideas” of how mobile phones could be used to bring employment to 
people. Discussions of economic feasibility or specific country contexts and limitations 
beyond India or other Asian contexts were not found. An overview of suggested uses 
uncovered in the course of research can be found in table 1.  
                                                     
10 A description of the three winning entries (from over 900), chosen in May 2012, can be 
found in Appendix 3. 
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Suggested mWork application: Suggested By:  
Smart Rickshaw: tourist advice on traffic, 
hotspots ect. M2work Hackathon Report (2013) 
Translation of local languages 
Maximising Mobile, 2012; Govindaraj et al.  
2011; Gupta et al. , 2012 
Market research 
Kulkarni, 2012; Narula et al., 2011; 
Maximising Mobile, 2012; Kubzansky et al.  
2011) 
Mobile App testing 
Govindaraj et al., 2011; M2work Hackathon 
Report, 2013 
Tree planting M2work Hackathon Report (2013) 
Medical diagnosis for eye disease 
(Diabetic Retinopathy) M2work Hackathon Report (2013) 
Transcription of medical services M2work Hackathon Report (2013) 
Crowd journalism 
Govindaraj et al. , 2011; M2work Hackathon 
Report (2013) 
BPO-like tasks on a smartphone 
Based on mirco work insights of 
Lehdornvitra and Ernkvist (2011) 
Human intelligence micro work tasks on a 
feature phone Govindaraj et al. , 2011; Narula et al., 2011; 
Peer-to-peer tasks (shopping options, 
traffic advice) 
Govindaraj et al. , 2011; M2work Hackathon 
Report (2013) 
Table 1  mWork applications suggested by previous literature 
 
2.3.3 Mobile for Recruitment 
In Section 1.2 the underlying causes of the structural unemployment in Kenya were 
discussed in detail. Prominent among those reasons are coordination and information 
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failures that occur between the demand and supply sides of the labor market (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2002; Gachugia et al., 2014). InfoDev (2012a) finds that while currently 
well-skilled and educated workers may already be able to access existing web-based job-
matching services such as monster.com, mobile-based job-matching services may be 
important for people who lack access to web-based services. The employed mobile-to-web 
technology may benefit people who at minimum possess the skills and education of basic 
literacy, but are not able to create a marketable curriculum vitae, access online resources 
and lack basic knowledge in how to apply for jobs. Furthermore, employers often find it hard 
to find low-skilled workers for entry-level jobs in developing countries, as the existing job-
matching services mainly target highly skilled candidates. Mobile-to-web technology holds 
the promise of bridging some of these gaps (InfoDev, 2012a). The current M4D literature has 
so far not treated the potential of mobile for recruiting in detail. The first available study of 
GSMA (2014a) which was published in June 2014 after the empirical data collection phase of 
this research forms an exception and delivers first and high level insights. Since the findings 
are relevant for this research, the insights of the report will be treated in detail. The report is 
condensed to 25 pages in total, takes a global perspective looking at eleven cases of mobile 
job connection enterprises companies, which are active in 17 countries. It provides a brief 
introduction into recruitment processes in the developing world as well as an overview of 
the services offerings, the service delivery channels and the monetization models of the 
investigated mobile job matching companies.  
 
Recruiting processes in developing countries 
The recruiting processes that according to GSMA (2014a) are most prominent in developing 
countries are: job adds in newspapers or on job boards, Internet recruiting platforms and 
word of mouth. Here their research indicates that especially problems around identity and 
qualification assuring of job seekers is a major hurdle in developing country contexts, which 
renders most recruiting alternatives to personal network recruiting ineffective. The research 
further conducts a survey with youth from Ghana and finds that 47% of youth cites their 
biggest barrier to employment to be “not knowing the right people to seek out in order to 
find work” (GSMA, 2014a, p.10). The report argues that the suggested reliance on personal 
networks as recruitment method are neither satisfactory for employers, since it limits the 
amount of choice of candidates and thus the chance of hiring the “right candidate”, nor for 
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job seekers, who lack information on what types of jobs are available, or how much they 
should be expected to be paid.  
 
Service offerings of mobile job connectors 
The report finds that in addition to the basic job connecting service some companies in the 
sample also bundle value added complementary services to their offering. The observed 
offerings include:  
 Training or upskilling: providing business or entrepreneurial skills and sector-specific training 
to jobseekers. 
 Credentialisation: adding previous employer references, or certifying training. 
 Information or mentoring: providing career or life skills.  
 
While these added value services seem appropriate in addressing some of the analyzed 
structural problems in the employment market of developing countries, the report provides 
no detailed information on the way these services are operationalized, their effectiveness 
and feasibility given cost and technology constraints.  
 
Service delivery channels of mobile job connectors 
The GSMA (2014a) finds that the choice of communication channel to deliver services is 
closely connected to the technology penetration. In areas with low penetration of web-
based technology, mobile job connectors rely strongly on the use of feature phones11. 
Currently most solutions employ SMS to target job seekers; as this enables these services to 
reach scale more effectively, especially in rural areas. Interactive Voice Response (IVR), 
where a computer interacts with humans through the use of voice and DTMF tones input via 
keypad, can also be used as a delivery channel, an approach which offers the distinct 
advantage of overcoming literacy barriers for some users (GSMA, 2014a).  
The most flexible approaches, when it comes to content customization and wealth of detail 
is the adoption of face-to-face and call-center solutions, which naturally are costlier than 
                                                     
11 The term feature phone describes a class of mobile phones and is used as a retronym to 
describe low-end mobile phones which are limited in capabilities in comparison to a modern 
smartphone. Feature phones typically provide voice calling and text messaging functionality. 
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SMS and IVR services.  A trade-off between the scalability and the flexibility of content 
customization is stressed and visualized in figure two (GSMA, 2014a). 
 
 
Figure 2 Content and choice of delivery channel (GSMA, 2014a) 
 
The business case of mobile job connectors 
Mobile employment providers can either employ B2C (job seeker-paying) or B2B (employer 
or government-paying) monetization models. The former, where revenue is generated from 
consumers looking for work can present a challenge in poor countries. GSMA (2014a) gives 
the example of Souktel in Rwanda, who experienced a significantly higher traffic when 
offering their service to job seekers for free. In the latter model, businesses (or the 
government) may be more likely to have the ability to pay. Nevertheless, those businesses 
may first have to scale and have a positive track record, so that businesses are willing to pay 
for the service (GSMA, 2014a). Another alternative, which is deemed promising by the GSMA 
authors, is the ‘freemium’ model, which permits a user to access limited content for free 
with full content available at a cost. Among the GSMA sample job connect services adopting 
B2B freemium models have seen the highest commercial success rate (GSMA, 2014a). The 
report concludes that the observed mobile enabled recruiting platforms are able to 
“significantly improve market information” and hence may offer potential improvements to 
labor market productivity. An overview is provided over the progress of each of the 
companies so far, which mostly contains the amount of users on the platform, the amount 
of jobs posted and, in some cases, also the amount of jobs matched (See Appendix one for 
table). 
Unfortunately no information on the actual impact in the form of quality of job matches, 
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(income level, duration, sectors ect.) or a more in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of 
qualification and identification assuring services and training services is provided. Therefore, 
the report’s conclusion of the high potential of mobile job matching services drawn by the 
report is only limitedly persuasive fitting well into the techno-deterministic context of M4D 
literature, which has been criticized earlier to lack a rigorous assessment of development 
potential (e.g. Thompson and Walsham, 2010; Heeks, 2010). It is regrettable that the only 
documentation that could be uncovered that treats the potential of mobile phones in the 
area of recruiting, stems from an association that represents the interests of mobile phone 
operators. Not only do such reports lack the methodological and theoretical rigor of 
academic studies, but they also may have an interest in promoting investments in the area 
of ICT technologies. Therefore, the discussed GSMA report’s conclusion of the strong 
potential of mobile phones for recruiting and its call for investments on behalf of policy and 
donor stakeholders in this area should be evaluated with caution. 
 
2.4 The ecosystem view on entrepreneruship 
 
Plenty of theorizing exists on how entrepreneurship evolves, what dimensions interact and 
how the creation of such environments that are conducive to entrepreneurship can be 
created. James Moore originally coined the term in his influential Harvard Business Review 
articles published in 1993. In line with the demand-side school of research he claimed that 
businesses don’t evolve in a ‘vacuum’ and stressed the relationally embedded nature of how 
firms interact with suppliers, customers and financiers (Moore, 1993). In recent years the 
focus on ‘entrepreneurial ecosystems’ has emerged in the entrepreneurship domain 
(Zacharakis et al., 2003; Napier and Hansen, 2011; Kantis and Federico, 2012; Feld, 2012; 
Isenberg, 2010; Mason and Brown, 2014; Autio et al., 2015). In a recent Web of Science SSCI 
search using the search string ‘entrepreneur* AND ecosystem*’ executed by Autio et al.  
(2015), the authors confirm that the ecosystem theme in the domain of entrepreneurship is 
indeed both very recent, as well as rapidly increasing in popularity. They find that in 2010, 
only 14 papers were published under that theme, but five years later, a total of 81 papers 
are available with 23 papers being published in the last year. The authors further find that 
this rapid increase in ecosystem approaches to entrepreneurship has created conceptual 
and terminological proliferation and confusion, and therefore urgently call for more 
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empirical and theoretical work in this area. Therefore, there is to date no commonly shared 
definition of the term ‘entrepreneurial ecosystem’. In synthesis of various definitions found 
in the literature this research defines the term EE as:  
 
 ‘a set of interdependent entrepreneurial actors (both potential and existing), organizations 
(e.g. firms, venture capitalists, incubators, business angels), institutions (universities, public 
sector agencies, financial bodies) and factors (e.g. markets, infrastructure, technology, social 
norms and values around entrepreneurship) which interact to collectively determine the 
performance of the local entrepreneurial environment’ 
 
A number of models operationalizing entrepreneurial ecosystems are now available. An 
especially influential approach has been developed by Isenberg (2011a, p1.). According to 
the author six dimensions determine the nature of entrepreneurship in any given ecosystem. 
These dimension are: socio-cultural norms around entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial 
support systems, availability of capable human capital (HC), presence of appropriate 
financing sources, relevant policy and venture friendly markets for new products. As seen in 
Appendix 1 these dimensions comprise hundreds of elements interacting in complex and 
idiosyncratic ways. Given the locally dependent nature of the dimensions in the model, 
Isenberg stresses the importance of context. The here presented literature review draws 
upon Mason and Brown’s (2014) comprehensive review of the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem 
concept and its relationship to high growth entrepreneurship.  
 
Figure 3: Dimensions of an Entrepreneurship Ecosystem (Isenberg, 2011) 
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2.4.1 Theoretical basis: Cluster Theory and Regional Innovation Systems Theory 
The EE view is strongly related to clustering theory and draws upon many of its insights. A 
rich academic literature, stretching back some 100 years, exists in which economic 
geographers and geographical economists have sought to explain the reasons for clustering, 
the internal dynamics of clusters and the economic benefits that arise. The origin of the 
concept dates back to Alfred Marshall’s study on industrial districts and the economies of 
agglomeration at the turn of the 20th century. Subsequently interest in industrial districts 
declined, until Saxenian’s work on Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994), indeed undertaking a neo-
Marshallian perspective, was received with great interest and re-awoke the focus on the 
geographical clustering of economic activity. Saxenian argued that social, cultural and 
institutional factors are underpinning regional economies and attributes Silicon Valley’s 
economic success to its relatively open, non-hierarchical ‘regional network-based industrial 
system’ with porous boundaries. The author contrasted this with the less successful Route 
128 in which larger autarkical firms dominated. He finds these latter firms to feature 
traditional hierarchies and distant relations with local institutions (Saxenian, 1994). 
 
The immense economic success of Silicon Valley gave rise to a huge global ‘industry’ in which 
policy- makers have sought – almost entirely unsuccessfully - to reproduce the success of 
Silicon Valley in their own countries (Hospers et al., 2009). In 2015 there are Silicon Fen, 
Silicon Fjord, Silicon Alley, Silicon Bog and Sinus Valley and in total more than 79 different 
“Siliconia” around the world (Siliconia, 2015). A further stream of literature from the 1990 
on has focused on knowledge and learning regions (e.g. Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999; Henry 
and Pinch, 2000). The regional innovation systems (RIS) literature in a similar manner 
emphasizes the role of localized systemic factors that enable knowledge development in 
local firms (Cooke et al., 1997; Cooke, 2001; Asheim and Isaksen, 2002). Arguably much of 
the recent work on Entrepreneurship Ecosystems corresponds with the RIS literature, 
particularly the focus on relational elements within regions, which govern innovation and 
entrepreneurship. For instance, Bathelt et al. (2004) have emphasized the significance of 
‘local buzz’, a concept that is comparable to Marshall’s ‘industrial atmosphere’, in a cluster 
(Mason and Ross, 2014). The latter terms refer to the information and communication 
ecology shaped by face-to-face contacts, co-presence and co-location of people and 
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companies within the same region (Bathelt et al., 2004). The buzz consists of information 
and its continuous update, intended and unintended learning processes in both organized 
and accidental meetings, the shared understanding of new knowledge and technologies, as 
well as mutual cultural traditions and habits within a particular technology field. The latter 
stimulate the formation of conventions and other institutional arrangements. Through being 
present in such a region, individuals continuously contribute and benefit from the diffusion 
of information, gossip and news. Their mere presence thus enables firms to understand the 
local buzz in a useful and meaningful way (Gertler, 2003). Even though the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems approach offers a distinctive perspective on the geographical clustering of 
economic activity, it evidently does so by incorporating many of the themes from this earlier 
literature, especially from clustering of economic activity and RIS literature.  
However, the EE approach is distinctive from previous models in three ways. First it provides 
an explicit focus on entrepreneurial activity and especially on the aspirational type or “high-
growth” entrepreneurship. Second, the framework attempts to list the main conditions that 
are required to generate and nurture successful entrepreneurship in a local or regional 
environment. Finally, the approach stresses the interactions between the framework 
dimensions and regional geographical environments (Mason & Brown, 2014). Due to this 
distinctive perspective the policy agenda that results follows a much more facilitative 
approach to assistance than those of conventional ‘economic development’, ‘innovation’ 
and ‘cluster’ policies (Isenberg, 2011a).  
 
2.4.2 Distinguishing features of Entrepreneurship Ecosystem functioning 
Large firms 
Large firms or established businesses typically are at the core of an EE and execute 
significant management functions (headquarter / international division headquarter) as well 
as research and development (R&D) and production activities (Mason and Brown, 2014). The 
authors see large firms as significant in developing the ecosystem, for four reasons. Firstly, 
they are ‘talent magnets’ that recruit a large number of skilled workers, many of them 
recent graduates, from outside the area (Feldman et al. , 2005). Secondly, they provide 
hands-on business training for their employees and qualify them to proceed up the 
corporate hierarchy. Staff who were initially recruited for their technological know-how 
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acquire management skills this way and finally are apt in becoming technology managers. 
For small and starting-up technology firms this represents a valuable resource. Thirdly, they 
drive new businesses creation since some staff will leave to start their own ventures. ‘Cluster 
maps’, such as the one of Neck et al. (2004), show the importance of certain companies as a 
source of spin-offs, since a large amount of founders were initially employed in certain key 
companies. Finally, large exogenous firms are important in developing regional ecosystems, 
especially in peripheral regions. They develop the managerial human capital (Adams, 2011) 
and provide commercial opportunities for local businesses. For instance, SMEs in the United 
Kindom’s oil and gas ecosystem in Aberdeen were able to sell to the multinational energy 
companies operating in the North Sea and often also ‘piggyback’ on these relationships to 
enter international oil and gas markets (Raines et al., 2001). Further, large companies may 
contribute in a variety of ways, for example the provision of space and resources for local 
start-ups, wider start-up supporting programs and the development of companies that 
enhance their own eco-systems. Mason and Brown (2014) cites Isenberg (2013) who states 
that “you simply cannot have a flourishing Entrepreneurship Ecosystem without large 
companies to cultivate it, intentionally or otherwise”. Importantly these benefits build on 
the premise that large businesses are open and collaborative towards the wider ecosystem.  
 
Universities 
Universities and advanced research institutions, in addition to corporate R&D labs, also play 
an important role in building the knowledge base of EEs. Especially in a high-tech context 
their research generates the scientific discoveries, technological advances, and advancement 
of knowledge that form the basis for the creation of new businesses (Mason and Brown, 
2014). Second they are ‘talent magnets’, attracting talented individuals in the form of 
eminent scholars, gifted students and ambitious scientists and engineers, thereby 
strengthening the human capital pool of individuals who may become future entrepreneurs 
and employees. Ebdrup (2013) however notes that universities may not play the eminent 
role that is often attributed to them. She notes that a pharmaceutical ecosystem has 
emerged in Copenhagen despite the lack of a world leading university. Åsterbro and 
Bazzazian (2011) find that the numbers of university spin-out ventures are typically small 
and high growth spin-outs are infrequent. Therefore, the educational aspect of universities 
in providing management know-how, intellectual capacity and creativity seem to be more 
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relevant than spin-out effects (Roberts & Eesley, 2011). University level entrepreneurship 
programs are however criticized for being located mostly at business schools rather than 
juxtaposing them with the students and professors creating innovations, namely for example 
in engineering, computer science or life science departments (Feld, 2012).  
 
Financing  
The availability of appropriate finance is a further determining feature of EEs. In particular, a 
critical mass of seed and start-up investors to provide finance and hands on support is key. 
Financing innovative technology start-ups is characterized by significant problems, such as 
uncertainty, strong sensitivity to capital and product market conditions, shortage of tangible 
assets, and asymmetric information problems (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). Therefore, 
traditional financial institutions mostly shy away from financing innovative tech start-ups. 
Here business angels, cashed-out as well as current entrepreneurs and senior-level 
managers, play a critical role. Seed capital funds and business accelerators and VC 
companies are also of critical importance. In the discussion of EEs especially the role of VC 
investors as a key success factor for e.g. the emergence of the Silicon Valley is well 
documented (Wonglimpiyarat, 2009). The particular VC structure, contracts, practices, and 
expertise enable these firms to deal with asymmetric information problems and provide 
their portfolio companies with added value (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2001, 2003a, 2003b). VCs 
are hereby not merely capital suppliers to the new ventures, but they also add operational 
value and supply specific expertise and assets. The firms’ key expertise lies in their ability to 
select firms with growth potential (Jain, 1999; Riquelme & Watson, 2002), and to improve 
their quality by providing them with the resources they generally lack and by augmenting 
their accessibility to external resources.  
VCs draw upon their networks not only to evaluate potential deals, but also to create the 
companies in which they have invested by providing them with access to their networks of 
contacts (Branscombe & Auerswald, 2001). Several empirical studies suggest that VC-backed 
companies show a better performance than other start-ups (Barry, 1990; Gompers & Lerner, 
1999). On a critical note, Gompers and Lerner (1999) argue that VC investments tend to be 
focused on a few narrow technological areas that are perceived to possess the greatest 
potential. Therefore, the increasing importance of VC industries in entrepreneurial high-tech 
clusters, and the growth in VC fundraising in particular, is likely to lead to more intense 
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competition for transactions within a specific set of technological fields, rather than to more 
diversity in the technological fields of the companies funded (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; 
Lerner, 2002). This pattern of narrow concentration of VC investments is discussed further in 
Gompers and Lerner (2000). Mason and Brown (2014) argue that the presence of venture 
capital funds in a particular region is not essential, since it can be ‘imported’ as their 
example of the EE of Ottawa illustrates. However, this requires local investors to have 
connections with national and international venture capital funds that make larger and later 
stage investments and provide the discussed types of value added support needed by 
growing businesses (Mason and Brown, 2014). Furthermore, Isenberg (2010, 2011) argues 
for an effective liquidation of the market and warns about the perverse effect on the overall 
EE of flooding even high-potential entrepreneurs with easy money. He argues that in an EE 
the amount of new ventures does not translate into “the more the merrier”, as it is crucial 
for ventures to be exposed early to the rigors of the market in order to develop sustainable 
business models and to develop the toughness and resourcefulness necessary in succeeding. 
He provides the example of Malaysia, where the Ministry of Entrepreneur and Co-Operative 
Development granted 90% of some 21,000 applicants $5,000 each in venture creation 
support, as an affirmative action program aimed largely at indigenous Malays, who were less 
entrepreneurial than the country’s business-minded Chinese immigrants. Nevertheless, 
Malay entrepreneurs themselves attribute the disappointing results partly to the fact that 
funding was too loose and the chances of venture success determined to leniently (Isenberg, 
2010).  
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Figure 4: Access to entrepreneurial finance (Isenberg, 2011) 
 
Several scholars, such as Isenberg (2011), Mason and Brown (2014) and Avnimelech (2009) 
point towards the liquidation program pursued by the Israeli government as an effective 
intervention. The created program ‘Yozma’ is a 100 Mln $US fund of investment funds that 
in three years spawned ten venture capital funds. In each fund, Yozma, a local private 
partner and a foreign private partner with proven fund management expertise invested 
equal amounts. From the start, the Israeli government provided the option for the private 
partners to buy out its interest in the fund at attractive terms. Eight out of the ten funds 
exercised that option, even creating profits for the government. Five years subsequent to 
the founding of the fund the remaining assets were liquidated by auction. By profitably 
exiting the government provided the proof that real value had been generated (Avnimelech, 
2007, 2009). Isenberg (2010) names this initiative key in the why the Israeli VC industry 
became self-sustaining and simultaneously achieved a quantum leap in growth.   
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Entrepreneurial exits and recycling 
An important driver of growth in an EE is a process of ‘entrepreneurial recycling’ (Isenberg, 
2011, Vogel, 2013; Mason and Harrison, 2006). Many entrepreneurs who have successfully 
built and sold companies leave these firms and remain involved in the cluster, through 
reinvesting their wealth and experience to create more entrepreneurial activity (Mason and 
Brown, 2014; Isenberg, 2011). Some of these become serial entrepreneurs and start new 
businesses, while others become business angels, providing start-up financing for new 
ventures and contributing their experience. Others set up venture capital firms, become 
mentors and board members, engage in teaching entrepreneurship. Other well-known 
entrepreneurs become involved in creating and supporting activities that enhance the 
entrepreneurial environment, for example, by lobbying government and establishing 
organizations that support entrepreneurial activity (Mason and Brown, 2014). The OECD 
(2010, 2013) model highlights the importance of ‘blockbuster entrepreneurship’ or serial 
entrepreneurship for the growth of an ecosystem. This is described as a successful 
entrepreneurial firm that has grown to an exceptional size and has created significant wealth 
for its founders, investors, top management and employees. These individuals maintain a 
continuous involvement in the ecosystem, reinvesting their experience and wealth as 
mentors, investors and serial entrepreneurs. With his ‘law of small numbers’ Isenberg  
(2010; 2011a) emphasizes that only few of those entrepreneurial successes are necessary to 
have major benefits for the ecosystem. These benefits arise in the form of spillover effects in 
terms of role models, serial entrepreneurs, angel investors, venture capitalists, board 
members, advisors and mentors. This is confirmed to be the case in various clusters (Drexler 
et al. , 2015; Mason, 2008). Mason and Brown (2014) give the example of Microsoft and it’s 
role in developing Seattle into a dynamic hub for software development. During the 1990s 
employment in computer and processing sector increased sixfold from 11,800 to 60,800 
fostered by almost 150 Microsoft-related spin-offs in Seattle (see Mayer, 2013). 
Exits are driving this re-recycling process. Ideally, the wealth created through such exits 
makes entrepreneurs and other senior management shareholders sufficiently wealthy so 
that they can devote their efforts to creating and supporting more entrepreneurial activity. 
This requires that entrepreneurs grow their businesses to a point where sizable value has 
been created. In order to reach this point several rounds of finance may be required. 
Businesses that exit prematurely, for instance since they are unable to raise further finance 
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(on acceptable terms), are likely to limit the extent of entrepreneurial recycling because this 
limits the wealth that is generated as well as the entrepreneurial learning that occurred. This 
is especially evident in weaker entrepreneurial ecosystems, where access to large amounts 
of growth capital is limited, for example through weakly developed public stock markets that 
are not conductive of IPOs (Mason and Brown, 2014). In this vein, Isenberg (2011) stresses 
that entrepreneurial failure is an important mechanism that forms part of entrepreneurial 
recycling. Here the failure of an entrepreneur redeploys capital and talent resources to 
society as the entrepreneur abandons his original venture to either start a new company or 
work in other peoples’ firms. The author further links this to the need for rigorous market 
for equity investments, which serves as a “Darwinist” selection process for new ventures, 
where only high potential ventures are receiving funds and resources deployed to low-
potential ventures are freed.  
 
Cultural Norms around entrepreneurship  
In all models of EE the social norms around entrepreneurship or ‘local entrepreneurial 
culture’ (Vogel, 2013) are stressed as vital. In his work on the EE of Boulder Feld (2012) 
identifies several cultural aspects as driving its entrepreneurial success. First of all, the local 
culture has a philosophy of inclusiveness, where an attitude of ‘give-before-you-get’ is 
embedded in the start-up community. Knowledge, experience and expertise are widely 
shared. Vogel (2013) and Isenberg (2011) also underline the importance of the attitude to 
failure as critical. Feld (2012, p.50) argues that “The local community quickly absorbs the 
people involved into other companies. Entrepreneurs aren’t shamed when they fail; it’s 
quite the opposite reaction, they immediately are welcomed as advisers for other 
companies, entrepreneurs in residence for VC firms, and mentors or executives for 
accelerators … Although many take a short break to catch their breath, they often get back 
in the game quickly. That’s what entrepreneurs do.” Isenberg (2011) advocates  a culture of 
experimentation, fast failure and fast recycling.  Feld (2012) stresses that the community 
needs to have porous boundaries, meaning they have to accept that  people move from one 
company to another and do not shun those that have failed or worked for another company. 
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Information exchange 
In line with this required culture of openness research in EE has characterized these regions 
as “information rich”. Mason and Brown (2014) argue that in such a context, individuals can 
access information and knowledge about buyer needs, new and emerging technologies, 
operating or delivery possibilities, component and machine availability, and service and 
marketing concepts. Thereby ‘just by being there’ entrepreneurs in a well functioning EE can 
more easily perceive gaps in products, services or suppliers to fill (Gertler, 2003).  
Organized and informal meetings are the main means by which such information is 
distributed. But for an efficient sharing of such information and knowledge this is often not 
sufficient. Hence, entrepreneurial ecosystems also require “bridging assets” that serve to 
connect people, ideas and resources (Sweeny, 1987). These bridging assets, so called liaison-
animators, are individuals whose mission is to connect people.   
The FORA study identifies such individuals, names them ‘deal-makers’ and finds them to be 
central actors in the process of information sharing (see also Napier and Hansen, 2011). They 
are defined as experienced business people with extensive networks to people and 
resources, skills and know-how to support young companies. Through sharing their know-
how, resources and providing connections to appropriate individuals and organizations (e.g. 
customers, service providers, talent) they are in a place to help new ventures realize their 
growth potential. They may be entrepreneurs, investors or service providers. Feldman and 
Zoller (2012) confirm that the presence of deal-makers is an important prerequisite for 
successful entrepreneurial economies and find an association with a high level of new 
venture creation.  
 
The role of such dealmakers and information brokers has been associated with technology 
hubs, incubators and open technology spaces and the like (Campbell and Allen, 1985). Such 
institutions are especially relevant in a technology entrepreneurship context and are 
considered by Isenberg (2011) to be prominent “entrepreneurship support systems”. Lewis 
(2001) maintains that technology business incubators became a popular economic 
development strategy instrument in the USA beginning in the mid-1980s, because policy-
makers understood that the vast majority of new ventures failed due to three common 
problems: lack of capital, poor management skills and insufficient understanding of the 
marketplace. Since then, business incubation has proven to be a flexible instrument and has 
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been employed by universities and local governments alike to develop a wide range of 
industry sectors in urban, suburban, and rural areas with the aim of creating jobs, wealth 
and other economic benefits (OECD, 2008). Business incubators support new ventures in 
growing and surviving past the early stages, when they are most vulnerable. The principle of 
the concept of incubation is that premature ventures necessitate temporary support to 
obtain strength and become more efficient. Business incubators’ role is to supply a 
supportive environment, where new entrepreneurs receive a portfolio of services, including: 
training and assistance in business management, marketing and various other business 
services, as well as access to seed capital (Allen & McCluskey, 1990; Peters et al. , 2004).  
According to Campbell and Allen (1985) there are four key areas where incubators create 
value: selecting and monitoring of their start-ups, diagnosis of business needs, providing 
access to significant business networks to their new ventures and providing access to capital. 
Smilor (1987) finds that incubators benefit their tenants in the development of credibility, 
accelerating learning curves and access to important entrepreneurial networks. In addition, 
the networking among tenants, and between tenants and external regional-related agents is 
suggested as another important aspect of incubation (Phillips, 2002). Especially interesting 
regarding the contribution of technology incubators is that most incubators enhance the 
new venture survival rate as well as regional development (Smilor & Gill, 1987). In addition, 
incubators foster the entrepreneurial spirit in the region and are able to attract skilled 
individuals to the area (Vedovello & Godinho, 2003). 
Despite the popularity that business incubators have with governments around the world 
and in entrepreneurship literature (Wynarczyk & Raine, 2005), several scholars doubt the 
actual capacity of business incubators in fostering competitive businesses. Isenberg (2010) 
states that “well conceived and managed incubators can take 20 years or longer to generate 
a measurable impact on entrepreneurship. Poorly conceived and managed, they can be 
white elephants”. Avnimelech et al.  (2007), who investigated Israel’s renowned incubator 
program, find that the success rate of enterprises bred in incubators is outperformed 
significantly by VC supported enterprises with success rates 3.9% as opposed to 16.6%, 
respectively. According to Isenberg (2009) the same extensive incubator program has helped 
to launch more than 1300 ventures, but of the hundreds of successful Israeli companies that 
have been taken public or have been acquired at hefty valuations at best 5% were hatched 
in incubators. 
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2.4.3 Emergence and development of ICT entrepreneurship ecosystems over time 
Identifying generic features of entrepreneurial ecosystems is valuable only to a certain 
extent, as first-of-all each ecosystem has emerged under a unique set of conditions and 
circumstances and secondly, the time dimension is ignored. Since EE are dynamic systems 
that face an evolutionary logic (Feldman & Braunerhjelm, 2004), a young ecosystem faces 
challenges that are very different from those of more mature systems. However, in their 
literature review Mason and Brown (2014; p.12) find that most literature misses this 
dynamic nature and discuss the phenomenon “as if they emerged fully formed and do not 
change”.  
Significantly for the purpose of this research, very little research has been conducted around 
the question of how clusters get started and what growth trajectories such regions follow 
and on why some EEs are successful over a period of time, while others wither away (Autio 
et al., 2015; Mason and Brown, 2014). Up to now literature has ignored difficult ‘chicken and 
egg’ problems. For example, if the accessibility of local finance is a key attribute, did it 
precede the appearance of ventures in which to invest, or did the ventures precede the 
finance, in which case how were those first ventures financed? (Mason and Brown, 2014). Or 
if skills for entrepreneurship are best learned through the practice of entrepreneurial 
endeavors, then how did the first entrepreneurs learn their trade? It also ignores questions 
around the trajectories of such regions – how do clusters get started? Why are some 
successful over a period of time, successfully adjusting to changes in technological paradigm, 
while others stumble and fail? (Mason and Brown, 2014). As Feldman and Braunerhjelm 
(2004) argue, there is an evolutionary logic to cluster formation. 
In their call for papers for a special edition on “Entrepreneurship Ecosystems” for the 
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, Autio et al.  (2015) call for papers that investigate the 
process of Ecosystem creation and dynamics and especially whether challenges and the role 
of actors are dependent on the ecosystem development stage. In line with this Vogel (2013, 
p. 443) asks “is there a temporal dependency of the importance of individual components 
[…] and can we infer some sort of pattern on how to develop an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
without having to put everything in place at once?” In addition, he proposes future research 
to investigate “which stages outline the development of an entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
how do the paths differ depending on the type of ecosystem?” 
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Scholars seem in agreement that certain prerequisites have to be given in a region before a 
EEs or cluster can successfully emerge. The influential advocate and one of the fathers of the 
cluster concept Michael E. Porter has stressed in his article “Clusters and the new economics 
of competition” (1998, p.7) that “Governments [...] should reinforce and build on existing 
and emerging clusters rather than attempt to create entirely new ones [...]. They form where 
a foundation of locational advantages exists. To justify cluster development efforts, some 
seeds of a cluster should have already passed a market test.” The literature on EEs finds 
several prerequisites that seem to bring the “fertile ground” for ecosystem development. 
Examples of these preconditions have been discussed in the previous section and include 
advanced knowledge institutions that produce both knowledge advancements as well as 
supply skilled scientists, engineers and professionals and large firms where scientists and 
engineers can learn management skills. Other scholars point towards proximities to 
established industries and government spending, for instance the role of defense industry in 
the early growth of Route 128 and Silicon Valley is often stressed (Adams, 2011; Leslie, 2000; 
Saxenian, 1994). The literature stream on how industries emerge that was reviewed by 
Gustafsson et al. in 2015 finds four main subprocesses of industry emergence, namely 
establishment of technological basis, emergence of activity networks, market emergence 
and formation of industry identity. Here especially the roles of technology and industry 
conditions are stressed as important factors. Rothwell (1989) theorizes that, technologically 
disruptive advances create ‘discontinuities’ that produce the most of the new opportunities. 
Further the technological trajectory of these advances determine the way in which 
entrepreneurs might exploit the technology and, lastly, the technology has to create market 
opportunities if entrepreneurs are to start businesses. In this view the emergence of EE 
depends on the development of markets for newer technologies.  
Isenberg (2011) stresses that once an ecosystem has achieved first entrepreneurial 
successes and a critical scale of entrepreneurs, ‘spillovers’ occur that have a broad positive 
impact on all ecosystem dimensions. Mason and Brown (2014, p.15) argue that once these 
“spin-off” effects gather momentum “it sets in motion a virtuous, self-reinforcing process 
which leads to the creation of an ecosystem that nurtures and supports further 
entrepreneurial activity”. For instance, the HC base is upgraded through training and 
experience and former key employees leave organizations to found new ventures and 
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become serial entrepreneurs (Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). The importance of emerging 
serial entrepreneurs as drivers of ecosystem growth has been stressed in former studies 
(Drexler et al. , 2014; p. 68-71). Financial capital, mentoring and access to networks become 
available when successful entrepreneurs act as angel investors after a successful exit 
(Feldman, 2001). Emerging entrepreneurial success stories build legitimacy for the career 
path of entrepreneurship, shape social norms around risk, failure and wealth creation, and 
inspire new generations of entrepreneurs (Isenberg, 2011). When a critical mass of clients is 
reached, a support network of professional and technological services emerges. These 
include law firms with expertise in intellectual property, venture capital firms, management 
consultants, and technology-marketing firms (Kenney and Patton, 2005). Finally, 
experienced entrepreneurs often take on or advise public positions and advocate for 
entrepreneurship-friendly policy (Isenberg, 2011). 
 
2.4.4 The role of Policy in fostering EE growth 
The EE paradigm is especially helpful in guiding policy makers in their actions to foster their 
local entrepreneurship phenomenon. Isenberg (2011, p.1) considers the “entrepreneurship 
ecosystem strategy” that is based on the understanding of entrepreneurship to be 
determined by the outlined six locally determined and interacting dimensions and their 
components to either replace, or at least to form a necessary complement, or even pre-
condition to, cluster strategies, innovation systems, knowledge based economies, and 
national competitiveness policies. Building upon the presented EE view of entrepreneurship 
four main recommendations that are formed from a synthesis of current literature are 
found. First of all policy makers should beware of copying what worked elsewhere. In light of 
the idiosyncratic nature of underlying elements and different stages of maturity of each 
ecosystem there cannot be a generic roadmap for policy makers to follow. What worked in 
one ecosystem does not necessarily work in another. Nevertheless especially in an ICT 
context the ‘gold standard’ ICT EE  of Silicon Valley makes governments’ mouths water and 
has motivated widespread policy initiatives such as engineering ‘technology clusters’, setting 
up technology incubators and supporting venture capital industries (Isenberg, 2010, 2011). 
These strategies may indeed be valuable, but their appropriateness has to be re-considered 
for each ecosystem’s individual context. As the preceding review of literature shows, 
clustering- or regional innovation systems theory that motivate such policy actions is, when 
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taken in isolation, overly simplistic and fails to do justice to the multitude of factors that 
determine the success chances of entrepreneurs in a given context. 
In 2015 a multitude of examples from around the world show how technology-clustering 
policies have induced governments to spend billions of dollars with essentially very little 
impact to show for it (Martin and Sunley, 2003; Rocha, 2004; The Economist, 2007). Instead 
policy makers should develop a thorough understanding of the nature of their regional 
entrepreneurship phenomenon and understand the barriers and enablers to risk-taking 
high-growth entrepreneurship at each dimension of the ecosystem. It is imperative for policy 
actors to develop a profound understanding of the nature of their EE and to gain a 
comprehensive overview of each dimension and the inter-dependence between the 
different dimensions (Vogel, 2013).  Thirdly Isenberg (2010) stresses the need to “intervene 
holistically”. Most policy actors have in the past prioritized one or two dimensions over 
others, since they considered these especially important to entrepreneurial success. 
However, given the inter-dependent nature of the EEs, tackling only a few dimensions can 
lead to perverse outcomes (Isenberg, 2010). Just like a doctor does when prescribing a 
medicine to a patient, policy makers must carefully consider the anticipated “side-effects” 
on other elements of the organism before intervening. For example, while providing capital 
to entrepreneurs to address early funding gaps may be desirable from a financing 
perspective, it can – if tied to loosely - lower the quality of entrepreneurial talent on the HC 
dimension and impede the formation of a functioning equity finance market and hence the 
availability of strategic resources provided by such stakeholders (support dimension) 
(Isenberg, 2010). Further, policy action needs to address multiple dimensions at once if they 
want the ecosystem to move forward. Ács et al.  (2014) argue that when one dimension of 
the EE model is neglected and far less developed than other dimensions it forms a 
“bottleneck” and thus limits the growth of the entire ecosystem. 
Finally, the insight that generic pathways to EE growth offer little value, if at all, and that the 
entrepreneurship phenomenon is complex and constantly changing, policy makers have to 
embrace uncertainty and engage in ongoing iterations of experimentation to see what works 
in their context (Mason and Brown, 2014). Given the complexity inherent to considering 
multiple, constantly changing and inter-connected dimensions at once, policy makers need 
to strive to establish a continuous dialogue with ecosystem stakeholders of all dimensions. 
Policy makers should therefore establish an open-door culture that invites ecosystem 
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stakeholders to inform or even co-design interventions and to provide continuous feedback 
on the efforts of the past (Vogel, 2013). This requires policy makers not only to invest 
resources and time but also master patience and perseverance. Naturally it is neither 
practical nor feasible to jump in and address all at once, but once one has developed an 
understanding of how the EE works one can take first steps without loosing sight of what is 
next on the agenda (Isenberg, 2010). 
 
2.5 The context for entrepreneurship in Kenya 
 
Much of the insights on ICT or technology entrepreneurship stem from resource-rich 
contexts, such as the USA and Europe, and thus provide only limited applicability for the 
relevant geographical domain. In Kenya ICT entrepreneurs face the challenges of venturing 
in a sector that itself is still in its formative years, such as a lack of overall legitimacy of the 
industry, the need to carve out new market structures and to recruit untrained employees 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Furthermore, the previous section shows that venturing in a nascent 
EE is significantly harder than in more mature systems, since much of the required 
conditions are not yet established. Finally, Kenyan ICT entrepreneurs face wider contextual 
challenges that are inherent to resource-scarce contexts and informal economies, such as 
low-income consumers, disproportionately higher risk of entrepreneurial failure and a low 
enforcement of formal institutions and contracts (Webb et. al, 2009). Therefore, this section 
presents an overview of literature that treats particularities of the conditions for 
entrepreneurship in resource-scarce contexts along the previously introduced EE dimensions 
of Policy, Market, Finance, Culture, Support and Human Capital 12. Where available this 
section presents insights that cater specifically to the geographical domain of Kenya, 
however given the relative scarcity of research on national level this chapter at times draws 
upon insights that were written more generally for ‘resource-scarce’, ‘African’ or ‘developing 
country’ contexts and that still have to be confirmed for the context of Kenyan technology 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore this overview caters to findings that are deemed relevant for 
this research’s focus on “aspirational” or high-growth type of entrepreneurship (Isenberg, 
                                                     
12 For more complete reviews on the topic of entrepreneurship in Africa refer to: Buame 
(1996); Mead & Liedholm (1998); Frese et al. (2002); Kiggundu (2002) and Zoogah and 
Nkomo (2013). 
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2011; Miller, 2005), rather than on the creation of micro and small-scale enterprises that 
consist of one to three employees, mostly operate in the informal sector and that are the 
focus of many developmental entrepreneurship studies (Daniels et al.  1995; Jalloh and 
Falola 2002). Finally, a detailed discussion of two recent reports that treat the context for 
technology entrepreneurship in a Kenyan is provided.  
 
The extent and shape of entrepreneurial activity in an economy is strongly influenced by the 
policy dimension and its institutional environment (Chiles et al., 2007). In developmental 
economies this is especially evident, as the state constitutes a major actor in facilitating an 
appropriate environment for a strong economy (Dahles, 2008). Government to private 
enterprise relationships in such economies are generally seen as hierarchical with the former 
having considerable leverage due to its control over the resource flows in the economy 
(Chang and Kozul-Wright, 1994). Pertaining to the formal and regulatory dimension, prior 
research on developmental states notes the role of the “strong” hand of the government in 
managing the business sector (Shafer, 1990). In such economies, the government is 
considered responsible for directing potentially profitable endeavors, allocating resources 
and sharing risks in the realization of new opportunities. Further, tight governmental control 
over loans is established where the state takes responsibility for providing low-interest loans 
to export-oriented strategic industries (Cole and Park, 1983). In such states the government 
is often not reluctant to intervene in the market through subsidies, trade restrictions, credit 
allocation and managerial guidance (Amsden, 1989). On the one hand this proactive 
governmental stance is beneficial through removing impediments to investments by ‘fiat’ 
and through establishing a climate that is conducive to investment and high return to capital 
is promoted. On the other hand, nevertheless, a lot of profitable endeavors are brought 
under the control of large enterprises, so resources can be expended more efficiently, which 
naturally discourages individual entrepreneurship (Rodrick, 1995; Kshetri, 2011).  
Especially in many African economies the rule of law is “often weakly developed” or even 
“ignored with impunity” (Bratton, 2007). In her survey of 23 African countries, Sievers (2001) 
finds that governmental and judicial institutions are weaker “than needed for sustained high 
growth.” Here issues such as corruption, quality of rule of law as well as the effectiveness of 
the national legal systems in enforcing contracts proved obstacles to entrepreneurship 
(Sievers, 2001). Numerous studies such as Kiggundu (2002) and Pope (2001) support this 
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outcome. Several scholars further stress the inefficient bureaucratic systems as strong 
barriers towards entrepreneurship in an African context. Chu et al.  (2005) find that in a 
Kenyan context especially business registration and taxation systems are overly complex and 
difficult to understand. The authors further find that Kenyan government officials are 
suspicious and sometimes hostile to profit making. Other scholars find Kenyan 
entrepreneurs to complain about long delays in obtaining trade licenses and business 
registrations, complicated tax forms, heavy control by government, and outright 
misinterpretation of laws (Gray et al. , 1997; Kenya Management Assistance Programme 
Report, 1999; Pratt, 2001). A further explanation for the prominent importance that the 
institutional environment seems to hold within the dimensions of the EE can be found in the 
countries’ wider economic system. 
 
 In their work on the prevalent forms of capitalism and how each form contributes to 
economic growth Baumöl, Litan and Schramm (2007) have highlighted four different forms 
of capitalism: namely entrepreneurial, big firm, state directed and oligarchic. In the context 
of many African economies, oligarchic capitalism merits special attention. In this form of 
capitalism, corrupt government officials are linked to entrepreneurship. A symbiosis of 
political and economic elites is one of the defining features of this form of capitalism 
(Schlumberger, 2000). Moore (1979) defines Political elites as “persons who, by virtue of 
their institutional positions, have a high potential to influence national policy making”. In 
this context, entrepreneurs often draw upon political power, capital and social networks to 
maximize economic rewards (Hankiss, 1990; Staniszkis, 1991; Stoica, 2004). Adly (2009) 
states that oligarchic capitalism is related and facilitated by “politically-embedded 
cronyism”. In this form of capitalism, state incumbent firms are known to generate and 
maintain an uneven distribution of property rights, which favor a small number of private 
actors (Adly, 2009). This system often is an efficient tactic of ensuring survival for a ruling 
regime and further explains the role of networks with the government within African 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. It is thanks to this in many African economies prevalent system, 
that ruling elites and their family, friends and clients are able to live a parasitic existence 
(Seitz, 2013; McGaffey, 1987). 
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A further particularity of African entrepreneurship is the role that international development 
agencies and NGOs play, an example of such activities are programs that provide micro loans 
to of micro and small-scale enterprises (McDade and Spring, 2005). Prahalad (2005) critiques 
the impact of international development collaboration on African entrepreneurship. He 
argues that aid payments may reduce local entrepreneurship opportunities when the aid 
lacks linkages to the local economy. The author illustrates this with an example from U.S. aid 
from 2004. The United States had granted African economies US$1 billion in food aid, of 
which 90 percent was spent on foods manufactured in the United States rather than 
sourcing locally and creating entrepreneurial opportunities. In the same way, the plan for 
AIDS required the use of FDA-approved drugs, which are costly and no attention was paid to 
investing in generic drugs and prevention programs. Despite the poor being the intended 
beneficiaries (or the NGOs and foundations working with them) they sometimes receive a 
small proportion of the total aid and have little influence on how it is used. Prahalad (2005) 
argues that aid programs that are structured in such a way may benefit the givers and aid 
administrators as much as or even more than the intended recipients.  
The market environment and the nature of demand is central to entrepreneurship in any 
given region. From the review of literature, a general consensus emerges that the market 
environment in Africa “is tough” for entrepreneurs (Kiggundu, 2002). Several authors find “a 
slow economy” and “low income of consumers” to be the most frequently named obstacles 
to entrepreneurship in Kenya (Chu et al. , 2007). Access to finance is highlighted as a 
considerable challenge to entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa and Kenya in particular. 
Several scholars find that entrepreneurs in this context usually have to depend upon their 
own savings or family support to start their businesses. It is argued that most do not meet 
the requirements for commercial loans and those who do, find them costly (Chu et al. , 
2007; Gray, Cooley & Lutabingwa, 1997). One of the rare papers that cover aspirational 
entrepreneurship, McDade and Spring (2005), find that many medium sized businesses fall 
into a financing gap that is served neither by donor institutions nor by financial institutions. 
According to the authors donor agencies often provide small loans (e.g. US$50—$lOO) to 
micro-enterprises, while banks loan multimillions to large corporations; but the medium- 
sized loans (US$50 000 to SI million) that entrepreneurs may require to grow their firm or 
start a technologically advanced venture are hard to obtain.  
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Social norms around entrepreneurship have a strong influence on why, where, how and if 
new ventures are founded. From a normative perspective some scholars have argued that in 
developmental states the zeitgeist is one of ‘the rich get richer and the poor get poorer’ 
which effectively discourages the establishment of an entrepreneurial climate. Negative 
social attitudes such as these may be rooted in a widespread belief that even when a 
venture fails due to mismanagement, individual promoters of such businesses are unlikely to 
be financially impacted as long as they have the right connections (Kshetri, 2011). According 
to Kim (1976) private enterprise is considered, not as a legitimate and positive way to 
achieve one’s dreams, but as an exploitative endeavor involving “speculation, price-fixing, 
tax evasion and taking advantage of [...] political connections” (Kim, 1976). In such 
environments entrepreneurship is often associated with “plutocrats”, “political capitalists” 
and “compradors” who benefit through “right connections” and “special favors” (Kim, 1976). 
Several scholars point towards Africa’s colonial history to explain today’s lack of successful 
wide-range entrepreneurship. Robson et al.  (2009) argue that entrepreneurial activities 
arguably existed in pre-colonization Africa, while Takyi-Asiedu (1993) shows that such 
activities slowed down in post-colonial Africa. Himbara (1994) argues that in Kenya under 
colonial rule as well as under the kleptocratic rule of Daniel arap Moi from 1972-2002 there 
was very little opportunity for individual business owners and entrepreneurs. An important 
particularity that shapes the climate of entrepreneurship in African states are captured in 
social practices such as Kalabule (Ghana) and Magendo (Uganda) (Kiggundu, 2002). Both 
terms refer to illicit, improper, or illegal conduct of business. They are used to describe the 
criminalization of entrepreneurial activities in order to allow those in positions of control 
and influence to make quick and illegal money. According to Buame (1996), Kalabule reigned 
in Ghana in the 1990s with the effect that no commercial law, no banking law, no company 
law and no laws of ethics were enforced in practice. This lawlessness and corruption spread 
across many occupations such as taxi drivers, managers, police, officers, military personnel, 
teachers and public servants. Kiggundu (2002) finds that every African country has its own 
version of Kalabule and Magendo at great cost to the general business climate, which 
considerably impacts entrepreneurs, the general economy, public administration, and the 
wider society.  
Significantly such a way of business conduct does not only undermine legal frameworks and 
the national integrity and regulatory system, but also undermines trust among 
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entrepreneurs, which forms a critical part of the foundation of private enterprise (Kiggundu, 
2002; Pope, 2001)13.  
Finally pertaining to the human capital that is available for entrepreneurship Alamine (2006) 
finds that poor management of human resources is among the major barriers to 
entrepreneurship in Africa. Wilson (1990) argues that private entrepreneurs in this context 
often lack financial and managerial ability required to run large and sophisticated 
businesses. Further a lack of entrepreneurial education available in developing countries has 
been stressed by Nabi and Liñián (2011). 
  
                                                     
13 See section 2.1 Entrepreneurship and trust for more elaboration. 
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2.6 Technology entrepreneurship in Kenya: Challenges faced in the Silicon Savannah 
Two reports on the phenomenon of Kenyan technology entrepreneurship and in particular 
the challenges that are faced in this regard were published in early 2014. Julia Mannske 
wrote the first report for the Vodafone institute for society and communication. It is titled 
“Innovations out of Africa - The emergence, challenges and potential of the Kenyan Tech 
Ecosystem”. The second research report is published by GSMA and is titled “Digital 
Entrepreneurship in Kenya 2014”. Given their relevance for this research inquiry, both 
reports are treated in detail.  
 
The former research was conducted by a single researcher who held personal interviews 
with local EE stakeholders in addition to ethnographic research and literature and discourse 
research. The report first revisits the rise of the local EE and stresses improvements in the 
area of ICT connectivity and the successful establishment of mobile money interface m-Pesa 
as a main prerequisite for the emergence of current EE structures. In its investigation of the 
challenges and the potential of the current Kenyan digital EE the report finds that: 
“Despite these impressive developments, the challenges remain substantial: Kenya’s tech 
ecosystem is young and still unstable. The success story of M-Pesa has yet to repeat itself. 
[…]. In fact, the framework conditions for entrepreneurship in Kenya are considerably less 
favourable than in the Western world and setting up a profitable company entails enormous 
risks” (Mannske, 2014, p.4). The conducted analysis brings forward four areas of action that 
are suggested to be necessary to improve the local entrepreneurship environment, namely: 
- Create access to funding capital  
- Promote lasting structures 
- Promote relevant competences 
- Set up stable real and virtual networks 
 
The first recommendation builds on the report’s finding that financing opportunities for 
early stage ventures in Kenya are limited and that entrepreneurs are often struggling to 
cover living expenses or hardware costs. The research finds a lack of angel investing culture 
in Kenya and further finds that the involved transaction costs in VC processes (e.g. through 
due diligence audits) render the investment of small sums uninteresting. The report 
therefore suggests that new funding models should be investigated in which early ventures 
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in the idea and concept development phase can receive the small sums needed. Here the 
research suggests that development organizations may become active in this field. The 
research further proposes that governments should create incentives for business angels, for 
example in the form of pro rata investment subsidies from state institutions or development 
agencies.  
 
The second recommendation of the report is to “promote lasting structures”. Here the 
report argues that the talk of a “Silicon Savannah” and the inherent comparison with Silicon 
Valley is misguided, given the fragile nature of this small and young ecosystem. Investors 
looking for short-term rewards have little prospect of success in this market. Instead, 
investors should provide long-term incentives for entrepreneurs and enable sustainable 
business models. In more detail this entails that, instead of high one-off monetary prizes, 
companies and institutions should offer long-term support and targeted monitoring at start-
up competitions, which would be more in line with the needs of local entrepreneurs. Here 
especially the establishment of non-monetary support such as mentor networks, training, 
and access to social capital are suggested as focus fields for development agencies and 
governments.  
 
The third recommendation is to “promote relevant competencies”. The author argues that 
deficiencies are apparent in entrepreneur’s programming and management know-how and 
finds obstacles to the production of hardware goods, namely a lack of infrastructure and 
high tariff levies. In order to address this issue the author argues that African universities 
need to anchor management competence in their teaching and also argues that institutions 
that convey programming skills should combine this with training in commercial 
management. Development organizations and IT companies may supposedly employ grants 
and internship programs to encourage talents.  
 
Finally, the author suggests that real and virtual networks should be set up. The author finds 
that especially in a context where entrepreneurs face severe financial restrictions the 
creation of technology meeting places (co-working spaces, incubators and accelerators) are 
particularly relevant, since they would allow for access to hardware equipment, 
infrastructure, affordable premises and potential business contacts. In addition, the author 
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argues for the creation of (virtual) networks for the international exchange of knowledge 
between different tech hubs. Here the author suggests to international development 
stakeholders to support exchange programs between western and African start-ups and 
award travel grants for international conferences.  
 
The GSMA report titled “Digital Entrepreneurship in Kenya 2014” (2014b) draws upon an 
extensive sample of over 200 interviews and Kenyan ICT EE  stakeholders and several focus 
groups. The lion’s share of the DFID supported research was outsourced to the Kenyan 
research organization iHub Research. The research report’s aim is to “understand the 
challenges to developing digital services across Kenya”. Given the recent mobile revolution 
in Africa the research sees vast potential for digital entrepreneurship in East-Africa and 
especially Kenya, which is named the frontrunner in this region. While the report names 
notable African digital entrepreneurial success stories that exemplify the potential in the 
area of for example Internet-based telephony, or software companies providing banking and 
insurance solutions, the authors also find “a myriad of financial, commercial and technical 
challenges [that] prevent the vast majority of digital entrepreneurs from scaling and realising 
the full potential of their business ventures” (GSMA, 2014b;p.2). 
 
The research provides detailed information about these challenges, which can be 
summarized as follows:   
- Early stage financing gap for ventures and a lack of investible businesses 
opportunities for venture capital investors 
- Lack of entrepreneurs’ management skills and expertise 
- Funding shortfalls at all stages that harm team focus and composition 
- Lack of business angle culture in Kenya 
- The multitude of competitions and grants is helpful to create a hype around 
entrepreneurship, but can hardly provide the resources that are needed by current 
Kenyan tech entrepreneurs 
- Need for increased engagement between telco providers and entrepreneurs 
 
The reports extensive research covering most venture capital firms investing in digital new 
ventures in the relevant environment, shows that most investors focus on financing more 
mature ventures and only very few provide capital at the idea generation or prototyping 
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phase. Nevertheless, those more mature start-ups looking for investments often find it hard 
to find investors. The report’s interviews with investors finds that the mostly western 
investors complain about poorly developed business plans, and entrepreneurs with 
insufficient business skills or relevant experience to meet the existing expectations.   
 
As a result, the lacking availability of capital at early stages and the lack of confidence in 
startups at later stages results in most startups ‘bootstrapping’ and running side businesses 
in parallel. The research finds however that this “side money” is mostly insufficient to 
sustain the venture to the next milestone or funding round. The conducted survey showed 
that at least 70 per cent of startups indicate not earning enough to maintain business and 
living expenses for a small team. In other tech hubs angel investors often execute the role of 
early stage financing and mentoring. The research finds that “technology-focused business 
angels and angel networks are just emerging in the region” and that there is currently little 
willingness on behalf of wealthy Kenyan individuals to invest in tech startups. While the 
research notes that mentorship opportunities are accessible through current networks, 
accelerators, and peer-groups, the authors deem these avenues overall not sufficient to 
overcome gaps in practical business and management knowledge. 
 
The report further finds that competitions and grants seem helpful in spotlighting 
entrepreneurs and an important source of capital for social impact projects. However, the 
research also finds that some competitions, mainly those with prize money below 2000 USD, 
create an incentive for individuals to simply move from competition to competition with 
what the report calls “‘cool’ mobile applications as opposed to scalable business ideas”. The 
GSMA report (2014b) argues that the total amount awarded in such competitions over the 
last several years was overall hardly substantial and is unlikely to ‘crowd out’ venture capital 
funding, the authors also find that the frequency of and hype around competitions create a 
distracting environment for entrepreneurs and a significant amount of noise.  
 
The GSMA report further analyses the role that mobile operators play in the Kenyan digital 
EE. In this regard the conducted analysis finds that several capabilities and assets possessed 
by these companies render them important gatekeepers to the market and hence make 
them important stakeholders for digital entrepreneurs in Kenya. The identified assets and 
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capabilities include direct channel access, for example the direct access to SMS, USSD or 
Voice / Interactive Voice Response (IVR) distribution, a wide distribution network that goes 
deep into rural communities, operations capabilities and established trust with consumers. 
The report argues that these unique assets can be leveraged in a wide range of applications 
and services, including capabilities like payments and billing, identity/user authentication, 
location awareness, customer trust and loyalty etc. However, the conducted survey of over 
200 start-ups shows that to date only 11 percent of ventures have secured such a 
partnership. Here the report finds that 33 percent of startups indicate the main challenge in 
forming commercial partnerships to be lack of trust and concerns about sharing ideas freely. 
 
3. Methodology Chapter 
3.1 Research Design 
This research follows an inductive theory building approach employing qualitative research 
methods to gain insights into the novel phenomena of mWork and technology 
entrepreneurship in Kenya. Initially the current research set out to explore the possibility of 
mWork in Kenya and to analyze the different shapes that the phenomenon would take, as 
well as the challenges and enablers that it faces in a Kenyan context. As the literature review 
reveals, the status quo of the research on the topic is far from having reached a level where 
deductive research, thus theory testing, would be reasonable. Currently there is no basic set 
of assumptions or frameworks concerning mWork in the given context that could be 
empirically tested. At this stage theory building is more sensible as there is still no clear 
notion on the ways in which mobile technology may contribute to employment or in how far 
such initiatives actually engage with “development”. Therefore, interviews with mWork 
entrepreneurs, mWork users and stakeholders with expert knowledge in mobile technology 
for development were conducted. These interviews are the primary source in the creation of 
multiple case studies that provide a sufficiently rich insight to answer the posed research 
questions.  
A multiple-case study approach was chosen for two reasons. First, according to Yin (1994), 
multiple-case studies yield better results than single-case studies and should always be 
chosen when having the choice and resources. Second, multiple cases enable the researcher 
to conduct within-case and cross-case analysis which expands the external generalizability of 
 74 
the findings. Following Yin’s logic, this study first describes each individual case in order to 
show the particular example in which mobile technology is used to create “work” and deliver 
insights pertaining to the challenges faced and the successful strategies employed as well as 
towards the development impact. Then an analysis across cases demonstrates shared 
challenges and opportunities of mWork to extend credibility.  
 
Where possible, the research conducts an assessment of “development impact” of mWork 
applications. As outlined previously this research understands “development” as a 
multidimensional concept that moves beyond the terms of income and skill generation and 
sees e.g. participation and empowerment as equally important drivers of development 
(Todaro, 2015). Therefore, Heeks and Arun’s (2010) assets framework for impact assessment 
of ICTD projects is employed for the assessment of the development impact of mWork 
activities. Heeks and Arun (2010) and Madon (2013) argue that in order to grasp the 
multidimensional view of development in an ICT context interview-based qualitative 
research is required in which the researcher captures the subjects’ “perceptions and ‘stories’ 
[...] about their lives in general and their involvement with Information Technology” (Madon, 
2013, p.6). 
The applied multiple-case study research approach follows the process described by 
Eisenhardt (1989) and is therefore characterized by a strongly flexible and opportunistic data 
collection process in which iterative circles of adapting the research question provides the 
possibility to react to serendipitous findings and interesting emergent themes. Similar to 
grounded theory approaches, data collection and data analysis were not executed 
sequantielly but rather in parallel (Charmaz, 2000, Glaser, 1978). In the course of the 
empirical research the particular nature of technology entrepreneurship in a Kenyan context 
and the significant context-dependent entrepreneurial challenges surfaced. Hence the 
author decided to widen the focus of the study and to collect additional data to provide 
much needed insight on this topic. As the ICT infrastructure in Kenya and with it the 
phenomenon of technology entrepreneurship has emerged relatively recently, little is 
known pertaining to the why, how and where ICT ventures in this context emerge. Hence 
this research uses the insights gained through the mWork case studies and validates and 
supplements the information through a set of additional interviews with non-mWork ICT 
entrepreneurs and a range of ecosystem expert stakeholders. Such qualitative research 
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methodologies are well suited to understanding the barriers and enablers as well as the 
particularities of technology entrepreneurship in Kenya as they are helpful in understanding 
the “why and how” of a phenomenon (Yin, 1994) and are appropriate when little is known 
about a phenomenon and current perspectives seem inadequate in the empirical context 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
In addition to the interview data as well as the perusal of literature and other secondary 
sources this research has also benefitted from ethnographical observations made over the 
four-month period that the researcher spent in Nairobi. The researcher participated as an 
active member of the local technology entrepreneurship scene, through taking part in 
numerous technology entrepreneurship events such as Hackathons, round table discussions, 
company presentations, coding courses and informal networking events. Further the 
researcher employed his knowhow in the area of technology entrepreneurship to mentor 
some aspiring ICT entrepreneurs and to provide feedback on, e.g., business model creation 
and venturing processes. The research method of ethnography is especially valuable in order 
to grasp often tacit beliefs, norms, values and cultural artifacts and behaviors within a 
particular social setting (Atkinson, et al., 2001). Due to the importance of the motivations, 
norms and values around the establishment of new enterprises the researcher found these 
ethnographical insights to be very valuable. While the ethnographic observations do not  
provide a detailed holistic cultural portrait, the insights enabled the author to better 
contextualize, interpret and understand the statements made on behalf of the interview 
subjects and conduct the current analysis in the to him foreign cultural context of Kenya. The 
research design can be illustrated as follows in figure 5. It is important to understand the 
cyclical, iterative connection among the three phases, and thus only a somewhat linear 
nature that occurs in the process research conduct and analysis.  
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Figure 5: Overview of data collected 
 
3.2 Data collection and access 
The majority of data was collected during a four-month empirical research in Nairobi, Kenya 
from the 01.09.2013 to the 23.12.2013. Coming to Nairobi with no more than a few initial 
contacts, I started working from the open tech space iHub, which takes a central role in the 
local ICT EE . The iHub not only provided a free space to work and free Wi-Fi Internet with 
reliable energy supply, but also  access to numerous tech events and courses and the 
possibility to network very efficiently with a diverse range of members from the local ICT EE . 
After a few weeks of participation, I felt like having become an accepted member of the still 
relatively small tech community of Nairobi. In hindsight I believe that my continuous 
presence and the establishment of many informal relationships with members of the tech 
scene helped to establish access to relevant respondents as well as the interviewees’ trust. 
The trust of the interviewees is a critical concern in qualitative research as it inclines 
respondents to share information truthfully and not to omit uncomfortable details or 
criticism (Gartner and Birley, 2002). Harrison and Krauss (2002) argue that the phenomenon 
of “interviewer cheating” is especially problematic in the context of qualitative research on 
entrepreneurship in a development context, since the subjects assume that the outcome is 
in some way related to the allocation of financial support and hence give biased answers. 
During this trip the engagement manager at the iHub and the head of the infodev incubator 
mLabs acted as “sponsors” taking an active interest in my research. Through their 
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introductions I was able to gain access to individuals that I would have otherwise not met. 
This type of “snowballing” is common to qualitative research and was one of the most 
important and effective sampling strategies used in this research (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011). Snowball sampling is just one type of purposive sampling employed in this research. 
Purposive sampling or non-probability sampling involves selecting subjects, sites or cases 
based on a particular set of characteristics (Lindhof & Taylor, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 
2011). In line with the opportunistic data collection process used, this research employed 
theoretical sampling which Glaser and Strauss define (1967; p.45) as “the process of data 
collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes 
[her] data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them”. The advantage of 
this approach was that it enabled the researcher to stay focused on checking and refining 
the constructed codes and categories, while simultaneously avoiding to be overwhelmed 
and unfocused in data collection and analysis. 
 
Most of the interviews were conducted face to face during the research period in Kenya. 
However, during 2014 and early 2015 some interviews were conducted via Skype or 
telephone (see list of interviews in Appendix one), mostly to follow up on case company’s 
development or to further validate statements that respondents had made. Prior to the 
interview the respondents were asked whether the author could record the interview. While 
some of the interviewees objected, most interviewees agreed to be recorded. The records 
facilitated the transcribing of the interviews, which then aided analysis of the data later on. 
As most interview respondents preferred not to be quoted directly, statements were coded 
and names were generally not mentioned. By ensuring the respondent full discretion the 
approach protects the interviewee and makes her more comfortable in displaying processes 
in a truthful fashion. Gartner and Birley (2002) stress that the establishment of a trustful 
atmosphere is an essential facilitator of data quality in qualitative research. Thus each case 
and quote carries the type of organization, the industry of operation and an indication of 
their role. This system enables the reader to follow the arguments, without disclosing the 
identity of the respondent.  
The interviews were entirely conducted in English language, which did not pose an obstacle 
in the case of mWork, ICT entrepreneurs, EE experts and Shop Soko artisans. Two subjects 
from the biNu impact assessment were not comfortable in English and a translator 
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translated in Swahili and Luo. Additionally, notes were taken according to four categories: 
Field notes documented the content and description of the interview. Personal notes 
reflected more qualitative impressions such as interviewees’ personal reactions to questions 
and personal impressions the researcher had during the field contacts. Methodological notes 
contained comments on the chosen methodology and ideas for possible changes. Lastly, 
theoretical notes documented emerging trends and hypotheses and also personal guesses to 
follow up in later interviews. Making notes according to these categories was somewhat 
burdensome, but has, in the author’s opinion, significantly supported the grasp of the entire 
picture of the conducted cases. 
 
3.2.1 mWork sample selection 
For the first section of interviews I selected interviewees that were or had been actively 
involved in start-ups that fall under this research’s definition of mWork and with individuals 
that had “expert knowledge” on this field of mobile technology application. Examples of the 
latter are the organizers of the infodev Hackathon Mobile2Work and stakeholders knowing 
the local ICT EE  well, i.e. incubator managers, or development stakeholders.   
While this research deliberately limits itself to the geographical context of Kenya, one case 
from Armenia and one case from Nepal were included in the analysis since they brought 
forward interesting insights into additional potential fields of application of mWork.  
The mWork case studies were designed using triangulation of sources, namely interviews 
with the founders themselves, industry experts, and secondary material, such as the case 
company’s websites and the documentation provided by the infoDev Hackathon reports. For 
some cases several interviews were executed allowing a longitudinal view of the 
development of the enterprise and the underlying business model. Nevertheless, most of 
the mWork cases encountered were discontinued either during or shortly after the research 
period in 2013. In total 16 interviews of approximately 60 minutes each were executed with 
mWork entrepreneurs and five interviews with mWork experts (see Appendix one for list of 
interviews). Multiple case study research follows a saturation principle, i.e. no additional 
cases are added whenever the point of saturation is reached. The saturation point is defined 
as that number of cases beyond which adding an additional case causes no notable change 
in the identified pattern (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In the current study, however, the 
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sample size of case studies can be considered to be exhaustive of the population of mWork 
endeavors in Kenya at the time of the study. As the number of companies involved with 
mWork proved to be significantly less than had been estimated previously on the basis of 
journalistic accounts of the “Silicon Savannah” and the accounts made within the M4D 
discourse, the author is confident that the relevant cases and interviewees are covered. This 
impression was confirmed by at least six ecosystem expert interviewees, who through their 
central position as heads of incubators, technology competition organizers or technology 
journal editors had good overview of the scene and confirmed that they knew of no 
additional companies active in the technology scene that conduct mWork related activities.  
 
3.2.2 Interview conduct with mWork and other local ICT entrepreneurs 
The interviews with mWork entrepreneurs followed a semi-structured format, which on the 
one hand permitted flexibility and opportunity for new aspects to arise and on the other 
hand ensured a goal-oriented conversation. At all times the interview flexibility was 
maintained and, depending on the individual interview, questions were neglected or asked 
in different chronology. Significantly and imposed through the inductive nature of the 
research the content of the interviews changed as the study went on and incorporated the 
evolving themes and hypothesis that had been formed through previously conducted 
interviews. In addition, when the interviewer did not fully understand a statement by the 
respondent, the interviewer tried to summarize the line of reasoning and asked for 
confirmation, if she understood correctly. 
 
mWork entrepreneurs were asked a set of open questions that allowed the collection of rich 
data and related contexts of the underlying mWork business and its founders. First the 
founders were asked to introduce themselves, specifying their educational and professional 
background and general personal information. Then questions were asked to grasp the 
commercial logic underlying their mWork endeavor that covered the basic components 
covered in Osterwalder & Pigneur’s business model generation (2010). Respondents were 
asked to explain and describe the chronology of activities they had followed so far in the 
venturing process (i.e. from idea brainstorming, market research, design of value proposition 
to business model validation and product design and launch) as well as to describe the 
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current stage of development the entrepreneurial endeavor was in. In the case of the 
mWork applications stemming from the infodev Hackathon this entailed asking them how 
much they had achieved since the initiation of the companies one year ago.  
In most cases respondents independently brought up the significant challenges that persist 
in the Kenyan context for entrepreneurship. If they did not come up organically they were 
asked to indicate what they perceive as the most important barriers and enablers to 
founding an ICT business in Kenya. Respondents were also asked to indicate their opinion on 
other mWork fields of application, its potential for development impact and economic 
sustainability. After respondents had answered these questions autonomously the author 
presented the preliminary insights, evolving themes and emerging hypothesizes with them 
to discuss if they could confirm or disconfirm them or help him to specify them further. At 
the end of each interview the respondent was asked if there were any other aspects they 
wanted to share, if they agreed to being cited and whether they could provide me with 
contacts for further interesting interview contacts. In addition to the interviewed mWork 
entrepreneurs six entrepreneurs that are active in a technology related entrepreneurial 
endeavor were interviewed as well in order to validate whether the derived themes and 
findings also hold outside the domain of mWork. These interviews also followed the 
previously outlined procedure.  
 
3.2.3 Sample selection and interview conduct with “Silicon Savannah” experts 
In total 17 interviews with expert ecosystem stakeholders from different dimensions of 
Isenberg’s (2011) EE paradigm were executed, including VC investors, University 
stakeholders, incubator and accelerator managers and organizers of start-up competitions 
(see Appendix 1 for table of interviews). These interview partners were selected according 
to their role in the wider EE and the expert knowledge that these individuals hold through 
years of experience working with ICT start-ups in Kenya. The exact number of interviews 
needed is hard to determine in qualitative research. Marshall (1996) finds that the number 
of interviews needs to be increased until a repetition of patterns and topics indicates a 
saturation of data and therein signals that an adequate sample size has been reached. In 
light of the breadth of covering an entire entrepreneurship ecosystem to uncover challenges 
and enablers faced, not all emergent themes could be sufficiently pursued. Further, some 
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fields of investigation, such as the policy component of the EE could not be pursued 
sufficiently since no policy actor was available for interview during the limited research span. 
Nevertheless, for several themes and codes that had already emerged through interviews 
with the mWork and other ICT entrepreneurs the expert stakeholders were able to provide 
validation, more detailed insight or a contrasting opinion. Finally some of the found themes 
achieved sufficient repetition by different stakeholders to indicate their credibility according 
to Marshall (1996) and were therefore included in the final model of the EE. The interviews 
with ecosystem experts included an open component, where the expert was asked to give 
his opinion on the wider ecosystem, the prevailing opportunities, challenges and enablers. 
Then the expert was, dependent on his field of expertise, asked to provide additional insight 
into his field. For example, a VC investor would be asked about his view on the availability of 
financing in the ecosystem, the available financial support systems and their effectiveness. 
Only after each expert had independently shared his views did the researcher probe 
additional answers by discussing current hypotheses and emerging research themes with 
her.  
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Interview data analysis 
Analysis of the data followed coding processes regularly associated with grounded theory 
methodologies that are seeking to induce theory from empirical observation. The three 
processes are called (a) open coding, (b) axial coding, and (c) selective coding (Glaser, 1978). 
It is imperative to understand the cyclical connection among the three phases, and thus a 
nonlinear nature that occurs in the process of analysis. Therefore coding does not follow a 
stepwise procedure so much; once it has commenced with the initial round of open coding, 
it follows a continuous iteration between types of coding in order to “distill a grounded 
theory rooted in a solid rationale” (LaRossa, 2005, p. 840). In addition to coding, Charmaz 
(2000) recommends the writing of memos, which are notes that serve the researcher by 
providing a trial and error apparatus to compare and contrast emerging variables and their 
components, keeping an eye on the final narrative. They also help the researcher reflect on 
the process, and provide reference points for later stages of the writing process. To 
accomplish these coding and memo writing processes effectively and efficiently, the 
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researcher utilized two computer software applications that are popular in qualitative 
research: NVivo and Microsoft Excel.  
 
Open Coding 
For every transcription, the researcher perused the subject‘s words for indicators (Glaser, 
1992). An indicator is a section of text, possibly as short as a word or as long as a few 
sentences, that makes some statement considered to be interesting. NVivo made it possible 
to highlight that segment, label it in accordance to its content, and place the segment in an 
appropriate place in a hierarchy that emerged over the course of classifying several 
segments.  
As more and more indicators arose, many of those were found to be strongly related to each 
other so that they could be grouped into a concept. 
At the same time as concepts accumulated, the researcher recognized that many could be 
grouped together into a category. LaRossa (2005) gives the example of a subject that talks 
about romantic love, other places where they speak of platonic love, and again other places 
where they speak of courtly love. Each one of these should be labeled as such, and 
considered concepts. Finally, all of those may be assembled under a category of ‘types of 
love’.  Again another set of indicators from the same interview may contribute to concepts 
like low-, medium-, and high-intensity love, and then those concepts may give birth to a 
category called ‘intensity of romantic love’. Beyond that relatively basic example, LaRossa 
encouraged the researcher to employ a dimensionalization approach at the category level, 
or a heightened sense of the need to think abstractly to consider possible connections that 
run between concepts.  He provided an example that “toy grabbing” and “toy hiding” among 
a research setting of young children playing could be considered as the category, “strategies 
for toy accumulation”.  
In the current study, the researcher strove to follow that guidance, testing different ways of 
combining concepts into categories. Concepts were first grouped loosely as barriers and 
enablers and then attributed to the different dimensions of the ecosystem. Then concepts 
that seemed to be interactional, meaning resulting from an interaction between one or two 
or more of the ecosystem dimensions and actors, were grouped.  
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Axial Coding 
The next phase of coding, axial coding, is portrayed by LaRossa as taking each Category or 
variable and for some time investigating it deeply guided by what Glaser (1978) calls the six 
Cs “causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences, covariances, and conditions”.  This is the 
distinctive feature of the axial coding phase according to LaRossa since the researcher 
essentially comes to develop hypotheses by testing each of the different categories as a 
potential focal category, incorporating questions that naturally arise from the “six Cs”, and 
considering which category appears to offer the best fit. Charmaz (2004) names this phase 
“focused coding” and generated five central questions that may be employed:  
(1) What process is at issue here?  
(2) Under what conditions does this process develop?  
(3) How does the research participant(s) think, feel, and act while involved with this process?  
(4) When, why, and how does the process change? 
(5) What are the consequences of the process?  
 
In the current study Microsoft Excel proved particularly useful to re-organize, index, and 
tabulate the incidence of categories by respondent type. 
It was from this phase that key barriers and enablers were identified. The researcher 
analyzed those according to the consistency and priority that participants placed upon 
different barriers and enablers, and settled upon those that seemed to be most interesting 
and that encountered sufficient repetition in the data. At this point also the particularities in 
the Kenyan process of founding an ICT venture emerged, and the way that these interacted 
with the defined barriers and enablers or cultural particularities was established. 
 
Selective Coding 
Using the analogy of a good novel, LaRossa argues that selective coding is essentially 
considered the main plot and storyline. In this phase of the coding process, the central task 
was to excavate the core variables that tie the whole of the data together into a coherent, 
tangible, explainable whole. On this matter LaRossa states “In short, the stories that 
researchers put together should be lucid, understandable, and hopefully compelling” (p. 
850). It was in this phase, that the investigator developed the entirety of the model of the 
barriers and enablers in the Silicon Savannah ICT EE , weaving together the focal categories 
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and processes identified in the previous coding phases into a coherent composition, and 
plotting out additional intricacies and interdependencies. The output of this final level of 
coding is the substance of what is conveyed in chapter five. 
 
Use of Qualitative Software 
The actual analysis of interviews largely relied upon the use of two software programs. 
Firstly, NVivo, a widely-used product from QSR International, allowed the investigator to 
conveniently code splices of text into indicators, then to cluster indicators into concepts, and 
concepts into categories. Lastly, the investigator analyzed the resulting categories for 
discovery of the focal categories, and for discovery of themes that emerge from the focal 
categories. Also, Microsoft Excel benefitted the process, particularly in the attempt to 
recognize how repetitive certain concepts and categories appeared among the taken 
sample.  
3.3.2 Case analysis: within case and cross case analysis 
The current study employed both a within case and a cross-case analysis. The within case 
analysis provides an in-depth analysis of each case study and critically investigates the 
processes that were employed in founding of the mWork business, the economic feasibility 
of the underlying business model as well as the challenges that each business was subjected 
to and the strategies that each successful case employed in overcoming evident challenges. 
The cross-case analysis was executed comparing different groups of cases to find patters, i.e. 
comparing mWork cases across and within the different segments, across their success 
profile, across their founder profile and other categories or dimensions. This was done to 
then look for within-group similarities and differences coupled with intergroup differences 
and similarities (Einsenhardt, 1989). A second tactic that was employed was to select pairs of 
cases and then to list the similarities and differences between each pair. The benefit of this 
approach is that this forces researchers to look for the subtle similarities and differences 
between cases. According to Eisenhardt (1989) the juxtaposition of seemingly similar cases 
by an investigator searching for differences may break simplistic frames. In the same way, 
the search for similarity in a seemingly different pair may lead to more in-depth 
understanding. The result of these forced comparisons can be new categories and concepts, 
which the investigators did not anticipate. 
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3.3.3 Development of the Model of Ecosystem Emergence  
The presented model of nascent ecosystem emergence in GS contexts was developed in a 
process of abductive analysis, where the author engaged in an iterative process between 
empirical materials and existing theory. Abductive analysis, other than deductive or 
inductive analysis, reflects the process of creatively inferencing and double-checking these 
inferences with more data. As such, abduction fits in with the traditional grounded theory 
recommendation to move back and forth between data and theory (Timmermans and 
Tavory, 2012). The authors draw from the theory of inference, meaning, and action of 
pragmatist philosopher Charles S. Peirce, in arguing that abduction, rather than induction, 
should be the guiding principle of empirically based theory development. This approach is 
more pragmatic and efficient than purely inductive theory construction and allows sufficient 
room for developing innovative hypothesis and theories, based on interesting empirical 
research findings (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012; Tavory and Timmermanns, 2014).  
 
3.4 Measurement of mWork development impact 
Only two cases of mWork firms in Kenya, biNu and Shop Soko, were sufficiently advanced at 
the time of empirical research that interviews with mWorkers (those working with mWork 
applications) could be conducted in order to determine the development impact. In the case 
of Shop Soko three artisans were met and asked to talk about their experience with the 
company. The interviews were arranged by Shop Soko, were between 20 and 30 minutes 
long and conducted in person in the artisans’ workshops in Kibera. In the case of biNu eight 
users of the company were interviewed. These were found by approaching people in the 
marketplace of Kibera, Nairobi, on two consecutive days and two more were asked in the 
area of Wagoma, Kisumu, because the researcher encountered them by chance. The 
interviews were semi structured, first allowing the interviewee to speak about her life 
situation and subsequently open questions were asked according to the five capital 
dimensions by Heeks and Arun’s (2010) assets framework.  
In order to operationalize “development impact” a framework is needed that both satisfied 
this research’s view of development and that was appropriate for use in an ICTD context. 
Therefore, this study draws upon Heeks and Arun’s (2010) assets framework for impact 
assessment of ICTD projects. The framework builds upon the five classes of assets of the 
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Sustainable Livelihoods framework (DFID, 1999), which may be the most well-known 
conceptual model drawing on the new perspective of multidimensionality and is used in 
both planning new development activities and assessing the contribution to livelihood 
sustainability made by existing activities (Arun, Heeks, Morgan, 2004). The underlying assets-
vulnerability approach has been employed previously to measure the impact of 
development initiatives (i.e. Moser, 1998); it focuses on what the poor possess in terms of 
multidimensional assets that can be employed to reduce poverty and vulnerability. Unlike 
for example baseline monetary indicators the model does not focus on what poor people do 
not have but rather “contributes to the development of analytical tools to facilitate those 
interventions which promote opportunities, as well as removing key obstacles” (Heeks and 
Arun, 2010, p.444). 
Heeks’ approach, as illustrated in Figure 1, builds on the notion of vulnerability as a dynamic 
concept and captures change processes catalyzed by development interventions through 
their impact on five asset classes that underpin changes to vulnerabilities (Heeks and Arun, 
2010). The asset classes considered are human capital, political capital, financial capital, 
physical capital and social capital. Guiding the empirical research and semi-structured 
interviews this model enabled the researcher to develop a multidimensional understanding 
of which assets the mWork application under assessment provided the users with and what 
contribution these assets actually made to reduce vulnerability and improve livelihoods.  
 
 
Figure 6: Assets framework for impact assessment of ICTD projects (Heeks and Arun, 2010) 
      
 
According to Heeks and Arun the assets comprise five different categories through which 
ICTD projects can have an impact, namely: 
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Human capital denotes the skills, knowledge, ability to work and good health that 
collectively enable the mWork user to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve 
their livelihood objectives. 
Political Capital includes power-related issues such as: empowerment, the users’ perceived 
status within their community and gender relations.  
Financial capital represents the financial resources that the mWork users use to achieve 
their livelihood comprising available stocks that can be held in different forms such as cash, 
bank deposits, assets like livestock and jewelry, or resources obtained through credit-
providing institutions; and regular inflows of money, comprising earned income, pensions, 
other transfers from the state and remittances. 
Physical capital comprises the basic infrastructure and producer goods needed to support 
livelihoods.  
Social capital comprises social resources, which mWork users draw upon in pursuit of the 
livelihood objectives; mainly conceived as networks and relationships based on trust, 
reciprocity and exchanges.  
 
3.5 Other Methodological Considerations 
3.5.1 Researcher‘s Role 
The researcher designed and implemented the study with occasional consultation with 
scholars on the dissertation committee, as well as from a research forum on technology 
entrepreneurship in Africa. In contrast to quantitative research where the questionnaire or 
experimental treatment is the instrument yielding the data and conclusions, in qualitative 
research the investigator himself collects and documents the data. For that reason, it is 
important to convey who the researcher is, in order to ascertain what biases and 
assumptions may have been present throughout (Creswell, 2003). At the commencement of 
the current study the researcher had finished a Bachelors of Science and Masters of Science 
degree in International Business Administration and International Management, 
respectively, at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the 
University of St. Gallen (HSG). Especially in the course of the Masters degree the author has 
specialized in international entrepreneurship and has written his master thesis in this field. 
In addition, he was able to gain practical experiences in the field of technology management 
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and entrepreneurship through working with a leading German telecommunication MNE and 
through consulting an ICT enabled start-up when working for an IT consultancy. Being born 
and raised in Germany and having been educated in England, The Netherlands and 
Switzerland the author clearly comes from a western European context and therefore can be 
considered to hold western European paradigms and cultural values that influence his views 
on entrepreneurship and management. The author had previously spent an exchange 
semester at the ESAN University in Lima, where he was first sensitized for issues around 
international development and especially the role of entrepreneurship in developing 
countries of the GS. The author had never before been in Africa, but had close contact and 
friendships with diaspora Africans in the course of his studies in Rotterdam. Further previous 
to commencing the research in Kenya the author read several belletristic works and 
textbooks about Kenyan history and culture in order to acquire at least some necessary 
background knowledge. As a check against his western European assumptions and biases, 
the investigator maintained a discipline of memo writing concurrent with performing his 
analysis, so that an introspective assessment occurred throughout the process. The author’s 
practice of Vipassana meditation was further extremely helpful as a tool of self-monitoring 
and critical introspection in order to guard him from being led by unconscious assumptions.  
 
3.5.2 Ethical Considerations 
As described previously, interviewees were given explanation of the purpose of the study at 
first contact, either over the phone or in person. They were further informed about their 
privileges to cancel the interview and rescind their participation, their choice to stay 
anonymous and any other considerations of importance. 
 
3.5.3 Credibility of findings 
Eisner (1991) argued that it is more appropriate to use the term credibility than validity in 
regard of qualitative research, and that there are standards with which qualitative research 
can be scrutinized to establish higher levels of credibility. First, the author offered the 
standard of structural corroboration, which calls for an investigator to utilize multiple 
sources of data in order to affirm or debunk their interpretation. “We seek a confluence of 
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evidence that breeds credibility, that allows us to feel confident about our observations, 
interpretations, and conclusion” (p. 110). Concerning the current study, structural 
corroboration is strengthened by the fact that multiple informants from different 
backgrounds have been used to construct the data set. The clarifications that were most 
universally observed among the subjects are, therefore, the most credible and worthy of 
inclusion in the developed theory. In line with this, Charmaz (2000; p. 497) suggests that it is 
an advantage of grounded theory method that it offers integral checks of validity: “A major 
contribution of grounded theory methods is that they provide rigorous procedures for 
researchers to check, refine, and develop their ideas and intuitions about the data…. [further 
they] offer systematic approaches for discovering significant aspects of human experience 
that remain inaccessible with traditional verification methods”.  
In addition to structural corroboration, Eisner (p. 127) mentions consensual validation, which 
he understands as “an agreement among competent others that the description, 
interpretation, and evaluation and thematic are, in fact, accurate”. In this vein Creswell 
(2003) employs the term external auditing to suggest a comparable standard. The researcher 
of the current study sought consensual validation through regular consultation with 
committee members, who were well-informed in the area of technology entrepreneurship 
as well as with other researcher and experts of ICT EE  in the GS. Also the discipline of field 
note writing captured the informal and contemplative thoughts of the investigator. Lastly 
two research organizations, the Vodafone Research Institute (Mannske, 2014) and the GSMA 
(2014a; 2014b) independently conducted research on the emerging ICT EE . As the data for 
these reports was collected autonomously and published after the main data collection 
period of this current study had commenced, they have not influenced the data collection in 
any way. Nevertheless, as the analysis section shows the findings of this study are in many 
cases in line with the preceding reports, which strengthens the credibility of the current 
study’s findings.     
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4. mWork in Kenya 
4.1 Introduction: mWork in Kenya 
The literature review has shown that to date there is little academic discourse on the topic 
of mWork applications. Those scholars that have theorized about the use of mobile 
technology for creating employment in developing countries have done so mainly in an 
Asian (Indian) context, or by limiting themselves to discussing tasks that would be 
hypothetically possible, given the technological resources. No discussion of the economic 
feasibility, as well as more detailed investigation on the (potential) development impact 
substantiated by empirical observations was uncovered.  
To develop a more thorough understanding of the potential that is embedded in mWork, 
this research conducts empirical research in the domain of Kenya and focuses not only on 
the technological challenges involved, but also on the sustainability of underlying business 
models and the (potential) development impact that can be achieved. The perused M4D 
literature brings forward several suggestions about how mobile technology may be 
employed as a way to bring people into employment in a developing country context, which 
fall under this research’s definition of mWork. Table 2 shows potential mWork business 
ideas taken from the literature and compares them with businesses that were encountered 
during the empirical research in fall 2013 in Kenya.  
 
Suggested mWork application: Suggested By:  Found in study: 
Smart Rickshaw: tourist advice 
on traffic, hotspots ect. InfoDev (2013) -- 
Translation of local languages 
InfoDev (2012a; 2013); 
Govindaraj et al.  2011; Gupta et 
al. , (2012) Tafsiri 
Market research 
Kulkarni, 2012; Narula et al.  
(2011); InfoDev, (2012a); 
Kubzansky et al. (2011) biNu 
Mobile App testing 
Govindaraj et al. (2011); InfoDev 
(2013) -- 
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Tree planting InfoDev (2013) 
(Armenia: Micro 
Forrester) 
Medical diagnosis for eye 
disease (Diabetic Retinopathy) InfoDev (2013) -- 
Transcription of medical 
services InfoDev (2013) (Nepal: Medic Info) 
Crowd journalism 
Govindaraj et al. (2011); InfoDev 
(2013) HiviSasa 
BPO-like tasks on a smartphone 
Based on mirco work insights of 
Lehdornvitra and Ernkvist (2011) -- 
Human intelligence micro work 
tasks on a feature phone 
Govindaraj et al.  (2011); Narula 
et al. (2011) -- 
Peer-to-peer tasks (shopping 
options, traffic advice) 
Govindaraj et al. (2011); InfoDev 
(2013) -- 
Recruiting GSMA (2014a) 
Duma Works, Jua 
Kali 
Table 2: Suggested mWork applications in literature and applications found in study 
 
In addition to the segments of mWork applications that were previously discussed by M4D 
scholars, namely Mobile Micro Work and recruiting, this research also finds applications that 
act as market intermediaries and as market research firms. In total this research brings 
forward ten case studies of mWork businesses in Kenya. Further this research considers one 
Armenian and one Nepalese mWork business, since their cases provide insights that are 
valuable to a general discussion around mWork and potentially also interesting in a Kenyan 
context (see table 2). 
 
Market research Recruiting Mobile Micro Work Market intermediary 
biNu Duma Works Kaisari Mobi-Agent 
 Jua Kali Smartblackboard Shop Soko 
  Medic Info (Nepal)  
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  Micro Forrester 
(Armenia) 
 
  Tafsiri  
  HiviSasa  
  Sendy  
Table 3 Overview of mWork cases per segment 
 
The enterprises in the sample differ significantly with regard to their stage of maturity, with 
some businesses being on the market and operational for several years and others never 
actually having introduced a marketable product and being discontinued during the research 
period. Further the amount of insight per case differs. For the case study of Tafsiri no 
interview with founders could be conducted, while interviews with other mWork 
stakeholders that had worked with Tafsiri provided sufficient information to compile a case 
study that explains the business model’s rationale. The cases of Sendy and HiviSasa emerged 
approximately one year after the main data collection phase of this research had been 
closed. While a senior manager of Sendy was available for an interview no member of 
HiviSasa could be interviewed, which is why the information on this case study is somewhat 
limited.  
 
4.2 Case presentation 
4.2.1 mWork segment: Market Research 
Case study: biNu 
biNu offers an Internet portal app for feature phones that provides users with fast and cheap 
Internet access, through a patented and cloud based pager technology that drastically 
reduces both computing requirements on the handheld device and amount of data 
transmission. Through the biNu Internet portal app the user can access several Internet 
applications, such as information or social networking sites. The user can further answer 
market research surveys and earn virtual currency or mobile airtime in return. This market 
research is commissioned mainly by large western market research firms and forms the main 
form of monetization of the company.  
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Overview - Case biNu.     
Founded  2008 Geographical 
scope 
Over 22 countries, 
mainly global south  
Origin of 
founders 
Australia, 
(one founder from 
African Diaspora) 
Stage Live since 2011, 
heavily expanded 
Employed 
technology 
feature phones;   
Cloud based 
computing, pager 
technology 
Feasibility 
/ 
Challenges 
faced 
 
Patented technology 
helps circumvent 
feature phone 
limitations, business 
model seems  
promising in Kenyan 
context  
Size  3.5 mln users Funding / 
Affiliation 
VC funded: 
Tomorrow 
Ventures; Square 
Peg; Savannah 
Fund; Artesian 
 
biNu was founded in 2008 by two successful Australian serial tech entrepreneurs, one of 
which was brought up in Zimbabwe. At the company’s initiation the founders purchased the 
intellectual rights to the pager technology that today forms the backbone of the biNu 
Internet portal app. biNu’s patented technology took approximately three years of 
development before the first app went live in 2011 in Vietnam.  
 
The company is backed up by prestigious venture capital firms such as Google founder Eric 
Schmidt’s TomorrowVentures and has so far been able to collect over 7.5 mln US dollars in 
funding, which allowed the fast pace internationalization across emerging markets of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America (Interview Jeremy George, 2013; biNu.com, 2014). 
The technology evolves around offloading all processing tasks into the cloud and 
transmitting the data packages via pager technology. Therefore, information can be 
displayed with only a fraction of the data volume and at higher speed than with 
conventional WAP or HTML enabled mobile Internet services. In order to achieve this biNu 
strips out all of the HTML and thus a lot of the “decorative” content. Instead simplified 
versions of the websites are created that basically are composed of images of text, which are 
transmitted by pager technology. Essentially the biNu platform creates a virtual ecosystem 
that offers simple versions of popular web applications such as News, Facebook, Twitter, 
Youtube, Google Search, Google Translate, Wikipedia ect. Within this ecosystem a virtual 
economy is established where the user can execute market research tasks in exchange for a 
virtual currency, so called “biNu credits”, which can then be used in biNu’s gaming- and 
social gambling services or to purchase information goods such as digital books and music in 
one of the designated stores on the biNu platform. The biNu credits can also be converted 
into mobile airtime credits (biNu.com, 2013). 
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The case of biNu offers interesting insights for mWork business models. BiNu’s commitment 
to developing an alternative technology that poses an alternative to SMS or USSD as well as 
to mobile data, shows that there are limitations to both technologies in developing country 
contexts. The former limits what can be achieved, while the latter has little scale and is 
relatively pricy to use.  
“There really is a limit to what can be achieved in the scope of a SMS or USSD on a 
feature phone. Data is too expensive and inefficient to actually be considered a 
scalable option for now. […] There is a reason biNu spent several years developing it’s 
proprietary cloud computing / pager technology” (Malaika Judd, 2013).  
 
The biNu case shows a need for monetization models to look for alternative streams of 
revenue, other than BOP consumers, who have a very low disposable income: 
"For us there is more value from the people who are paying to get in touch with these 
audiences, rather than thinking there's a big revenue stream that's going to come out 
of very price-sensitive poor customers,"  
"Marketers want to talk to customers in these markets, and they're looking for the 
platforms to help with that” (Jeremy George, 2013). 
 
The availability of mobile money services, even for BOP consumers, has been a premise in 
creating the concept of mWork and establishing Kenya’s role as a potential forerunner in this 
area. Nevertheless, biNu decided against using this installed base, due to the high costs they 
impose in a context where small transactions are executed.  
“We decided against offering mobile money [compensation to users], since with the 
exception of Kenya, it is not really common and advanced enough in any African 
country. [Furthermore] in Kenya the charges are prohibitively high for small 
payments” (Jeremy George, 2012) 
 
4.1.2 mWork Segment: Recruiting 
This segment of mWork pertains to the use of the mobile phone as a job market 
intermediary, as discussed in chapter 2.2. Two cases of companies trying to offer a solution 
in the area were uncovered over the research period. However, a strong discrepancy 
between the states of development of the two enterprises is noted with one company never 
actually making it to market (Jua Kali) and one company actually being in operation in Kenya 
since 2012. Therefore, the level of detail of the cases provided differs.  
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Case study: Duma Works 
Duma Works is a recruiting company that employs SMS and web technology to match job 
seekers and employers. Job seekers use SMS to create a mini-CV on Duma’s platform by 
sending an indication of their skills, education, location and job requirements as well as 
creating a professional network. A central part of Duma Works’ value proposition is the 
validation of applicants’ skills to ensure they meet the employer’s requirements. This 
evaluation is executed mainly via SMS based multiple-choice tests and open ended 
questions, but can also be executed via a smartphone messenger application or via E-Mail.  
 
Overview - Case Duma Works    
Founded  2011 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya  Origin of 
founders 
USA 
Stage Operative in Kenya 
since 2013  
Employed 
Technology 
Feature phone; 
smart phone;  
Personal Computer 
Feasibility / 
Challenges 
faced 
 
Feasibility depends 
on ability to 
conduct skill 
verification given 
local technological 
Infrastructure 
 
Size  5-10 employees, Appr. 
10’000 Job candidates, 
and 200 Employers in 
their data base 
Funding / 
Affiliation 
Princeton 
University eLab,  
Rockefeller 
foundation, Google 
innovation award 
 
Duma Works was founded in 2011 by three US grad students at Princeton University, who 
developed software and a business model as a member of the Princeton University 
Incubator E-Lab in the USA. In 2012 the company did a pre-launch in Nakuru, a city two 
hours drive from Nairobi, to then launch the company in Nairobi in June 2013.  
 
From December 2013 until August 2014 the company that employs eight full-time 
employees has grown the amount of job seekers in their database from 4000 to over 11000 
users (DumaWorks, 2014). Since December 2012 they have sent out approx. 7500 job alerts 
to qualified job seekers, have executed 4500 applicant skills screening tests and have so far 
matched approx. 1500 people to jobs. Of these 1500 job matches the founder Arielle Sandor 
estimates that approximately 1000 have been matched to temporary employment and 500 
to long-term jobs (Arielle Sandor, 2014). The nature of the jobs that Duma currently 
administers includes entry-level white-collar jobs such as office administration, especially in 
the area of front office, communication and sales as well as less sophisticated jobs such as in 
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the area of hospitalities (waitresses, restaurant supervisors, event staff) and retail (i.e. store 
employees and store managers) and construction.  
 
Duma is not affiliated with a Kenyan incubator or accelerator, but has benefitted strongly 
from the services offered by the Princeton University incubator. In addition, the company 
receives support by several entrepreneurship grant programs and has won a number of 
social entrepreneurship competitions, among these are a 100’000 Dollar US Grant through 
the 2013 Centennial Innovation Competition by the Rockefeller Foundation and the 2013 
Google Innovation Award as well as the Ashoka She Will Innovate Competition (Arielle 
Sandor, 2013).  
 
Service delivery channel 
The main service delivery channel chosen by Duma is SMS technology. In order to register 
with Duma Works the applicant sends an SMS with the words ‘Sign up’ to Duma’s number 
and gets a response that welcomes him and asks him to send in age, name and location to 
create a profile. Once the profile is created he gets a set of MC questions that help create a 
mini-curriculum vita on the Duma platform, i.e. with information pertaining to the highest 
form of education, desired salary range, years of experiences in which sectors, ect. 
Employers can submit the job opening they desire to fill via phone or online. 
Recently Duma further started to offer the possibility to sign up online via their website or 
using an integration to a widely used smartphone messenger application (Whatsapp), which 
is useful especially for jobs that require a more advanced skill-set and thus also more 
advanced screening processes that require more typing and  may not be as conveniently 
executed via SMS.  
“We ensured that candidates for low-skilled jobs are able to do the entire process via 
SMS, using mainly our MC quizzes. For more advanced positions where the candidate 
is expected to possess computer skills he may find it more convenient to answer the 
essay questions via our Whatsapp integration or via E-Mail, by using e.g. one of the 
many Internet cafés”, but can certainly also do so via SMS” (Arielle Sandor, 2015).  
 
Service offering 
In the basic plan, that costs approximately 21 euros, the employer can evaluate up to 20 
candidates that are relevant to his job query. Job seekers that fit this profile have answered 
about five MC questions to enrich their profile with additional information on their 
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background and two questions that verify the skills that she indicated. See figure 7 for 
illustration. 
“In the basic plan a software developer would for example be asked a multiple choice 
question on the names of different software tools that may be used in iOs mobile 
application programming and one open ended question where he is asked to indicate 
the name of his Github14 profile” (Arielle Sandor, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 7: Basic job Screening, Duma Works 
 
The advanced plan costs approximately 103 euro. In this plan the employer sees only final 
round candidates that have passed the mobile screening tests. In addition to the questions 
asked on the basic level, candidates need to pass more rigorous MC tests on their skills and 
are also given three open ended essay questions to answer. The prospective employer is 
further given the option to screen using his own recruiting questions. See figure 8 for an 
example of such a question. 
“The advanced plan is actually a bit of our sweet-spot and we try to push this option. 
Currently this is also the most popular option since it offers great value. […] Examples 
of the open-ended question in the advanced plan are e.g. for a communications 
position that the candidate gets a bit of information and is asked to transform this 
into a blog article style text. Alternatively she could be told that she needs to invite a 
distinguished guest to a conference and is asked to formulate an E-mail for this. 
Finally she may be sent a short newspaper article and be asked to submit a catchy 
headline for this” (Arielle Sandor, 2013). 
                                                     
14 Github is a social network for software developers, where each developer showcases the 
codes that she has created. 
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Figure 8: Adcanced Job screening; Duma Works 
 
The elite plan, which costs 440 euro, resembles a service offered by professional recruiting 
firms, since it is a customized recruiting solution where only two or three very well 
performing candidates are suggested to the employer. In addition to the screening activities 
of the basic and advanced plan, the elite plan includes a further, more extensive case study 
and a personal phone interview that a Duma employee conducts with the candidate. 
“We offer this option at the moment mainly to build our reputation and tap into the 
segment of demanding, large players and to further build job offers in the segment of 
middle and higher management. Nevertheless we understand ourselves as a tech 
company and want to stick to automated online and phone based recruiting 
applications in future” (Arielle Sandor, 2014). 
 
Trust and validation through applicant screening 
Looking at Duma’s current value proposition, as compared to the original idea of being a 
matching service between job seekers and employers, the strong emphasis on screening and 
validation becomes evident. The founder Arielle Sandor (2014) comments on this transition 
as follows: 
“At the beginning Duma Works was set out to match job seekers to employers to 
address the current inefficiencies in the Kenyan employment market. However we 
soon realized that in order to provide useful candidates for the employer it was not 
enough to provide a match based on the data submitted by the candidates. Too often 
did the candidates not fill in the profiles correctly, thus deteriorating the usefulness of 
the matches. Therefore we have been working hard to create an automated system of 
mobile phone based skills screening tests. We realized that this actually meets the 
employers’ needs very well and that they are willing to pay for such a service. We 
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have been working with the skills screening tests for the last 6 months and have 
received very positive feedback from the employers”.   
Another function offered by the recruiting firm is a professional networking tool in which 
each platform member can add people they know and have worked with to their Duma 
professional network. Upon completion of each job both the employer and the employed 
rate each others’ performance. This creates accountability for both parties so they perform 
to the best of their abilities. In addition, this practice creates a record of the user’s 
performance, which can be leveraged to improve job matches and the type of jobs 
accessible over time. 
The professional network function can be important in signaling trustworthiness, since the 
amount of professional contacts creates credibility and allows employers to search for 
candidates within their professional network. An interesting leverage factor here could be 
the possibility to look for job candidates that are within a 2nd or 3rd degree connection, since 
the prospective employer could then approach the “mutual contacts” to ask for additional 
information and personal recommendations on the job candidate. Nevertheless such a 
function is hard to operationalize since it needs a critical mass before it can actually provide 
value. 
“In the end the professional network function will be integral for Duma Works and we 
believe that it can be powerful in establishing trust and leveraging the power of 
professional networks. Nevertheless, at the moment our network function has not yet 
reached the required critical mass. Therefore, we developed the screening 
applications to establish trust and to grow the platform in the meantime. However, 
we see that the professional connections grow organically and once they have 
reached that critical mass I expect this function to be very helpful in establishing trust 
(Arielle Sandor, 2013).”  
 
Duma Works is also currently working on an mLearning service that can be used by the 
applicant to advance professional skills that are relevant to the field of work that she is in as 
well as other mentoring content e.g. on how to prepare for interviews etc. These quizzes 
would essentially resemble the MC skill verification quizzes, but would provide the applicant 
with a detailed feedback answer. 
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Case study: JuaKali 
JuaKali is a recruiting firm that focuses on connecting construction companies with unofficial 
sector workers. Given the technical constraints the company does not verify workers’ skills 
directly, but has a referral function on their platform, where workers can exhibit references. 
The company does so far not seem to have a finalized business model, or revenues. 
 
Overview - Case JuaKali     
Founded  2013 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya  Origin of 
founders 
Kenya 
Stage Founded in 2013, put 
on hold in 2014, 
reactivated in 2015 
Employed 
Technology 
Feature phone;  
Personal Computer 
Feasibility/ 
challenges 
faced  
Business model not 
yet final. Company 
unable to test 
applicant skills given 
SMS technology 
limitations 
Size  -- Funding / 
Affiliation 
Tandaa Grant 
Receiver (ICT Board 
Kenya) 
 
JuaKali is the entrepreneurial project of Judith Owigar, who holds a B.Sc. in computer 
science (2008) and a M.Sc. in applied computing (2014) from the University of Nairobi and is 
the CEO of Akira Chix, an organization that provides girls with programming skills. In 2012 
Judith Owigar obtained a Tandaa grant by the ICT Board Kenya with seed funding to realize 
the planned venture JuaKali. Given the fact that the company has so far not finalized its 
business model and has not yet been able to generate noteworthy revenues the case offers 
only limited insights from an mWork perspective. The founder stresses that the validation of 
applicant skills and background have been a major hurdle in the to her available SMS or 
USSD technology. Nevertheless, interesting insights on challenges and enablers of 
technology entrepreneurship can be taken from this case study and are elaborated upon in 
more detail in Chapter 5.1.  
 
4.2.3 mWork Segment: Mobile Micro Work 
This segment contains five cases, which all stem from the infoDev M2Work innovation 
challenge held in Nairobi’s iHub in 2012. Here the mobile phone is used as a tool to execute 
little local tasks, such as checking the compliance of a billboard, transcribing clinical data 
information, tree planting or answering a student’s question. Two of the observed case 
studies do not stem from a Kenyan context, but were included regardless since they may 
offer insights pertaining to the kind of micro work tasks that could be possible. 
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Case study: Kaisari 
Kaisari is an example of a somewhat challenged mWork business model that centers on the 
use of micro workers as government compliance agents. Initially the company focused on 
checking the license of shopkeepers in Kenya from which they moved to their current focus 
on checking the license of billboards.  
 
Overview - Case Kaisari     
Founded  2012 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya Origin of 
founders  
Kenyan 
Stage Product development 
stage in 2013. 
Discontinued in 2014.  
Employed 
Technology 
Feature Phones / 
Low-end 
Smartphones 
Feasibility/ 
challenges 
faced 
Business model failed 
due to lacking 
government Interest 
and technical 
constraints 
Size  -- Funding / 
Affiliation 
Out of m2Work 
Hackathon. Work 
from iHub 
 
Seven local entrepreneurs founded Kaisari in the course of the m2Work Hackathon that was 
organized by the World Bank in 2012. At the competition the team won the fourth price. The 
initial business model was to draw upon the large mass of feature phone users as 
compliance workers, who, while shopping, would check the shop license for its validity. Since 
shop licenses have to be readily on display in shops in Kenya, the micro workers could then 
just SMS the number of the license and the shop name to the governmental platform that 
checks its validity. The worker would then be compensated for each case of non-compliance 
that they have discovered. While this model can be expected to be attractive for the micro 
worker since it is a relatively fast and straightforward task, it is also efficient for the 
government which now can send out government agents to non licensed shops directly 
instead of having to do random checks. Furthermore since this may be a way for the 
government to bring a fraction of the informal sector to the formal sector and also to limit 
the ability of the currently employed government compliance agents to offer shop keepers 
the possibility to bribe them instead of buying a valid license.  
The entrepreneurial firm encountered several challenges pertaining to the business model 
as a result of which the product was never brought to market. Aiming to increase 
compliance with government processes, the government is a central stakeholder in Kaisari’s 
business model. Nevertheless, Kaisari founder Israel David complains about a lack of interest 
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from the government department responsible for compliance. He explains this by pointing 
to their corrupt behavior:  
“The people who are currently in the positions of checking compliance and collection 
of the fees are not willing to implement such a system. What currently happens is that 
when someone is a collector of the fee he can make a good money by being corrupt 
and offering the offender a choice of whether or not he wants to pay the full fine or 
just a protective payment and for that leave him alone for the next three 
months”(David Israel, 2013). 
 
Secondly it is noted that even though the shop license is supposed to be exhibited at a well 
visible place in the shop,in reality this is seldom the case and licenses are mostly in some 
back office, hence not available to a micro worker walking into the shop. Currently the 
Kaisari team is working on a business model that focuses on the compliance of fees paid for 
advertisement billboards. Here the model is somewhat similar to the original one, since each 
business putting up a billboard over an A4 size needs to buy a permit. David Israel (2013) 
states that while the large MNEs can be expected to pay, most of the local businesses 
currently do not pay such a fee. At the time of the data collection in fall 2013 the team was 
working on an application that finally will draw upon the GPS function of a low-end smart 
phone to locate the user and then load pictures of the billboards that the government has 
registered for the user’s location. The user can then check whether some of the billboards 
he sees around him are not listed in his app and can then send a picture of the unregistered 
billboard and his GPS location to the authority and collect his reward. However, several 
significant shortcomings seem to inhibit this business models viability. First of all, such an 
operating mode involves relatively high data costs, as the application needs to load a lot of 
images, which given local network conditions may be a very slow process. In addition, the 
GPS function that tracks users’ positions is too inaccurate as it provides the locations only 
within a radius from 4-100 meters, depending on reception and whether conditions. It would 
further require the government to maintain an updated central register of all billboards that 
have paid a fee, which is most likely not currently the case. According to interviews with 
other m2Work entrepreneurs the founders seem to have abandoned the business in mid-
2014. 
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Case study: Medic Info 
Medic Info is a Nepal based micro work application, which aspired to record patient data in 
digitized form in order for medical professionals to be able to consider patient history when 
making a diagnosis. The company has been discontinued in 2013, due to a lack of 
technological readiness of key stakeholders in the medical sector, as well as due to a relative 
inefficiency of the company’s value proposition.  
Overview – Medic Info     
Founded  2011 Geographical 
scope 
Nepal Origin of 
founders  
Nepal 
Stage discontinued Employed 
Technology 
Smart Phone Feasibility/ 
challenges 
faced 
Relative inefficiency 
compared to 
execution of task on 
PC; little interest on 
behalf of hospitals 
Size  -- Funding / 
Affiliation 
m-labs 
 
Winner of the infoDev 2012 m2Work challenge Nepal, Medic Info sought to solve the 
problem that more often than not medical diagnoses need to be made without being able to 
access the patients’ medical history, since hospitals do not provide record keeping services. 
Instead, patients are expected to file their received prescription and other documents on 
their own, which especially poor patients seldom do.  
The process envisioned by Medic Info is such that the patient, doctor or hospital 
administration sends the medical documents - either digitally as a scan, or physically via mail 
- to a micro worker who then uses his smart phone to enter the relevant information into a 
database. That database is cloud based and doctors can view the information via their data 
enabled smart phone. The costs for the process would be added to the patients’ medical bill 
and thus carried by the patient. 
There are two main concerns pertaining to this business model. First-of-all the question of 
efficiency arises. After all, one could execute the digitalization of files also centrally with a 
few full time employed workers which would benefit from faster entry times using 
computers with larger screens and keyboards and can also be expected to be subject to 
learning curves and to incur lower relative costs of training. Secondly the founders mention 
that the approached hospitals and doctors were not willing to implement such a model since 
they were not comfortable with the employed technology, which finally caused the 
discontinuation of the enterprise according to an interview with Prawesh Shrestha (2013). 
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 Case study: Smart Blackboard  
Smart Blackboard aspired to be a tutoring application, where students could pose questions 
via SMS while working on their homework and receiving answers by qualified teachers. 
These teachers would then receive micro-payments for each answer they sent to the 
student. The company is no longer active since it faced a set of issues evolving around the 
employed technology, the revenue model and entrepreneurial capabilities of the founders.  
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Overview   
Smart Blackboard     
Founded  2011 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya  Origin of 
founders 
Kenya  
Stage discontinued Employed 
Technology 
feature phone  Feasibility / 
Challenges 
faced 
  
SMS technology not 
suitable for service, 
low willingness to 
pay on behalf of 
parents 
Size  - Funding / 
Affiliation 
m-labs 
 
After winning the second place in the m2Work Hackathon in 2012 three local entrepreneurs 
further pursued Smart Blackboard. While in fall 2013 the entrepreneurs were still committed 
to working on the start-up, a set of issues discussed in the following finally led to the 
discontinuation in early 2014. The founder Mukeli Kweli states that they encountered 
problems with the SMS platform, since they realized that the space limitation of 60 
characters poses a barrier to efficient communication, since many students and teachers 
were not able to phrase an adequate question and answer within this constraint.  
“When you are a primary school student you often do not know what exactly your 
question is, you just know that you are stuck. So in order to help you the teacher must 
actually read the question at hand, or at least have some information on the context 
of your question. This is hardly executable using 60 characters” (Mukeli Kweli, 2013). 
The only scalable technological alternative, employing USSD codes, poses a similar space 
restriction and therefore does not pose a viable alternative. In addition, it was not possible 
to derive a satisfactory revenue model for the company, since the initial assumption that the 
children’s guardians would pay for the service was abandoned for the lack of available 
income at the base of the pyramid and there was no third party available to sponsor such an 
application. Finally, the founder Mukeli Kweli (2013) mentions the high costs of using mobile 
money infrastructure for many small payments, team dynamics and loss of impetus as well 
as lacking business skills or professional experience as reasons contributing to the 
discontinuation of the business.  
 
Case study: Sendy 
The platform Sendy enables local motorcycle taxi drivers to execute courier services through 
using their feature phone. The drivers register with Sendy, get a GPS tracking device installed 
on their motorbike and then get connected with businesses and individuals that want to 
execute the shipment of a good. Sendy users can use their PC or Smartphone application to 
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see if Sendy drivers are in the area, and order, pay and track the delivery of their good via 
the platform.  
 
Overview - Sendy     
Founded  2014 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya  Origin of 
founders 
Kenya 
Stage Expanding in Kenya Employed 
Technology 
Feature phone; 
Extended by GPS 
tracker  
Feasibility / 
Challenges 
faced 
 
Strong value 
proposition, large 
market potential  
Size  10 employees,  Funding / 
Affiliation 
Presented at DEMO 
Africa, Savannah 
Fund 
 
Sendy was founded by three Kenyans, Meshack Alloys, Don Okoth and Evanson Biwott, who 
were later joined by Malaika Judd. The three original founders have all three followed 
university courses in either economics or software design and two of the founders have 
previously worked several years in an East African technology firm. Meshack Alloys, the CEO 
of Sendy, also has experience as a co-founder of a Nairobian tech company. After their 
presentation in the 2014 DEMO Africa the company received immediate funding and is 
currently expanding the service heavily. Malaika Judd joined the start-up after working as a 
Principal and Mentor for the Startup Accelerator Savannah Fund.  
Sendy Users can access the service via an Android app or a PC browser, select the driver they 
want to pick up their package and afterwards check the delivery via the GPS tracker. The 
driver is informed via SMS where to pick up the package and receives the payment via an 
USSD mobile payment application. Currently Sendy charges a percentage fee of each 
delivery revenue. Sendy is serving businesses as well as private customers, with business 
customers generating most revenue (Malaika Judd, 2015). 
The company verifies the courier drivers, keeping their records on file, and providing the 
necessary technology for both the tracking of the motorcycle and communications with the 
driver.  
 107 
 
Figure 9: Sendy interface screenshot (Sendy, 2014) 
 
The company ensures scalability of their service by employing feature phones and 
substitutes the missing GPS function by an external GPS transmitter. 
“There are many advantages to using feature phones with a GPS extension, compared 
to a smartphone. It is more scalable, since more drivers have such a device. The 
purchasing costs are lower and currently data and data costs on smartphones are 
relatively expensive. Users understand feature phones well and usually don’t use the 
other smartphone features. The GPS signal is better through an external receptor and 
feature phones are more robust and have better battery life than smartphones” 
(Malaika Judd, 2015).  
 
The company’s value proposition caters well to the currently growing market for logistics, 
fueled by the growing East African e-commerce sector and further to the large traffic 
problems present in large African cities, which small and fast motorcycles are most apt in 
circumventing. While still relatively young the company has grown significantly in the first 
months of existence and plans to expand to other East African cities in the course of the next 
12 months.  
Case study: Microforrester 
Microforrester is a smart phone application through which micro workers can earn money 
by planting trees in remote areas. For each tree the micro worker plants, she sends a picture 
of the tree and his location through the app and receives a small payment in return. The 
company also plans to offer payments for the watering and caring of trees planted by users. 
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Despite funding by several social entrepreneurship programs the company’s business model 
faces some significant shortcomings.  
 
Overview - Microforrester 
    
Founded  2012 Geographical 
scope 
Armenia Origin of 
founders 
Armenian 
Stage No product launched in 
2014. Status unclear 
Employed 
Technology 
Smart phone Feasibility / 
Challenges 
faced 
Relative inefficiency 
compared to 
executing bulk 
afforestation. Focus 
on smartphone not 
scalable. 
Size  -- Funding / 
Affiliation 
Out of m2Work 
Hackathon 
Armenia 
 
Microforrester was founded by the Armenian entrepreneur Alexander Shakaryan in 2012 
and won the first prize in the Armenian m2Work 2012 challenge of infoDev. The founder and 
his local partner were since able to assure funds for their company through social 
entrepreneurship challenges, such as the CDRF “From idea to market” competition (1st prize 
worth 25,500 USD) or infoDev’s Global Forum 2013 (one of five winners worth 8000 USD) 
(CDRF global, 2014). In 2013, one year after the initiation of the business the company was 
still not incorporated and no application was launched, even though a functional application 
demo had been created (Sharkaryan, 2013). In September of 2014 the company still does 
not have an application up and running even though several posts on the start-ups twitter 
page and marketing videos published in June 2014 indicate that the founders have not yet 
abandoned the business. 
In the interview with founder Alexander Shakaryan (2013) several challenges pertaining to 
the execution of the company surfaced, which currently remain unsolved and mainly relate 
to the logistics of providing needed raw materials to micro workers, the compensation of 
micro workers and verifying the contract fulfillment of the micro worker. The three issues 
are elaborated by the founder as follows: 
“One problem we are currently facing is that micro workers need small pre-grown 
trees to plant in the designated areas. Since we want the service to be available in the 
entire country we will need a network of tree nurseries over the country to work 
with”.  
“The compensation of micro workers is hard in Armenia since no mobile money 
infrastructure is currently in place, we are thinking to maybe have a partnership with 
a bank where micro workers can withdraw their rewards”. 
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“Once the mirco worker has planted a tree he can submit a picture of the tree and his 
location to the server. Then someone needs to verify that this is indeed a newly 
planted tree. Since sometimes the location is not very exact and also the trees look a 
lot alike this can prove somewhat difficult”. 
 
In order to execute the tree planting work, the micro worker needs to be in possession of a 
smartphone, as he needs the picture as well as the GPS location tagging function. The 
founder plans to start with an iOs application and and then to follow with applications for 
Android and Blackberry phones (Shakaryan, 2013). However, given the relatively high price 
of such phones, poor people are not likely to possess such a device, let alone benefit from 
purchasing such a device in order to be able to execute the service. Further, Microforrester 
seems to be an economically inefficient solution to afforestation, compared to traditional 
afforestation projects. Compared to the micro work approach of dividing a large amount of 
work into micro tasks executed by many different individuals, traditional large scale 
afforestation projects offer the upside of being able to use modern machinery, 
knowledgeable professionals and benefitting from economies of scale in logistics, materials 
and the like. Naturally these traditional afforestation projects also provide employment. In 
conclusion the feasibility of the business model of Microforrester as well as the potential 
development impact can be considered very limited.  
 
Case study: Tafsiri 
Tafsiri aimed to provide companies or organizations with the translation of specific 
information into the language of local communities. Through SMS-based technology the 
company would split texts into smaller pieces and have feature phone users of local 
communities translate the English text into their local language in order to receive mobile 
money or airtime in return. The team won first price at the m2Work Hackathon in 2012, but 
discontinued their efforts shortly after, due to challenges around the business model.  
 
Overview – Tafsiri     
Founded  2012 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya  Origin of 
founders 
Kenya  
Stage discontinued Employed 
Technology 
Feature phone Feasibility/ 
challenges 
Relative inefficiency 
compared to 
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Size  - Funding / 
Affiliation 
m-labs Kenya, 
Winner of the 
m2Work 
Hackathon 
faced execution of task in 
bulk on PC 
 
While unfortunately this research was not able to interview the founders of Tafsiri directly, 
information was obtained through interviews with m-labs affiliates John Kieti and Paul 
Bommet (2013) as well as through interviews with other m2work participants.  
These interviews point towards the main challenge of the business model of Tafsiri which 
pertains to the relative inefficiency of splitting a larger task into many micro tasks and using 
small feature phone keyboards as a means of execution, instead of having workers execute 
the task in a bulk using a personal computer. Therefore the business was discontinued 
shortly after its inception after the m2Work Hackathon. 
 
Case study: HiviSasa 
HiviSasa is an online newspaper that crowd-sources all content from local citizen reporters. 
Anyone can submit stories and earn mobile money for each story that is published. Content 
is ‘hyper local’ and specific for each county of Kenya. The site is curated by a team of 
professional editors and optimized for mobile-phone readers. 
Overview - HiviSasa     
Founded  2012 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya  Origin of 
founders 
-- 
Stage Launched in January 
2014. Expansion 
strong in Kenya.  
Employed 
Technology 
Low-end smart 
phone  
Feasibility / 
Challenges 
faced 
 
N.A. 
Size  
 
 
 
Over 1340 citizen 
reporters, 150000 
readers  
 
Funding / 
Affiliation 
88mphs 
accelerator 
program. Funding 
by 88mphs, 
Omidyar Network, 
Novastar ventures 
 
As mentioned previously the case of HiviSasa was compiled after the empirical research 
phase in Kenya of 2013. Unfortunately, no affiliates from HiviSasa were available for an 
interview.  
HiviSasa has been founded out of the 88mphs accelerator program and received a seed 
investment after the first acceleration period was completed  and in June 2015 received 
follow up investments by the Omidyar Network and Novastar Ventures (HiviSasa.com, 2015).  
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The open platform pays any individual 100KSH via m-Pesa for each of the local news story 
(or news photo) that is published on the website. The most common topics of the 500-word 
limit articles are crime, politics and social justice. No previous qualifications are needed to 
write for the platform other than an Internet enabled phone and basic writing skills. 
Professional journalists/editors curate the incoming articles and choose the best ones for 
publication (Techmoran, 2015; Wikipedia, 2015). 
 
Figure 10 HiviSasa Interface (HiviSasa, 2015) 
 
 In 2015 the company provides news for the eight Kenyan counties and publishes 
approximately 80 articles per day (Hivisasa.com, 2015). The news based portal is free to use 
for readers and seems to generate income through advertising. According to multiple 
journalistic accounts the site has since its inception seen continuous growth of subscriptions, 
numbers having reached over 150,000 readers and 130,000 monthly page views in 
September 2014 (Global innovation Competition 2015, 2015; Techmoran, 2015). 
“The application has been extremely popular in Kenya, everyone is talking about it. People 
seem to value the localized content […] it has been used for example for the shaming of 
corrupt police officers” (Mina Steernblad, 2015). 
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4.2.4 mWork segment: Market intermediaries 
Two companies are in the mWork segment of “market intermediary”. Both start-ups are 
from Kenya and employ mobile technology to either connect local buyers and sellers 
MobiAgent or to connect global consumers and local producers (Shop Soko).  
 
Case study: Shop Soko 
Shop Soko is a platform that employs mobile technology and e-commerce to connect 
Kenyan artisans to global consumers. Through Soko artisans receive mentoring, skills training 
and can realize significantly higher prices for their produce. The company started out with a 
very open approach, where the mobile phone integration to their e-commerce platform 
allowed all interested artisans to sell directly to western consumers. Currently the company 
is focusing on a select group of artisans that receive intensive support to enable the sale of 
upscale jewelry. In the current business model the mobile technology is employed to enable 
communication and as an enterprise tool to improve the artisans’ business processes, from 
financial management to production and procurement planning. 
Overview – Shop Soko  
 
   
Founded  2012 Geographical 
scope 
Kenya  Origin of 
founders 
USA 
Stage 
 
 
Live since 2012 Employed 
Technology 
Smartphone 
technology,  
Feasibility/ 
challenges 
faced 
 
Open platform 
approach failed 
since artisans lacked 
know-how for 
selling globally. The 
selective e-
commerce approach 
seems very 
promising  
Size  App. 12 employees Funding / 
Affiliation 
Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology (MIT)  
 
Two American and one Kenyan female entrepreneur founded Shop Soko in 2012. The three 
women look back on extensive work experiences with social enterprises, ICT4D related 
projects as well as university level education at prestigious institutions, such as the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Stanford University.  
Soko first presented their initial business model at the competition DEMO Africa in Fall 2012, 
where they were selected as one of the winners and were subsequently able to raise over 
700’000 Dollars US in early stage funding and subsequently won a range of prestigious 
prices, such as ITU Telecom World Young Innovators Competition and BiD Network Women 
 113 
in Business Challenge, and, more recently, a USAID Development Innovation Venture grant 
(Soko, 2014). In 2014 the social enterprise has a long list of supporters, investors and grant 
providers including grants from MIT, Ashoka and the International Center for Research on 
Women (ICRW).  
 
The founding business model of Shop Soko spanned two segments: Soko Marketplace and 
Soko Collection.The former was an open mobile-based platform that allowed Kenyan 
artisans to have a digital storefront to western consumers. Artisans could employ a low-end 
smartphone to manage the entire process end-to-end. After registering and creating a 
profile through their phone, they could take a picture of their product, name and describe it 
and send it to Soko. Soko then evaluates whether text and photo quality is apt and adds the 
product to the site. Once the artisan has sold a piece via Soko he gets a notification and is 
asked to arrange for the product to be dropped either at one of the collecting stations (e.g. 
in the low-income neighborhood Kibera) or directly at the Soko office. Soko then takes care 
of the international payment and logistics facing the international customer and channels 
the funds to the artisans using the mobile money platform mPesa.  
“The entire artisan facing element of Soko marketplace was based on mobile 
technology, employing low end smartphones, from the registration to the product 
description, taking and uploading of pictures, planning of logistics and finally also 
financial transactions. On the marketplace any artisan who was interested in selling 
her produce on marketplace was admitted (Diana Sang, 2013).” 
 
The latter segment, Soko collection, is upmarket design jewelry that is co-designed with 
Soko. Soko gets US-American designers to come to Kenya and create the summer/winter 
collection together with the artisans. The end product is then high in quality and meets the 
taste of the international target group of buyers.  
“We included Soko collection mainly as a part for brand building and attracting 
customers to bridge that early gap, when local designers have not yet learned what 
kind of designs sell in international markets”(Diana Sang, 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, after 12 months of activity of both Marketplace and Collection the firm 
decided to drop the marketplace segment in favor of extending the Soko collection 
approach. According to Diana Sang (2014) this was due to low sales in the marketplace 
segment, which allegedly was caused by both design and quality issues. 
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“Many artisans ended up not selling anything over the entire period… […] Of course having 
too many unappealing products on the site, makes it hard for the customer to find what she 
likes and thus reduces the attractiveness of the entire site”(Diana Sang, 2014).  
 
Given the openness of the platform and the resulting large amount of people on it, the Soko 
team was further unable to give the artisans the amount of support in mentoring and 
training that was required to successfully sell to international clients.  
“We simply did not have the resources to give the necessary support to each artisan 
on the open platform. So we decided to focus on the Soko Collection, by selecting 
those artisans that seemed to have most potential and develop them further” (Diana 
Sang, 2013).  
 
Since September 2013 the Soko Collection is the heart of Soko, it includes a collection of 
over 40 jewelry pieces. The prices can be considered relatively high with an average price for 
a necklace of about 70 USD up to 300 USD (Shopsoko.com, 2014). The artisan receives the 
full retail price minus a markup that is deducted to cover operational costs and shipping. The 
social enterprise is currently not making any profits, but hopes to increase the markup by 
2015 in order to allow for a profit margin (Sang, 2013). According to Diana Sang (2014) this 
model is better suited to meet the international target group and realize a healthy margin. 
Further, the higher reliability of quality that comes with a closer collaboration and larger 
production size per artisans enables the business to also sell bulk orders to large clients, i.e. 
design jewelry chains. This is especially attractive since these pay the relatively high prices of 
Soko at large volumes.  
“In order to be able to satisfy such bulk orders we need to ensure that artisans deliver 
a constant product quality and have the capacity to execute such orders. This is very 
hard to achieve via an open platform design” (Diana Sang, 2014).  
 
At the time of the interview with Diana Sang in October 2014, Soko employed mobile 
phones in order to coordinate design, production and delivery processes with the artisans 
and teaching the  artisan how to find relevant knowledge online. Diana Sang (2014) explains 
that the messenger application Whatsapp is for example used to send artisans links to 
design blogs, and to “how-to” videos, for example if they want to show how to achieve a 
particular on bone or brass. Almost all Soko artisans possess a low-end smartphone, many of 
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which were able to purchase these through micro loans organized by Shop Soko and their 
partnership with the crowd funding micro-loan platform Kiva. 
 
To cope with the growing demand for their products Soko seeks to leverage their existing 
artisan network, by enabling their established artisans to train and employ other artisans. In 
doing this, mobile applications play an integral role.  
“We try to leverage the potential and know-how of our existing artisan base. We have 
successfully tought them about e-commerce and the expectations of international 
consumers and we believe that now they are able to pass this know-how on. They 
extend their business and hire other artisans to work for them. They effectively start 
little enterprises of their own, with Soko just being one possible outlet. […] Thus our 
artisans become agents for change”.  
 
The management team of Soko has found that with this extension of the artisans’ business 
activities a set of new problems arise, which pertain mainly to the management skills 
necessary for running a business.   
“The growing size of their business requires new skills, in production planning, project 
management, financial management, etc. Please remember that about 60% of our 
artisans do not have an education beyond primary school. This is a real challenge to 
them”(Diana Sang, 2014). 
 
To facilitate this transition, Soko is currently developing a mobile enterprise tool that 
enables process formalization and optimization in the areas of financial and operation 
management for their artisans. With this project Soko won the 2014 Vodafone Wireless 
Innovation Project competition, which provides funding for the tool’s development.  
“It is our opinion that in order to create effective mobile based enterprise tools for 
micro entrepreneurs, you have to know your target group very well. We understand 
the needs and capabilities of our artisans very well, as well as our own systems and 
requirements in handling orders, tracking finance and e.g. artisan development. 
Therefore we are able to create a customized application that delivers the sought 
benefits, while being simple enough to be operated by our BOP workforce. […] The 
app needs to be so simple that it operates on a straightforward input-output 
interface. […]For these reasons we have chosen to develop the mobile enterprise 
resource tool in-house” (Diana Sang, 2014).  
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Case study: MobiAgent 
MobiAgent was planned as a SMS-based sales intermediary platform, where users could act 
as sales agents by offering products to their social network. Each time an agent would 
facilitate a sale she would earn a commission. The company has moved from initially selling 
website domains to selling solar lamps. The founders abandoned the company 
approximately 14 months after its initiation mainly due to industry-wide low margins that 
did not leave sufficient room for sales intermediary models.  
 
Overview - Case MobiAgent     
Founded  2012 
 
Geographical 
scope 
Kenya Origin of 
founders 
Kenyan 
Stage discontinued Employed 
Technology 
Feature phones Feasibility/ 
Challenges 
faced  
While technologically 
feasible, low margins, 
low customer trust 
and operational 
issues led to 
discontinuation. 
Size  3.5 mln users Funding/ 
Affiliation 
M-Labs / iHub 
 
MobiAgent won the thirdprize of the m2work Hackathon in the September of 2012 and was 
started by four local Kenyan entrepreneurs, who have all completed university degrees at 
Kenyan universities in the area of management. The idea of the sales intermediary model 
rests on the assumption that everyone who owns a phone with a number of contacts saved 
in the phone book, actually possesses valuable information about her contacts, such as their 
approximate income level, relationship status, interests et cetera. This information is a 
valuable marketing insight and can be used for targeted peer-to-peer selling.  
MobiAgent thus allows users to suggest products to people they think may be interested in 
that particular product. For example, when football tickets are posted on MobiAgents 
platform the agents can think about whom they know that would be interested in buying 
such tickets and offer the sale of these tickets to that person. The agent then earns a 
commission for each sale that is completed. 
 
 The company started out using this approach as a sales channel for a website domain saving 
business they had started earlier. Through this approach the entrepreneurs effectively 
delegated sales, customer service, relationship management and logistics to the agent. 
Payments in this business model were executed by the mobile money platform M-Pesa.  
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“Having sold domains to several customers before, we had gained their trust and 
decided to give these customers the chance to become sales agents. We offer 
domains for 3999 to end customers, 3000 to agents and pay 1500 for them ourselves” 
( Leonard Korir, 2013). 
 
The agents working for MobiAgent were usually developers who work with their clients that 
want a website. These developers then sent an SMS to MobiAgent with the name of the 
requested domain. MobiAgent’s server then automatically checks if the domain is still free 
and notifies the agent about the availability status. The agent can then secure it or put it on 
hold. The founders argue that the sales intermediary approach provides value, since it 
addresses local consumption patterns that according to Leonard Korir are characterized by 
high price sensitivity, lack of trust in unknown parties and a relative reluctance to try new 
products, as following quote shows: 
What you need to understand is that here in Kenya most consumers have very little 
excess money to spend on things that are not bare necessities. They therefore may 
not easily try out new things […] Lack of trust is a major factor in our culture and 
economy. […] Consumers also are very suspicious, you don’t usually buy products you 
can’t judge easily yourself or from someone you don’t know. […] Also the mistrust 
across tribal lines play into this” (Leonard Korir, 2014). 
 
Based on these insights the founder sees a strong appeal of the agent distribution model, 
where products are marketed through trust networks and can be explained well to 
prospective consumers through personal interaction with the agent. The founder reports 
that, while the domain reservation model was working satisfactorily, the overall revenue 
potential embedded in this market was limited and made them look for additional products 
to sell. 
Finally, the company decided to focus on the sale of solar lamps. This product was deemed 
promising for it not only provided a much larger market opportunity, but also fit well with 
MobiAgent’s value proposition due to its innovative nature and relatively strong demand for 
explanation and trustworthiness. Soon, however, the entrepreneurs realized that the 
margins that were realizable with the sale of solar lamps were not high enough to 
accommodate an intermediary business model that employs agents. After the costs for 
agent commission, logistics and training of agents were deducted the company was hardly 
profitable.  
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“The problem was that there is a maximum price that we can charge for solar lamps, 
which is somewhat decided by the price of solar lamps in shops. But we face 
additional costs for agent commission and the extra logistic costs that we incur 
through having to deliver solar lamps in small quantities to the households. […]  
We thought that maybe the consumer would be willing to pay a premium for the trust 
he gains by buying through someone he knows, but we were wrong. In the end the 
margin we were left with was not attractive” (Leonard Korir, 2014).  
 
In addition to the relatively low margin, the company encountered several operational 
problems that led to a loss in reputation and to client dissatisfaction. First, the company 
marketed the lamps based on the producer’s claim that they were able to provide light for 
eight hours. Nevertheless, in practice the lamps turned out to provide light for a much lower 
number of hours. This caused unsatisfied consumers to complain and ask for refunds.  
“The thing with the actual hours of light possible was a fiasco for us. I think it 
would have been very hard to re-establish this trust again.” (Korir, 2014).  
Secondly, the company faced occasional problems in fulfilling received orders in time, 
because their supplier did not fulfill his claim to keep a certain minimum inventory level. 
Therefore, customers sometimes had to wait very long for the delivery of their product, 
causing dissatisfaction. Given the abovementioned difficulties the founders decided to 
discontinue working on Mobi-Agent in April 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.5 Overview of mWork Cases 
 
Segment: Market research 
Company Description Status Feasibility/ challenges 
faced  
biNu  Users can access basic 
versions of mobile web pages 
on their feature phone and 
earn mobile airtime by 
answering surveys 
Active and 
expanding; Kenya 
7th country of 
expansion 
Patented technology helps 
circumvents feature 
phone limitations, 
business model seems 
promising  
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Segment: Recruiting 
Company Description Status Feasibility/ challenges 
faced  
Duma 
Works  
Recruiting intermediary that 
pre-selects candidates based 
on skill verification tests 
Active, over 10000 
job seekers in 2015 
Feasibility depends on 
ability to conduct skill 
verification given local 
technological 
Infrastructure 
Jua Kali Recruiting intermediary in 
construction industry 
Founded in 2013, 
put on hold in 2014 
and reactivated in 
2015 
Business model is not yet 
final. Limitations of SMS 
technology cause inability 
to test applicant skills 
 
Segment:  Mobile Micro Work 
Company Description Status Feasibility/ challenges 
faced  
Kaisari  Micro workers as compliance 
agents for monitoring shop-
keeper and advertising 
licenses 
discontinued Business model failed due 
to lacking government 
Interest and technical 
constraints  
Medic Info  Use micro workers to digitalize 
patient data to create patient 
history registers 
discontinued Relative inefficiency 
compared to execution of 
task on PC; little interest 
on behalf of hospitals 
Smart 
Blackboard 
Micro workers as tutors to 
answer questions by students  
discontinued SMS technology not 
suitable for service, low 
willingness to pay on 
behalf of parents 
Micro 
Forrester 
Use micro workers and 
smartphone to crowd-source 
afforestation projects 
discontinued Relative inefficiency 
compared to executing 
bulk afforestation. Focus 
on smartphone not 
scalable. 
Tafsiri 
 
 
 
 
Use micro workers as 
translators of local languages 
discontinued Relative inefficiency 
compared to execution of 
task in bulk on PC 
HiviSasa Mobile-based local news 
platform that crowd sources 
content from ‘citizen 
reporters’ 
Active, but 
uncertain if content 
is generated via 
phone or PC 
Scalability through low-
end smart phones. 
Localized news content 
seems attractive to 
readers 
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Sendy 
 
 
 
Enabling motorcycle taxi 
drivers to earn supplement 
income through doing courier 
services. Using GPS 
transmitters to complement 
drivers’ feature phones.  
Active and 
expanding 
Caters to a real market 
need of logistics in traffic 
congested African cities. 
Operation model is 
inexpensive and scalable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Segment:  Market intermediaries 
Company Description Status Feasibility/ challenges 
faced  
Shop Soko Initially employed low-end 
smart phones to enable 
artisans to sell globally via an 
open platform. Now employs 
a classical e-commerce 
business model; develops 
mobile enterprise tools to 
improve artisans mgmt. 
processes 
Mobile based open 
platform 
discontinued, e-
commerce 
platform active and 
expanding  
Mobile based approach 
failed since artisans lacked 
know-how for selling 
globally. The selective e-
commerce approach 
seems very promising  
Mobi-
Agent 
 
 
 
SMS-based sales intermediary 
platform, first selling website 
domains, later solar lamps 
discontinued Despite technological 
feasibility, the market 
wide low margins, low 
customer trust and 
operational issues led to 
discontinuation.  
Table 4: Overview of mWork Case studies 
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4.3 Cross-case analysis 
4.3.1 Feasibility of mWork approaches and challenges faced 
Of the ten local and two international mWork businesses, five cases seem to have developed 
a business model that seems both economically and technologically feasible in the Kenyan 
context. In particular, the segment of mobile micro tasks seems to face significant barriers in 
the current Kenyan context, with five out of seven companies having discontinued their 
operations sooner or later. This section analyses the challenges faced by mWork that were 
analysed through the case study research and clusters the observed obstacles into three 
groups, namely constraints on the user/consumer side, technological context constraints 
and entrepreneurial ecosystem constraints. The research finds that the three identified 
groups of constraints together offer a good explanation for the failure of cases in the Mobile 
Micro Work business segment.  
 
Prevalence of feature phones 
The large installed base of feature phones offers the chance for scalability and reaching the 
BOP, while it significantly limits the possibilities of activities that can be executed, due to the 
technological limitations of the device. The indicated trade-off between the scalability of 
feature phones and the wider range of possibilities of (low-end) smart phones that was 
suggested by GSMA (2014a) is supported in almost every case study in this research. A major 
factor in the entire mWork debate is the question of just how much can be achieved with a 
feature phone. While the literature review in section 2.2 shows that feature phones are 
powerful enough to execute applications for banking and insurance services, mobile money 
transfers, and different uses in the area of mHealth and mAgriculture, the current study 
shows that the possibilities offered by a feature phone are still insufficient for many mWork 
applications. The small keyboard makes typing of texts very time consuming and relatively 
inefficient, especially in cases where there are alternative ways of entering data (such as in 
the case of Tafsiri and Medic Info, where data could also be entered using personal 
computers) or when the user has to enter longer texts, e.g. in the case of recruiting (Duma 
Works), or education (SmartBlackboard). Furthermore, the size constraints inherent to SMS 
technology (60 characters in Kenya) renders sending longer messages relatively expensive. 
For the entering of longer texts, USSD technology is also not found to be a sufficient 
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alternative, since the individual sessions time out after a few minutes and require a 
relatively large amount of bandwidth.  It can thus be excluded as possibility for entering 
longer texts. These findings add to the literature, which so far has focused on mainly 
technical feasibility of executing mWork tasks on feature phones (i.e. Narula et al. , 2011; 
Govindaraj et al. , 2011; infoDev, 2012). In addition, many of the mWork approaches require 
functionalities that are not possessed by a feature phone such as the camera function 
(Microforrester, Shop Soko), GPS location tagging (Microforrester, Kaisari) or the sending of 
pictures (Microforrester, Shop Soko, Medical App). Mobile Micro Work applications that 
have, due to these limitations, chosen (low-end) smart phones as their primary service 
channel, have simultaneously significantly decreased their scalability and ability to reach 
their target group to the point that their business model was no longer sustainable (i.e. 
Micro Forrester, Medical App, Kaisari). 
 
Costs of mobile data and mobile money transactions 
As mentioned earlier, Kenya’s relatively strong countrywide mobile coverage, as well as the 
widespread use of the mobile money payment system M-Pesa, provided the main premise 
for mWork approaches to be considered an option. The research finds, however, that the 
costs of using this infrastructure are still relatively high. Especially in the case for the 
segment of MMW, the current cost structure for mobile money transactions in Kenya has 
turned out to be problematic. Currently there is a minimum charge per transaction, 
irrespective of the amount transferred. This is problematic because the MMW activities, as a 
source of supplemental income, typically involve many transactions of very small value (see 
biNu or Tafsiri case study). This is in line with much M4D research that has shown that 
affordability of mobile phone enabled services remains a main challenge for the poor (i.e. 
Hellström, 2009).  
 
Low income of consumers 
On the consumer side, the case studies show that the very low available income of a large 
percentage of consumers renders B2C monetization models difficult. The case of Mobi-
Agent shows that while the service itself may offer an attractive value proposition, the stark 
price sensitivity of the consumer leads to profit margins that are so low overall that there is 
no place for an intermediary service. Further, the examples of Smart Blackboard, biNu and 
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Duma Works show that establishing revenue flows from BOP consumers through ICT 
enabled products at this point still remains very hard. The challenge of establishing a 
sustainable revenue model through poor consumers on behalf if M4D applications has been 
indicated in the Maximising Mobile report (2012), and furthermore, it has been stressed as 
critical in Hellström’s (2010) study.  
 
Openness to technological innovation on behalf of consumers 
Multiple entrepreneurs in the study have stressed the importance of the existing 
institutionalized low-trust environment in Kenya, where most consumers exhibit a strong 
reluctance to enter into transactions with actors they are not familiar with and to try new 
products. While corporations such as m-Pesa’s Safaricom have, over time, managed to 
convince BOP consumers to engage in distance payment transactions, poor consumers still 
show reluctance to try out new services and especially to engage in long-distance 
transactions that require the upfront transfer of funds (e.g. Duma Works). The detrimental 
effect of low-trust from the side of consumers in entrepreneurial environments has been 
suggested earlier by several scholars (Langseth & Stapenhurst, 1997; Pope, 2001; Isenberg, 
2011).  
 
Technical skills of consumers  
Several case studies confirm that BOP users often lack knowledge in how to engage with 
technological objects (Isabalija, 2011) and show that instruction on how to use such objects 
and ICT enabled services might not be straightforward. The case study of Shop Soko shows 
that for people who only have an elementary school education, learning technical skills may 
not be easy at all. This imposes a need for a very straightforward design, which again limits 
the amount of possible features, and hence the complexity, of tasks that can be executed 
within mWork. 
 
Entrepreneurial challenges 
The wider ICT entrepreneurship ecosystem of Nairobi presents a set of barriers that can be 
considered potent barriers to the successful execution of mWork. Given the design of this 
research, additional elaboration on the entrepreneurial challenges of ICT entrepreneurs is 
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provided in chapter 5. The identified importance of a functioning “enabling ecosystem”, 
which is an often-lacking prerequisite for M4D initiatives, was already mentioned by 
Helström (2010) and is confirmed in this research. The presented mWork case studies clearly 
exhibit a set of challenges pertaining to the business skills and relevant experiences of 
mWork entrepreneurs (available human capital), as well as to the process employed when 
starting a new business and to entrepreneurial grant financing (Finance).  On the human 
capital side, the lack of business insights and experiences exhibited by local entrepreneurs 
surfaces, and in many cases it leads to a poor quality of underlying business plans. The 
interviewed local entrepreneurs were seldom able to provide a convincing answer to what 
exactly their value proposition, target market or size of the market opportunity is. Often the 
young and inexperienced entrepreneurs had not yet learned these important business 
management concepts. The process of establishing a business in Kenya seems to diverge 
strongly from what is considered “good practice” in a western technology entrepreneurship 
context, where market research and iterations of business model development precede 
product development and launch. Within the given sample of local mWork entrepreneurs, 
there is a strong technological overemphasis and a distinct lack of market research and 
business model validation phases. This may be related to the educational background of 
entrepreneurial teams, which seem to be composed mostly of technology related skill-sets, 
such as application and software developers, computer science graduates, as well as to the 
indicated inability to forego income due to a shortage of early stage financing. This finding is 
in line with a critique inherent to the M4D debate, namely that stakeholders are more 
concerned with what is technologically possible than what is economically feasible or 
actually needed in the users’ specific context (Banks, 2013; Smertnik, 2012). Furthermore, it 
is evident that grant financing seems to play an important role in the context of mobile 
application development in Kenya. Here it is interesting that not only companies with 
seemingly sound business plans, such as Shop Soko and Duma Works, were able to receive 
such funds, but also cases without such promising business models, such as Microforrester, 
received tens of thousands of US Dollars through grant competitions. The problem with 
providing the “right amount of finance” and the perverse outcome of supporting 
undeserving ventures through previously set entrepreneurship funds was anticipated by 
Isenberg (2011), and it is elaborated upon further in section 5.1.4 and section 5.4 of this 
research.  
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Conclusion on the Mobile Micro Work segment of mWork 
The case study analysis shows that there are numerous constraints faced by mWork in a 
Kenyan context. The cross-case analysis finds that many of the observed MMW business 
models are not able to provide sustainable value, mainly due to constraints of the 
technology employed. Many of the reviewed micro work tasks resemble crowd-sourcing 
tasks and involve splitting a larger task into many small tasks, which are then executed by a 
large number of people. Examples such as Tafsiri, Microforrester and MedicInfo show that it 
may often be more efficient to execute the tasks in a bulk, i.e. by hiring a group of people in 
fulltime to execute the task. In these cases, executing tasks in bulk would allow workers to 
use more efficient tools, such as keyboards, and to realize learning curves. This method 
would also allow businesses to save the time and effort that is required to divide and 
disintegrate large tasks.  
Towards the end of the current study, the cases of Sendy and HiviSasa emerged. 
Unfortunately, no interviews could be conducted to analyze HiviSasa in-depth, but both 
business models can still be evaluated as promising in the Kenyan context. The distinguishing 
feature of these two MMW applications is that they draw upon crowd-sourcing services that 
are time-critical in nature. Hence, the aforementioned relative inefficiency of micro-tasks 
towards bulk execution is not applicable here. For HiviSasa, this is the highly localized, highly 
time critical provision of news articles, and for Sendy, it is the on-demand execution of 
courier services for private or business clients.  
The value proposition of Sendy and its operationalization through extending the function of 
feature phones using GPS tracking devices both seem promising. In contrast, it is somewhat 
surprising that the HiviSasa citizen reporters would be willing to type up to 500 words on 
low-end camera phones for compensation as low as 100Ksh (1 Dollar US), given the 
inefficiency of typing on such a device. Here, workers may be intrinsically motivated to 
publish information about their community, either for philanthropic reasons or for the social 
prestige that can be expected through being published and read. However, the author has 
no information regarding the actual devices used to submit the reports that are finally 
published. Furthermore, very little information pertaining to the monetization model of 
HiviSasa is available, so further analysis was not possible. Nevertheless, the crowd-journalist 
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Mobile Micro Work business model may prove to be an interesting business model in an 
east African context, and it warrants further investigation. 
 
4.3.2 Feasibility of business models suggested by literature in a Kenyan context 
Given the encountered challenges to mWork in a Kenyan environment, one can draw 
preliminary conclusions about the viability of mWork business ideas that are discussed in the 
M4D literature. 
The potential tasks, listed in table 1, can be grouped into smart phone based and feature 
phone based tasks. The businesses Smart Rickshaw, App testing, Medical diagnosis, as well 
as human intelligence tasks, all require the use of a smartphone, and thus they encounter 
the identified costs and scalability problematic in a Kenyan context. In addition, many of 
these business ideas focus on revenue generation from low-income consumers (medical 
diagnosis, smart rickshaw). For the reasons outlined above, the author of this study argues 
that these business approaches provide little value in a current Kenyan context. Those 
businesses that build upon feature phones, such as crowd journalism and peer-to-peer 
advisory services, do not face the issue of scalability, but nevertheless they also face the 
challenge of monetization, as well as the constraints of producing texts on a feature phone. 
In conclusion, given the current economic and technological environment in Kenya, the 
suggested mWork applications proposed by M4D literature are deemed to hold little 
promise.  
 
4.3.3 Overcoming challenges to mWork in Kenya: Four successful examples 
Despite the challenges to mWork that have been found in the context of Kenya, this 
research brings forward four mWork companies that have developed strategies to overcome 
the present obstacles. 
 
Monetization through non-poor consumers 
Given the context of poor consumers, establishing a sustainable monetization model can be 
extremely challenging. The four successful cases generate their revenue from either local 
business clients (Duma Works and Sendy) the middle-class (partially also Sendy), or foreign 
market customers (biNu and Shop Soko). The example of biNu is especially interesting. 
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biNu’s actual product, access to the Internet applications on the biNu platform, is offered to 
the consumer for free, in order to grow the user base and respond to the low income 
available to developing country populations. The company’s entire revenue flow is 
generated through western market research firms, which pay for the consumer insights that 
biNu generates through their surveys. Essentially, this business model resembles the types 
of business models that are successful in the digital sector in the developed world. 
Corporations such as Facebook or Google also offer their services to the user for free, but 
monetize their business by collecting user data and selling these insights to third party 
corporations. The example of HiviSasa seems to indicate that when the costs of the 
operational model are relatively low, a revenue model that builds on advertising to end 
consumers may also be feasible in the low-income context. 
 
Market oriented value proposition 
As the literature review shows, the entire M4D debate falls prey to a techno deterministic or 
“tech-first” mindset, in which the technological possibilities are the starting point of the 
discussion (Banks, 2013; Heeks, 2012).  This can, however, only be fruitful if what is 
technologically possible is also economically feasible. The current study shows that many 
mWork companies in the sample have neglected the latter requirement. The successful 
mWork firms in the sample have shown a market-oriented approach that addresses the 
need of a financially-potent target group, while at the same time employing a technology 
that is feasible given the current context constraints (Duma Works, Sendy). Alternatively, 
Duma Works and biNu draw upon local resources to fulfill the needs of international 
consumers. 
 
Extending the limited capabilities of feature phones  
Three of the five successful mWork cases had to overcome the limited technological 
possibilities inherent to feature phones. The company biNu spent significant resources to 
acquire and develop a back-end technology for transferring Internet pages to feature 
phones. Duma Works developed its service in a way that only requires more advanced 
devices at later stages of the recruiting funnel. Candidates for more demanding jobs are only 
encouraged to use devices such as smartphone messenger application and personal web 
based services if they have passed previous screening tests. Duma Works developed its 
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service in a way that allows them to employ feature phones as much as possible to ensure 
scalability. When a candidate has already passed first basic screenings, the user is 
encouraged to go to one of the Internet cafes to execute more advanced screenings. While 
simple jobs can be mediated entirely via feature phones, the company opened its service 
delivery channel to include multiple access points, including a smartphone messenger 
application, E-mail and their own website.  While it still remains to be seen how successful 
this approach actually is, it seems to present an interesting way of dealing with the indicated 
trade-off between the scalability of feature phones and the higher technological possibilities 
of smart phones and computers. Sendy, on the other hand, substitutes the missing GPS 
function of feature phones by providing their couriers with a GPS transmission device. They 
are therefore able to track their couriers, while remaining sufficiently able to scale and to 
execute communication and mobile money transfer. Models that provide a hybrid of 
building upon feature phones and either extending the possibilities through back-end 
technology (biNu), or pushing the need for more complex devices further down the process 
funnel (DumaWorks), or extending the possibilities by add-on devices (Sendy) seem to be 
promising.  
 
Overcoming local human capital shortages 
The four successful case companies are either founded by foreign tech entrepreneurs 
entirely (Duma Works, biNu) or partially (Shop Soko), or they have a foreign individual in a 
leading position (Sendy). As the cases of Duma and Shop Soko show, the founders were able 
to draw upon resources from highly developed entrepreneurial ecosystems in the USA. They 
received entrepreneurship education and employed entrepreneurship support systems that 
can be considered among the best in the world, such as those provided by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or Princeton University. The role of expat 
human capital and the usage of entrepreneurship support systems from abroad is treated in 
detail in chapter six of this study.  
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 4.4 Development impact of mWork 
4.4.1 Development impact of mWork Segment Mobile Micro Work. 
The segment of Mobile Micro Work has been shown to be only limitedly viable, which is why 
a discussion of potential development impact is not provided at this point. The two 
successful cases in this segment, Sendy and HiviSasa, emerged too late in the research 
process and therefore a detailed assessment of development impact could not be executed. 
Nevertheless, Sendy seems to provide financial capital to motorcycle taxi drivers, who 
arguably can be expected to encounter a relatively large amount of idle time and relatively 
low incomes due to strong competition in their industry. HiviSasa provides a relatively small 
amount of financial capital to citizen journalists that get published (approximately 1 USD per 
published article), but seems to provide political capital to users since it empowers them to 
report stories of local injustice, as the example of denouncing a corrupt police officer shows. 
The further research section in section 4.4 discusses these two cases in more detail. 
 
4.4.2 Development impact of mWork segment market research  
The segment of market research features one company that is active in Kenya: biNu. biNu is 
a company that is already active in several continents and that has shown an impressive 
international expansion over the last few years. While this research was not able to access 
the actual financial performance numbers for biNu, the fact that it has been expanding so 
significantly and that it was able to secure funding from some of the most prestigious 
venture capital firms in the industry indicates the feasibility of biNu’s business model. 
Through the conducted interviews with biNu VP Africa, Jeremy George, Savannah Fund 
manager, Malaika Judd, as well as eight biNu users from the low income area of Kibera in 
Nairobi, this research identifies several areas of development impact that seem to be 
achieved by biNu.  
 
1. Lowering threshold to mobile web use for low-income users 
Seven out of eight respondents that use biNu indicate that this portal is their only way of 
accessing the mobile Internet. Four of the eight respondents say they had never used the 
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Internet on their mobile phone before. The interviews confirm significantly lower data cost 
for the user, compatibility with feature phones, and a better fit with the locally available 
bandwidth as the main reasons that this access is possible. While people in urban areas are 
able to use cyber cafés to access the Internet when they need to, these services are much 
less common in rural areas of the country. Here biNu sometimes poses the only option to 
access the Internet. 
 “I didn’t even know that my phone was able to go on the Internet […]. A friend told 
me about it and now I check information on the Internet sometimes” (biNu user 8, 
2013) 
“In Kenya once you leave urban areas, 3G mobile signal often drops dramatically 
and in many parts of Kenya 2G or less is still the norm. […] Mobile operators have 
not invested in universal high-speed Internet coverage, especially in rural areas. 
Now if you use the latest Android or iPhone you might be able to send some e-
mails over a slow network and some very slow web browsing, but access to rich 
services such as social media really is severely limited or painfully slow. biNu with 
its simpler versions of such pages and lower data requirement is just more 
adequate to the local environment.” (Jeremy George, 2013)  
 
biNu also seems to play a role for operators in low income regions, as a way to develop the 
market, by getting users to use Internet services and ultimately up-sell the consumer to 
higher data contracts. Jeremy George (2013) explains this as follows:  
“In some countries such as Nigeria mobile operators have started offering biNu to 
their users free of charge. And I will explain to you why that is. It means that 
people can get on all of biNu sites like news, Facebook, […] and Wikipedia without 
paying […] you need no data to do that. They do this because a typical consumer 
scenario is as follows: a consumer goes and buys 500 shillings worth of airtime, 
then for the first time uses data on his phone to use Facebook ect. for which he 
initially has used the cybercafé. What he realizes is that all his credit is gone after a 
very short time interval due to the high charges. He switches off his data option 
and never turns it on again and in the end the provider is forgoing revenue due to 
that. The network operators are losing money on voice and SMS as the revenue 
from these streams are declining due to falling prices so the only way that they can 
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make money is through people that use data. So what we can do with biNu is we 
can charge a certain relatively low amount of money for the use of biNu for a 
certain amount of time, which does not put a strain on the telco provider’s network 
due to our data efficiency. […] They hope that: Some of those users will get used to 
the Internet and the guys that are slightly wealthier will then start to use normal 
data outside of biNu and even move on to a better data contract or even get a 
smartphone and a flatrate”. (Jeremy George, 2013) 
 
2. Financial capital gains 
The average number of surveys a biNu user in Kenya can take is about two to three. The 
number the user receives depends on the amount the client is willing to pay for the 
information. This means that harder to reach demographics, such as older women, can earn 
slightly more than more reachable demographics. Easy to reach demographics usually earn 
about 20 cents USD per survey while, for example, older women may earn up to 2 USD per 
survey. The total compensation that a user may receive monthly thus varies from about 50 
cents to 4 dollars US (Jeremy George, 2013).  According to an interview with Africa VP of 
biNu, OC&C, the compensation that biNu provides is mostly used for conversion into mobile 
airtime credits: 
“About 80% of our clients in Kenya choose to collect biNu credits until they have 
reached the minimum threshold for conversion into airtime credit. Looking at 
expenditure patterns at the BOP in Kenya I therefore think that we provide a very 
real kind of value, not virtual money” (Jeremy George, 2013) 
 
This is in line with the interviews with biNu users from this research. Seven out of the eight 
interviewed biNu users actively participated in market research surveys and were rewarded 
with biNu credits in return. The earned supplement income varies from a few cents to up to 
4 Dollars US a month. It is apparent that most of the credits were spent on mobile airtime 
credit (see table 5).  
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Respondent Gender Total 
monthly 
income 
(approx.; 
monthly) 
Amount of 
income 
through 
biNu 
(approx., 
montly) 
Avg.  
number of 
surveys 
conducted 
(approx., 
monthly) 
Percentage 
of credits 
spent on 
airtime 
(approx.) 
1 F 120 USD 3-4 USD 4 100% 
2 F -- 2-3 USD 3 50% 
3 M 80 USD 0.5 – 1 USD 2 0% 
4 F 200 USD 2 USD 2  
5 M -- n.a. n.a. n.a. 
6 M 100 USD 0.5 USD 1 0% 
7 F -- -- 3 100% 
8 F -- 2-3 USD 3 100% 
Table 5: Financial Impact biNu 
3. Human and political capital gains 
The interaction with the Internet applications on biNu seems to allow for human capital 
gains through improving ICT skills, health knowledge and personal well-being as well as 
providing political capital by enabling to maintain relationships with a larger group of 
people.  
 “When I am driving in the Matatu sometimes it takes very long and I use the time 
to read the word of god in the holy bible via biNu. […] I sometimes share passages 
with others on the Matatu to inspire [them]. […] It makes me feel good, it gives me 
strength.” (biNu user 8, 2013) 
“Through facebook I can reach a lot of people and speak about important issues 
[…] I can stay in touch even with distant relatives and call on them for help when I 
need it (biNu user 6, 2013). 
 
In conclusion, biNu’s development impact is twofold. On the one hand, a tangible financial 
impact can be realized by taking biNu quizzes. The extent of such earning possibilities varies 
depending on demography, but over the course of a month it can be considered a 
supplemental income for users at the BOP. On the other hand, the application seems to 
significantly lower the threshold of access to Internet services, which has been shown to be 
 133 
highly appreciated by the local BOP community, and seems to offer developmental benefits 
in the area of human and potentially even political capital.  
 
4.4.3 Development impact of mWork segment recruiting 
In order to determine the potential impact of the mWork segment of recruiting, 5.4.2, this 
research conducted a short analysis of the recruiting environment and the challenges 
encountered in a Kenyan context. The results of that analysis precede the analysis of 
development impact, in order to establish whether or not the encountered mWork 
application is able to address present recruiting market needs. The benefits of bringing 
someone without work into employment, or improving his employment situation, can be 
considered relatively straight-forward. Benefits can be expected in the area of financial, 
social, political and human capital. Establishing a match between job seeker and employer 
that creates the best possible fit between job requirements, applicant skill set, and personal 
aspirations is considered especially desirable, since it may result in larger motivation and 
productivity.  
Based on insights gained through literature, as well as through several interviews, the 
research brings forward a discussion of challenges that are currently present in said 
environment. Here the currently practiced recruiting mechanisms are evaluated. Hereafter 
the research compares the alternative recruitment mechanism offered by Duma Works to 
the challenges encountered, in order to assess whether present recruiting market needs in 
Kenya are indeed met. The literature on Kenya’s unemployment problem (see section 1.2) 
shows a set of root causes, including: the rapid growth of the population and the labor force 
with a low absorptive capacity of the economy, skill mismatch between educational system 
and labor market requirements, information problems in the labor market and the wider 
labor market setup.  
The review of M4D literature in section 2.2 reveals that the main suggested potential 
benefits derived from mobile job connectors lie in the field of improving information access 
on the type and location of jobs available. Unlike in developed economies, there is no state-
run employment agency in Kenya that serves as a means to decrease information 
asymmetries between demand and supply sides of the market. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that applicants lacking knowledge about how to create a marketable CV, how to 
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apply for jobs, or how to provide verification of their professional skills poses an obstacle. 
Lastly, a potential field of impact lies in the area of provision of skills that are desired by the 
market (GSMA, 2014a). 
 
Effectiveness of currently practiced recruiting mechanisms 
In order to assess the value of the alternative recruiting method that Duma Works offers, 
this research briefly analyzes currently practiced recruiting processes in Kenya, based on 
both examined literature and interviews conducted.  
The following recruiting processes have surfaced as being most widely practiced in Kenya 
and will be discussed one by one: Hiring through personal networks (word of mouth 
recruiting), posting job advertisements on job boards or online resources, putting up job-
billboards, advertising in newspapers, recruiting off university campus or hiring a 
professional HR consultancy.  
 
Hiring through personal networks (word of mouth recruiting) 
Literature suggests that recruiting through personal networks (word of mouth) is by far the 
most practiced recruitment method in developing countries (GSMA, 2014). This impression 
was confirmed during interviews from this research with Duma CEO Arielle Sandor (2014), as 
well as with local entrepreneur Judith Orwiga (Orwiga, 2013). The wide prevalence of this 
recruiting approach seems to be caused by several factors. One is the low-trust environment 
that has been suggested by Kiggundu (2002) and Pope (2001) (see chapter 2.5). Given the 
largely informal nature of the Kenyan labor market, employment credentials such as 
employer references are not common, which gives a work-seeking person relatively little 
documentation to prove former experiences and skills possessed (GSMA, 2014; Sandor, 
2014).  
Further, the cultural norm of carrying responsibility for extended family members, by giving 
them employment in one’s own business (see chapter 2.5) contributes to the popularity of 
this approach. This research argues that while recruiting through personal networks may be 
effective in overcoming the evident trust problems, it has significant drawbacks for the 
Kenyan labor market and hence, poses a challenge to advance overall economic 
development. First of all, the approach significantly limits the respective pool of applicants 
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and the rigorousness of the selection criteria, as compared to a situation where a larger pool 
of applicants would be considered. The resulting, relatively weaker match between the 
applicant’s skill set and personal aspirations and the possibilities offered by the respective 
job can, in the long run, be expected to lead to a lower employee motivation and a 
decreased productivity of the enterprise compared to a scenario where a more suitable 
candidate had been hired. Furthermore, this method may simply not provide an acceptable 
candidate at all, e.g. if the sought after skill-set is relatively rare or personal networks are 
limited. Word of mouth is also not effective for reaching people in more remote geographies 
or in less well-connected societal groups. Therefore, one may argue that this recruiting 
practice sustains current power distribution and strongly disadvantages capable candidates 
that are less well connected. This is especially problematic in a Kenyan context, where tribal 
discrimination is common (see section 1.2), and where members of smaller and less 
respected tribes can be expected to have significantly weaker networks than others. 
 
Posting on open job advertisements 
Open job advertisements, irrespective of the medium employed, have been said to result in 
a very large amount of applications that often do not match the required profile and thus 
require large screening efforts on behalf of the employer (Judith Orwiga, 2013). This 
problem is caused by the large asymmetry between available jobs and job seekers, and the 
involved screening is further complicated by the lack of trustworthy recruiting credentials 
and applicants’ lacking knowledge in how to apply for a job (Judith Orwiga, 2013; Arielle 
Sandor, 2013; GSMA, 2014). Given the informal nature of many businesses in a Kenyan 
context and the currently strong reliance on word of mouth hiring, one can also expect that 
many businesses lack recruiting knowledge about how to test the skills of an applicant and 
how to establish a good fit. Hence, open job advertisements may be more suitable for jobs 
that require little trust or skills and less suitable for more demanding positions.  
 
Recruiting off-university campus 
Recruiting off-university campus may be relatively efficient since it involves a preselected 
group, but naturally is restricted to a small part of most jobs available. Here also the criticism 
surfaced in the literature review on the mismatch between the skills produced in the Kenyan 
education system, as well as the young graduates’ expectations, and the realities of the 
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Kenyan labor market, which may reduce the attractiveness of hiring a student that has just 
graduated from university (Gachugia et al., 2014).   
 
Professional human resource firms and others 
Employing professional human resource firms for recruiting may be a good way to fill jobs 
that require strong skills and experience, but since it can be considered prohibitively 
expensive for most firms (Sandor, 2013), it was not treated in detail in this research. 
Furthermore, there are other recruitment possibilities, such as organizing career forums or 
networking events. However, since they were not mentioned in any interview or during the 
literature review, they are deemed to be of marginal importance and consequently 
disregarded by this research.  
 
Conclusion on the Kenyan recruitment environment 
This section shows that severe limitations are inherent on both the employer as well as the 
job seeker side of the Kenyan recruiting market that give rise to a ‘Kenyan recruitment 
dilemma’ (see figure 11 for illustration). In the conducted analysis, several barriers to 
efficient recruiting processes in Kenya surface, namely the lack of effective recruiting 
credentials, large floods of applications without apt screening mechanisms, and a skill 
deficiency on both employer as well as job seeker side. For employers, this skill deficiency 
pertains to a lack of recruiting know-how, and for the latter, it may be the bridging of 
insufficient knowledge on how to apply for jobs as well as the potential training of skills 
relevant to the labor market in the long term. Finally, given the absence of a central labor 
market intermediary, a general lack of labor market information is seen on both the supply 
and the demand side of the labor market. Therefore currently there does not seem to be an 
effective alternative to word of mouth recruiting. The prevalence of this practice is argued to 
cause drawbacks for the Kenyan economy, such as supporting nepotism, creating overall 
inferior fits between candidates and job profiles, and having a general lack of reach as well 
as a large potential for discrimination. In conclusion, the conducted analysis finds that there 
is indeed a strong need for an efficient labor market intermediary that addresses the 
underlying root causes that have been found to contribute to the popularity of world of 
mouth hiring.  
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Figure 11: The Kenyan recruitment dilemma 
 
The development impact of Duma Works 
Since Duma Works has changed its value proposition focus over the time of the case study, 
first the initial model and the reasons for its abandonment are perused. Hereafter the 
potential impact provided by Duma Work’s current business model is analyzed.  At the onset 
of their business, Duma Works provided simple matching services between candidates and 
employers, based on information the candidate would enter via SMS technology in a mini-CV 
format and job descriptions submitted by employers. Duma’s main focus was thus on 
bridging the existing shortage of labor market information, as well as on the problem of the 
recruiting and application skills on each side and of the large flood of applications. However, 
as the case study of Duma Works shows, there was little willingness to pay for job matching 
services on behalf of employers previous to the introduction of the candidate screening and 
skills verification. This is in line with this research’s previous finding on the role of trust and 
the lack of recruiting credentials in the Kenyan labor market. It seems safe to assume that 
for short-term, low-skill work, the importance of trust and skill credentials is less 
pronounced than for tasks requiring more responsibility. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
employers did not seek to recruit for work that required more responsibility and trust on 
Duma without a credential mechanism.  
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The fact that Duma Works also encountered a low willingness to pay for matching in the 
low-skill work segment, however, is very interesting. It may be interpreted as an indicator 
that employers in Kenya find workers for low-trust and low-skill work relatively easily and do 
not require job-matching services in this segment. This seems realistic, given the stark 
asymmetry in numbers between available jobs and job seekers. Given the initial “pay what 
you like” monetization model of Duma Works, in this phase of their enterprise one can 
further rule out price sensitivity of the employers as a possible reason for not using the 
service. In addition, one may argue that the initial mechanism of creating mini CVs and the 
relatively small amount of information gathered per candidate may have been insufficient in 
creating meaningful job matches, and further, that the company’s liability of newness and 
the relative novelty of their innovation may have discouraged employers. 
 
As the case study shows, Duma Works has altered its value proposition to offer applicant 
skill verification as a central component. For this, the company introduced a multiple choice 
SMS tool, which serves as a means to gather more detailed information and to verify skills 
indicated by the applicant. To provide skill verification for more advanced positions the 
company also introduced a multi-channel approach that allows applicants to execute 
screening tests on smartphones and personal computers. Since this change in value 
proposition has been executed relatively recently, it still remains to be seen how far this 
approach can be operationalized, given local technological constraints and whether it meets 
local market requirements. This research therefore offers a conceptual analysis discussing 
the fit between previously identified labor market requirements and Duma Works current 
value proposition, as well as a discussion of the technological constraints.  
Based on the premise that Duma Works is able to successfully operationalize and scale their 
current value proposition, a range of substantial improvements to the recruiting 
environment in Kenya could be achieved. Through the focus on skill verification, Duma 
Works essentially seeks to establish a mechanism where different candidates can objectively 
be compared by e.g. the scores of a skills test. These verification processes and the resulting 
recommendation by Duma Works can then serve as a recruiting credential mechanism. If the 
company is able to reach a critical scale, the additional function of a professional network 
and referencing tool may further be a powerful tool to establish trust and accountability 
between the two sides of the labor market. As previously discussed, this would, if successful, 
 139 
address a significant obstacle in the Kenyan recruiting environment. The application would 
be able to further minimize the amount of unsuitable applications an employer needs to 
process, since it preselects the candidates according to criteria specified by the employers. 
In doing so, the company addresses both sides of the recruiting skill gap that was identified, 
since it performs a large part of the selection process on the employer side and executes the 
formalities of applying for the candidate. In addition, the company protects minorities to the 
degree that, at least in the pre-selection phase, candidates’ information pertaining to tribal 
origin, neighborhood of residence or gender are not shared with the employer. Therefore, 
all candidates get a relatively fair chance in the stage of pre-selection. A further benefit for 
the candidate is the chance to execute the screening tests and even the interviews via the 
phone from their home or workplace, without having to travel long distances, thus saving 
time and money and lowering the threshold for people to apply for jobs. Should a critical 
scale be reached, Duma may additionally be a helpful information tool on the current status 
of the labor market, offering information regarding the available skills, jobs and wages, 
which are valuable for a large range of stakeholders.  
 
The planned extension of Duma’s service portfolio towards m-learning services may also be 
interesting. Several of Dumas possessed organizational resources put it in an excellent 
position to effectively execute such services. First of all, as a recruiting company, the 
company can be expected to possess a good insight into the skills that are currently valued 
and demanded in the market. Secondly, the company has an installed base of job seekers 
and possesses information on their current skill development level and skill development 
need, their chosen career path, their working history, etc.  This enables them to allocate 
training that is closely customized to the needs and potential of the respective candidate. 
Hence, the effectiveness of training efforts may be increased substantially when compared 
to other m-learning enterprises. Lastly, having developed and operationalized technology 
that can execute multiple-choice quizzes for skill verification on mobile devices, the 
company seems to possess the necessary technical skills to develop and implement such an 
m-learning system in a Kenyan context. Nevertheless, given the limited capabilities of a 
feature phone, it still remains to be seen just how much training can be achieved on such a 
device. 
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Potential drawbacks of Duma Work’s current business model involve the service’s 
susceptibility to cheating, which is natural since Duma can hardly assess whether or not a 
candidate had help when taking the skill verification tests. Nevertheless, the premise of 
whether Duma is able to operationalize and scale such a business model successfully in a 
Kenyan context is not yet established and depends on a range of factors. 
As GSMA (2014a) argues, the service delivery channel imposes a trade-off between a large 
scalability of the service (using SMS/USSD technology) and the degree of personalization or 
richness of interaction with each applicant (employing more advanced technology such as a 
smartphone or personal computer). The case of Duma Works indicates that employers do 
not value a recruiting service that is purely based on matching without verification of skills, 
but seem willing to pay for a service that does provide such skill-verification. The question 
that remains, however, is whether or nor this skill verification can really be executed to the 
satisfaction of employers in the current technological environment, without loosing the 
service’s scalability. On the one hand, the case study on Duma Works does show that the 
employed MC quizzes can be understood and answered using SMS technology. On the other 
hand, the more advanced screening tests involve open essay questions that are more aptly 
answered with a more advanced device. Therefore, Duma’s decision to open their delivery 
channel from purely focusing on SMS towards offering multiple access points, i.e. a smart 
phone and personal computers, is interesting.  
Given this option, the job candidates may still be able to execute more simple skill 
screenings via feature phones and may with this level of screening be eligible for more basic 
jobs. For more advanced screenings, the candidate could first execute as much as possible 
on his feature phone device and then execute the rest of the screening, for example, in an 
Internet café. It remains to be seen whether or not this channel mix proves to be effective in 
the local context. There is, however, a tension between the scalable business model based 
on job-matching, that does not seem to meet local requirements, and the business model 
based on skill-verification that meets local requirements, but where the scalability is yet to 
be proven.  
 
Conclusion on development impact of the mWork segment: Recruiting 
The research finds that there is a Kenyan recruiting dilemma, and it finds several root causes 
to present explanations for the strong presence of word of mouth recruiting. The research 
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finds that mobile-based recruiting mechanisms in a Kenyan context seem to need a way of 
skill verification for jobs that are not very basic in their requirement of skills and trust. 
Further, the research shows that Duma Works seems to offer a potential way of establishing 
skills verification through SMS based MC-quizzes as well as through opening up their 
platform to smart phones and personal computers. While the mobile recruiting business 
model of Duma seems promising and initial numbers on their usage and job matching 
activities seem encouraging, it is at this early phase not possible to determine whether or 
not this approach is able to provide a means of skills verification and trust credential 
mechanism that is sufficient in convincing employers to switch from their currently practiced 
WOM recruiting. Furthermore, it is not possible to determine whether the currently 
practiced approach is truly scalable to a large BOP population in Kenya. 
 
4.4.4 (Potential) development impact of mWork segment: Market intermediary 
The mWork segment of market intermediary features two distinct cases, which can be 
attributed to two different subsegments. The first being market intermediaries that connect 
seller and buyer in a local market using the mobile phone, while the second one connects 
global customers and local sellers of produce. 
 
Local market intermediary 
The case study on the local market intermediary MobiAgent shows two main reasons for 
failure of the business model. On the one hand, there are the industry-wide low margins, 
caused by high price sensitivity in the product segment of solar lamps, which the enterprise 
focused on. The founders argued that given the extra costs of an intermediary, including 
agent commission and training, logistics, etc., the final margin was hardly attractive. On the 
other hand, however, the case shows that operational issues, such as incorrect product 
claims and supply chain issues have also led to a loss in consumer trust and satisfaction, and 
ultimately contributed to the failure of the company.  
Nevertheless, from a technical perspective the case delivers evidence that such a business 
model can indeed be executed in a context where feature phones are dominant. Given the 
fact that operational issues contributed significantly to the discontinuation of the business, it 
still remains to be seen whether this model could actually work with a different product. The 
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inherent value proposition of local market intermediaries seems somewhat promising, since 
it addresses issues that can be expected to be eminent in the sale of innovative products in 
the local context, namely establishing trust and extensive customer education on the 
features and abilities of a new product. A sales agent that personally knows the buyer could 
be well suited, especially for carrying out those pre- and post-sale functions. The 
intermediary sales model could further provide development impact in the area of financial 
capital for agents. Finally, such an intermediary service may reduce search costs for the 
consumer, which in developing countries can be expected to form a significant component 
of overall encountered transaction costs. After all, the BOP consumer can be expected to 
have little access to information about products that may actually be valuable to her.  
 
Global market intermediary 
Initially the company Shop Soko ran an open e-commerce platform through which any 
Kenyan jewelry artisan in possession of a low-end smart phone could sell to western 
consumers. Artisans could manage the entire process of international selling, shipping and 
financial transaction end-to-end via their low-end smart phone through Shop Soko. 
Nevertheless, Shop Soko eventually abandoned this operational model and migrated 
towards a more classical e-commerce approach where mobile phones play a less central 
role. Finally, the case study shows Soko’s aspiration to employ mobile phones as a small 
enterprise management tool to enable artisans to grow their production quantity. This 
section therefore discusses three aspects, namely the viability of the original business 
model, then the development impact achieved through the current mode of operation, and 
finally the potential use of mobile phones as enterprise tools.   
 
Feasibility of the smart-phone enabled open e-commerce platform 
 Through the twelve months of operation of Soko’s smart-phone enabled e-commerce 
platform, the company provided proof for the operational feasibility of connecting BOP 
artisans to western customers and managing the entire artisan facing process via low-end 
smart-phones.  
The study also shows that for the product category in question, artisan jewelry, very few 
artisans actually generated international sales. Reasons for this seem to depend on differing 
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design esthetics and production standards, as well as the way that products are 
photographed and described on the website. On the whole, the large amount of relatively 
unappealing products ended up decreasing the appeal of the entire site.  
In light of the relative geographic dispersion of the artisans in different parts of Nairobi, the 
evident skills gap and the limited resources of the young company to train each artisan 
according to his needs, a decision was made to focus on a more select group of artisans that 
show promise and to give these artisans intensive training. However, the case study of Shop 
Soko importantly shows that in the current technological context of Kenya it is indeed 
possible to create a global e-commerce storefront for Kenyan small-scale producers.  It could 
therefore be possible that such a model holds promise in a different product category or in 
other GS contexts.  
 
Development impact of Shop Soko’s e-commerce business model: 
In Shop Soko’s current model of operation, a small group of artisans produces, and to a 
limited degree also designs, the upscale jewelry. Since the artisan no longer takes pictures 
with his smart phone and uploads and describes the product on an open e-commerce 
platform with his mobile phone, the model resembles a more classical e-commerce model 
rather than an mWork approach. Nevertheless, the low-end smartphones are still used to 
coordinate logistics, handle financial transactions and share information on jewelry trends 
and production techniques. Shop Soko can be considered to have a relatively substantial 
overall impact on the life of the artisans it employs. The main impact is realized in financial 
and human capital improvements, but advancements of political, social and physical capital 
were also observed. For the impact assessment, three semi-structured interviews were held 
with Soko artisans, who were visited in their production facilities in the low-income 
neighborhood of Kibera. In addition, several interviews with Diana Sang and Ella Peinovich of 
Shop Soko were conducted.  
 
Financial capital 
The Soko artisans are able to realize very attractive prices for their products, which 
according to Diana Sang are approximately ten times higher than those they can fetch in 
their local art craft markets and sometimes even more (2014). In addition, the costs they 
incur for selling online are lower, considering that they do not need to invest time traveling 
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and selling the produce at different markets. Over 70% of Soko artisans had never sold to 
international consumers, or online, before joining Shop Soko (Sang, 2013). 
The two interviewed artisans confirm the impact, by stating: 
“The money we receive when selling via Shop Soko is very good, it is much higher than what I 
get usually on the art crafts market”. (Wamaitha, 2013)  
“One of my best selling necklaces sells for 175 Dollars, this is much more than the 
approximate 20-35 Dollars I get when selling on the market here. […] Also it is cheaper for 
me to sell via Soko, because I don’t need to travel to the different markets anymore and do 
not have to spend time on selling. I can use this time to make more jewelry or be with my 
family”.  (Veronicah, 2013) 
 
Human Capital. 
 Shop Soko provides human capital mainly in the form of knowledge on how to design, 
manufacture for, and sell to international markets via e-commerce. As Diana Sang (2014) 
stresses, Soko does not establish an exclusive partnership with the artisans. Instead, they  
encourage them to grow beyond Shop Soko and to establish a brand of their own. The 
example of Wamaitha shows this: 
“With Soko I was first able to get a micro-loan and to buy a smartphone and sell 
my jewelry via Shop Soko. Since my products were selling well, I was soon able to 
employ other family members […] that way I repaid the loan even before the time. 
[…] I got a second loan through Shop Soko for buying a computer. This is very 
exciting for me I visit design websites and know how to use Facebook and Twitter. I 
am even in contact with some of my customers online. I plan to one day open my 
own online store” (Wamaitha, 2014). 
 
Physical capital. 
 Through giving out loans to the artisans to purchase technology, as well as manufacturing 
equipment or facilities, Shop Soko also enables the accumulation of physical capital that can 
help sustain the artisans in the future. According to Diana Sang (2013), while about half of 
the artisans are receiving micro loans, approximately 80% of these loans are used for the 
purchase of a smart phone.  
 
Political capital.  
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Since most Soko artisans are women, the enterprise is actively raising the topic of female 
empowerment, openly discusses gender roles in Kenya and tries to ensure that the women 
working with Soko are able to benefit from the earned income. Especially given their 
strategy to grow production capacity through their existing artisan network, it is a major 
concern for Soko to give their female employees the necessary confidence to believe such a 
transition is possible.  
“As we get to know more about them, their family and their social structures, we 
try to ensure that while they earn more their life also actually improves. A huge 
issue that we see here and I think is prevalent in all of Africa is that women are not 
really empowered. They take more of a back seat; the man decides where the 
money is spent and carries responsibilities, often making poor choices. […]. We try 
to help our artisans in standing up against men, building confidence to enable 
them to break prevailing gender roles. We have a mentoring program where 
successful female artisans engage in this activities and we also find that with 
increasing economic empowerment also comes the sociocultural empowerment for 
many of our artisans” (Sang, 2013). 
“Especially now that we try to leverage the capacity of our artisans and essentially 
pushing them towards becoming independent entrepreneurs we are increasingly 
pushing the topic of empowerment” (Sang, 2014).  
 
The use of mobile phones as enterprise management tools 
The case study of Shop Soko further brings to the surface a very interesting use of mobile 
phones that seems relevant for the field of mWork, namely the use of mobile phones as 
management enterprise tools. As the case study shows, the company is currently trying to 
increase production capacity by empowering the existing artisans to employ, train and 
supervise other artisans to then effectively grow into a small business. Naturally, moving 
from a handicraft artisan at the BOP towards a manager of a small business is a transition 
that requires the acquisition of new skill sets to manage additional, more complex processes. 
In order to facilitate this transition, Shop Soko tries to provide the artisans with mobile 
enterprise tools that can simplify management tasks such as inventory management, 
accounting, financial planning and logistics.  
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In Kenya the informal sector is large, and many people run informal micro businesses to 
make a living. Therefore, any platform that enables such people to increase productivity 
through more professional management processes and hence grow their business is a 
powerful lever for development. Nevertheless, it can be considered a challenging task to 
create an application that works on a low-end smart phone and manages relatively complex 
processes with an interface that is sufficiently simple for a user who may not possess an 
education beyond primary school or strong technological skills. Interviews with the 
responsible manager at Shop Soko show that the company possesses several key capabilities 
for creating such an application. First of all, the close contact to the relatively small group of 
artisans provides the management and the developing team with a good insight into 
artisans’ business needs, current technological skills and learning abilities. Further, through 
the close contact during everyday business activities, the intended user can actively be 
included in the design of the applications and provide feedback on a continuous basis. In 
addition, given the small group and close contact, the user can receive relatively intensive 
training in how to work with the application. Secondly, the fact that the same company that 
runs the back end of the e-commerce platform produces the application may indeed speak 
to Shop Soko’s ability to create an enterprise tool that supports management processes and 
integration with artisans. For the development of such a mobile enterprise management 
tool, the company has been given a grant by the Vodafone foundation, started developing 
the application in mid 2014, and is expecting the launch of the first beta version in the last 
quarter of 2015.  
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5. The Kenyan “Silicon Savannah” 
5.1 Empirical Findings: Barriers and enablers to technology entrepreneurship in 
Kenya 
This section presents the findings of the research pertaining to barriers and enablers faced 
by ICT entrepreneurs in the Kenyan ICT EE . The insights were derived through interviews 
with Kenyan ICT entrepreneurs, local ecosystem experts and ethnographical observations. In 
accordance with the ecosystem view on entrepreneurship (Isenberg, 2010; 2011), as 
outlined in Chapter 2.7, the first part of this chapter is structured according to the six 
suggested dimensions, namely: Culture, Supports, Human Capital, Finance, Policy and 
Markets. Finally, observations pertaining to identified particularities of the Kenyan venturing 
processes are presented. 
 
The nascent Kenyan ICT EE  faces a number of barriers and enablers, which are summarized 
in Figure 12 and elaborated upon in the remainder of this section. 
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5.5.1 Ecosystem dimension: Culture  
Social norms around entrepreneurship 
As discussed previously, there is a large variety of interpretations of the term 
“entrepreneurship”. The review shows that in a western technology entrepreneurship 
context the meaning of the term tends to lean towards the opportunity-driven view and the 
intrinsic motivation to ‘build something big’ even long after the personal economic needs 
are satisfied (Miller, 2005). This research finds five entrepreneur statements that indicate 
that even in the relatively advanced ICT technology context of Kenya the perception of the 
term entrepreneurship seems to lean more towards a view of entrepreneurship as a means 
of “self-employment” and providing for the immediate needs of themselves and their family. 
This seems to be connected to the history of the country, the economic circumstances and 
to a lack of successful entrepreneurs. Three respondents have stressed the importance of 
the country’s history for this conception. The colonial rule of the British left no room for 
local Kenyan entrepreneurship and was followed by the despotic rule of the president Daniel 
Arap Moi from 1972-2002. Moi’s rule has been associated with corruption and kleptocracy 
of the ruling political class and has been reported to have left very little opportunities and 
freedoms for individual business owners and entrepreneurs (Himbara, 1994). Clearly, 
therefore, there is a lack of examples of successful entrepreneurs that could shape the 
perception of entrepreneurship accordingly.  
“You know in my parent’s generation nobody really is an entrepreneur, unless of 
course you had the ‘right last name’ and connections to the political class etc. […] If 
you had the chance to study and were smart it is much more common in their 
generation to work for the government, or a university or a large bank or be 
employed in other people’s organizations. Where should this American „make it big“ 
idea come from?” (mWork entrepreneur 6, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, seven ICT entrepreneurs have mentioned that while within Nairobi’s tech 
community they feel accepted and receive recognition; there is little social prestige around 
the profession of an entrepreneur. This seems to be especially relevant with regard to 
generational lines, where the younger generations seem more tech-savvy and enthusiastic 
than the older ones. 
“My parents really are not too happy about what I am doing. They think I am crazy. 
They would love to see me work for a bank or maybe Safaricom” (mWork 
entrepreneur 2, 2013). 
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“I also think in university we are encouraged and educated mostly to go on to 
professional positions, which are communicated as the (best) way to go. 
Entrepreneurship is not really encouraged or conveyed as something that is very 
promising” (ICT entrepreneur 5, 2013).  
 
Perception and tolerance of risk 
A central concern in the entrepreneurship domain is the perception and tolerance of risk in 
pursuing business opportunities. Throughout this research several themes surfaced that 
have been indicated to influence this dimension. The following two themes, responsibility 
for extended family and the general low trust environment, are closely related to the 
entrepreneurs’ perception and tolerance of risk.  
 
Responsibility for extended family   
Two local experts in the area of digital entrepreneurship in Kenya and five entrepreneurs 
point to the responsibility that ICT entrepreneurs have for their extended family. They argue 
that the often well-educated ICT entrepreneurs are expected to help generate support in 
form of financing, jobs and connections for a wide array of family members. In order to fulfill 
this social obligation, the entrepreneur needs to earn a steady stream of income. This 
responsibility naturally decreases the tolerance of risk when starting a new venture. 
Especially in an technology entrepreneurship context this may be relevant since almost 
every individual in this research’s sample had enjoyed some degree of higher level 
education, throughout which they often have been supported financially by their family. One 
entrepreneur has described the situation as having to repay their family for their support 
throughout his studies and further indicates that this responsibility towards his family makes 
it hard for him to chose a relatively risky entrepreneurial career over a stable and reasonably 
well-paid corporate job.  
“It really puts pressure on me to continue building my business, when at this stage I 
could get a stable well paid job in a corporation. Especially at this stage where we are 
forgoing profits to invest in growth the pressure from my family is strong. They don’t 
understand how this works and think I am making excuses when I don’t deliver” (ICT 
entrepreneur 1, 2013). 
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Low-trust environment 
A theme that has surfaced in multiple sections of this research is the lack of trust in different 
stakeholders in the course of business conduct in Kenya. In more detail this research finds 
the topic of general mistrust pertaining to other actors, be it suppliers, institutions, business 
partners and employees to be a guiding theme in the general conduct of business in Kenya.  
Especially in interactions with a high power discrepancy, such as with large corporations, or 
high-ranking officials, several entrepreneurs have voiced their concern for being defrauded. 
There seems to be little trust in the other parties’ integrity or in institutions to protect the 
interest of the relatively weaker party. Respondents indicate that this institutionalized low 
trust impedes the process of building a business, which essentially can be viewed as the 
establishment of contracts with multiple parties. As it has been stressed in the literature on 
trust and entrepreneurship (see chapter 2.5) this impedes the process of building a business 
since it is harder to plan and further increases the perception of risk when entering into 
contracts with other parties significantly.  
“I notice a crazy obsession about intellectual property. Ideas are not shared. People 
are not hired because of this. People really mistrust each other.” (Entrepreneurship 
Support Organization Manager 1, 2013).  
“In a context where the legal system is so weakly developed and where corruption is 
so strong it is hard to know whether another party will fulfill its contractual. Now how 
can I mess with a large well-connected business partner? Even a small one, I cannot 
just sue them. […] Who pays for that? I can’t so I try to do business with people I know 
well.” (ICT entrepreneur 5, 2013) 
 
Entrepreneurial Success stories 
Another element pertaining to the culture around entrepreneurship is the availability of 
success stories that inspire other entrepreneurs and provide an international reputation for 
the entrepreneurship space. A very prominent example that is deeply ingrained in the mind 
of the Kenyan citizen is the mobile payment platform m-Pesa. During the four-month 
research period in Nairobi in 2013 it was hard to encounter a cab driver that would not know 
of the international reputation and great interest that the mobile money platform from 
Kenya has created worldwide. Hereby it should be noted that m-Pesa is not an outcome of 
entrepreneurial processes under this research’s definition of entrepreneurship but rather a 
product of an interaction of a leading telco provider Safaricom (Vodafone), the UK’s 
Department for international Development and the Kenyan Central Bank government. In 
addition, Kenyan media and government as well as international media and development 
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organizations have created a hype around ICT technologies and their role for development in 
Kenya, which has been mentioned by multiple respondents as an enabling factor.  
 
5.1.2 Ecosystem dimension: Supports 
Entrepreneurial support systems 
Several entrepreneurial support systems exist in Kenya, such as the open tech hub iHub, 
entrepreneurship accelerator programs as well as entrepreneurship competitions. All of 
these organizations aim to support entrepreneurs in the process of establishing tech 
companies. While section 2.2 discusses the important role that technology incubators and 
open tech hubs play in the process of startingup a business, no research was uncovered that 
shows in which ways such institutions provide value for digital entrepreneurs in developing 
country contexts or for entrepreneurship ecosystems that are just emerging from embryonic 
structures.  This research finds these organizations to play a central role in building the local 
tech scene and supporting entrepreneurs. Here several areas of positive impact have been 
found for both the open tech spaces or shared workspaces such as the iHub as well as for 
technology incubators and accelerator programs. Enabling functions mainly evolve around 
the provision of entrepreneurial know-how, establishing a trust network within a small and 
well-connected digital entrepreneurship scene, providing technological infrastructure, 
providing space and high-speed Internet and cultivating an entrepreneurial spirit. The 
interviews also surfaced some criticism on the ability of governmentally financed incubators 
to effectively support new ICT ventures. 
 
The iHubs central role in catalyzing the local tech community 
One of the most commonly cited functions of the iHub for local entrepreneurs is the chance 
to network and socialize with other people interested in technology entrepreneurship. The 
Bishop Magua Center, location of the iHub and many other technology entrepreneurship 
incubators, brings together software developers, business students, venture capitalists, 
technology corporation’s managers, NGO employees and researchers. This function of being 
a place where people interested in entrepreneurship can get together has been found to 
offer fertile ground for innovation processes, the sharing of experiences and knowledge and 
the generation of new ideas. Especially in the local context of Nairobi, where the career path 
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of becoming an ICT entrepreneur was seen to not yet be widely accepted and respected, 
especially with older generations, the iHub is found to be a vital instrument to catalyze an 
entrepreneurial spirit. This has been confirmed directly in ten entrepreneur and eight expert 
interviews. 
„(The iHub) is great because you meet people who actually get what you are doing, 
what you want to achieve. I feel like my parents generation just think I am messing 
around and being able to come here encourages me a lot” (ICT entrepreneur 2, 2013).  
 
Also given the present infrastructure limitations pertaining to the low penetration and high 
costs of high speed Internet, the high costs of office space in Nairobi, the often-occurring 
energy shortages and limited computing tools possessed by entrepreneurs, the facilities 
provided by open tech spaces offer a strong value for aspiring Kenyan ICT entrepreneurs. 
The iHub in particular has been found to host a wealth of events, competitions and 
workshops that have been indicated as a crucial knowledge source for young entrepreneurs. 
The events vary from ones with a technical emphasis, such as large IT corporations providing 
toolkits and technical know-how of how to integrate products to their existing platforms, to 
lectures on entrepreneurship held by successful, often international, entrepreneurs, to 
sector specific workshops, where e.g. health care professionals inform the tech community 
about challenges in their field to trigger the creation of potential ICT enabled solutions.  
 
Entrepreneurship competitions 
As already mentioned, the Kenyan tech ecosystem also possesses several technology 
entrepreneurship competitions, networking events and conferences that discuss the 
development of the tech scene in Kenya. Many of these events are held at the iHub. While 
the effect of the amount of competitions that grant prize money to entrepreneurs is 
discussed in more detail under section 5.1.4 multiple respondents voice appreciation for 
these as a chance to network, receive information and to meet potential investors but also 
meet co-founders and mentors. Further, the wealth of competitions also supports the 
interest in technology entrepreneurship and the perception of the respective career path. 
 
Incubators and Accelerator programs 
Important entrepreneurship fostering institutions in the Kenyan EE are further the in 2013 
active incubators and venture accelerator programs, such as the Growth Hub, the Savannah 
 154 
Fund, 88mphs, mLabs and Nailabs. Interviewed mentors as well as entrepreneurs who went 
through such a program stress the educating role of these institutions, namely to provide 
relevant entrepreneurial skills and know-how. Further the available mentoring through more 
experienced entrepreneurs and the access to professional services and networks has been 
stressed as an asset. In more detail, an educational program provided by the Growth Hub, 
which provides a cohort of entrepreneurs with a three-month crash course in 
entrepreneurship is especially noticeable. In addition, the incubators have been found to 
provide mentoring from more experienced managers often stemming from other ICT 
entrepreneurship ecosystems and to provide access to otherwise costly professional 
services. 
“I was a mentor at the Growth Hub and frankly I was surprised by the lack of basic 
management skills in the cohort. Even though everyone in the cohort had university 
degrees, many also in finance or management, they did not know how to write a 
business plan, do a market analysis or financial modeling.  It is the quality of 
management education and entrepreneurship education of local degrees that I 
question. I think completing the three month crash-course at the Growth Hub was 
extremely valuable for these individuals” (VC investor 4, 2015).  
 
Open tech spaces as facilitators of networks, accountability and trust 
Especially interesting in the local context of an institutionalized low trust environment that 
was found confirmed in this research for technology entrepreneurship this research finds 
that the entrepreneurship support systems play an important role in establishing trust and 
accountability between the actors. In total eight entrepreneurs and four experts have 
stressed the role of e.g. the iHub as a central meeting space and have, when asked, 
confirmed that this contributes to a closely connected community as well as to a sense of 
accountability for actions due to reputation effects. Respondents have related this to an 
increased trust and willingness to do business with other ecosystem actors.  
“Through the common meeting places, such as the Bishop Magua Center the tech 
scene in Nairobi is very interconnected. Since the scene is still relatively small you 
know everyone, or have at least heard of him or her or know someone who has heard 
of him or her. If you are a rat in this system you will not go unnoticed. Therefore there 
is an incentive to stick to proper business conduct” (VC Investor 4, 2015).  
 
“In this scene reputation is everything. You need to play by the rules, everyone knows 
everyone. There is a lot of talk going on. Of course I am much more easy going into a 
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negotiation with someone from whom I know that he has a reputation to lose” 
(mWork entrepreneur 3, 2014). 
 
Criticism of local incubation centers 
Some criticism was voiced on the overall quality of new ventures that were produced out of 
the iHub or development stakeholder financed accelerators, such as the Nailab or the m-
Labs.   
In more detail two experts and four entrepreneurs voiced skepticism about the ability to 
hatch strong new ventures in such institutions and pointed to a lack of experienced mentors 
and insufficient resources to provide a full bouquet of services needed by the respective 
start-ups. One respondent also mentioned an insufficient “market drive” and “performance 
culture” of such institutions.  
 “I think iHub is important in the sense of drawing people to the tech space and the 
support and the kind of guidance that they provide; in terms of really sending out 
solid ventures that are able to attract outside investment I haven’t seen that much of 
that” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
 
“I am the organizer of Demo Africa. The whole idea of Demo is to take the companies 
with the highest potential and present them to investors. So our idea has been to look 
at the pipeline of the companies that have been incubated by the incubators. And we 
are sitting on the other end to see what companies are actually coming out of this, 
waiting to present them to investors. It is a very good position to assess the 
effectiveness of the different incubators in the space. So in that form we looked 
around and we couldn’t see anything. So we had to actually use other means to find 
promising start-ups. We had to put advertisements in magazines, word of mouth, 
blogs, web and universities. But we could not get anything from one of the hubs that 
was actually something that you could present to international investors. In 2012 
there were two companies from Growth Hub and two from 88mphs. None, from iHub 
or mLabs. They were very weak. In 2013 we had more strong teams from Growth Hub 
and 88mphs” (Harry Hare, President of DEMO Africa, 2013). 
 
“The iHub claims to have contributed to over 150 ventures and sounds really 
impressive with 13000+ members, but I am not aware of one start-up that was 
started there that has scaled over a few thousand users” (ICT entrepreneur 5, 2013). 
 
Support professions 
Several entrepreneurs and experts complain about the prices of professional support 
services, such as in the area of legal, accounting and financial services. Here four experts 
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from the venture capital industry stress that the professional services prices are roughly on 
apar with what is paid for such services in the United Stated of America and that hence 
employing such services is almost prohibitively costly for many local start-ups. One 
respondent has indicated that given a relatively complex legal environment and involved 
bureaucracies for the incorporation of companies across different African countries the costs 
for e.g.writing a new company’s memorandum of association actually exceeds US prices.  
“Professional services such legal advice, accounting, tax, financial services are almost 
entirely out of reach. The prices are so high for such services. When the time comes 
that you need such a service you need to hope to have someone like this in your 
network or do it yourself. I think it would be very helpful if there was a central 
resource center that helps new ventures to access such services and also support in 
the interaction with the government, e.g. for taxes or registration” (mWork 
entrepreneur 10, 2013). 
 
General Infrastructure 
This research’s interview’s confirm that  overall the current ICT infrastructure in Nairobi and 
most parts of Kenya seems to be generally sufficient, which pertains to mobile coverage and 
mobile Internet. While compared to other Sub-Saharan countries the mobile (Internet) 
coverage is exemplary in Kenya, it still has not ceased to be a problem in more remote areas 
and can be considered insufficient for some digital services. Regarding other infrastructure 
elements that are especially important to entrepreneurship, such as transportation and 
logistics and energy supply pronounced difficulties exist. Multiple entrepreneurs have 
stressed the substantial traffic congestion in Nairobi as well as the often-occurring energy 
cuts and the staggering crime in Nairobi as a problem. 
 
5.1.3 Ecosystem dimension: Human capital 
Talent pool 
The case study research on mWork applications shows that out of the conducted cases many 
of the local entrepreneurs were missing crucial skills that are necessary for pursuing 
successful entrepreneurship. Here, the lack of basic management knowledge, such as 
knowledge pertaining to business models as well as the lack of relevant professional 
experiences of the entrepreneurs, are especially noteworthy. During the interviews with 
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experts of the Kenyan EE these findings were confirmed and a more detailed picture of the 
available talent pool for digital technology entrepreneurship in Kenya emerges.  
 
Youth and shortage of relevant experiences of entrepreneurs 
First of all, the general youth and corresponding lack of relevant experiences of active ICT 
entrepreneurs in the EE under study is noteworthy. Five experts mention that most 
entrepreneurs are in their early twenties and come straight from university, most of them 
never having been in full-time employment within the ICT industry, the start-up scene or 
other companies before. In comparison with other EEs, where entrepreneurs may be in their 
early 30s and may look back on years of experience with large IT corporations these 
entrepreneurs have comparatively little experience and insight about how the digital 
economy works.  
“These people have an idea and they can code, they have never worked in a business 
environment before and they lack the skills and knowledge and acumen needed in running a 
business” (NGO Entrepreneurship Expert, 2013). 
 
Lack of business knowledge and entrepreneurship know-how 
A dominant theme in the expert interviews is further the lack of business knowledge 
especially pertaining to the field of how to venture a successful company. Eleven experts 
have mentioned that local entrepreneurs do not know how to execute market research of 
sufficient quality, write a business plan, or possess the know-how to design a convincing 
business model. 
Instead of following an opportunity seeking, aspirational, entrepreneurial approach (Miller, 
2005) that follows several iterative stages of market research and opportunity analysis, 
business model creation, validation and venturing, local entrepreneurs have been said to 
overemphasize the product development dimension. Three experts have mentioned the 
phrase that local entrepreneurs are “building products not businesses” (e.g. 
Entrepreneurship Support Organization Manager 1, 2013) and stress especially the lack of 
thorough market research and business model validation.  
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Overemphasis of technological skills 
In this vein four entrepreneurs and three experts mentioned that many venturing teams are 
composed of individuals from a technical background only, which partially explains the 
overemphasis on product development and lack of business skills.  
“I see at this stage a clear over-emphasis on technical rather than business skills. 
Teams often lack capacity in softer skills: networking, selling and positioning the firm. 
I see a lot of people who apply to pitch to investors at Demo Africa who have created 
interesting solutions and you ask them whom are you going sell this to. They don’t 
even know. Monetization? No idea.” (Entrepreneurship support organization manager 
6, 2013). 
 
Competition for outstanding entrepreneurial talent 
Three expert respondents have also indicated that they see very attractive alternative 
employment alternatives to entrepreneurship for individuals who have proven excellent 
intellectual capabilities and have relevant experiences in the field of technology or 
entrepreneurship in developing countries.  
 mWork entrepreneur 8 (2015) states that “I feel that the people who are extremely capable 
and overly intelligent get offered positions elsewhere and do not become entrepreneurs. Our 
founder has established successful companies before and he receives phone calls by large 
corporations or organizations weekly offering him very good positions like 10000 dollars a 
month. Naturally it is hard to turn down an offer that 99% of people in your country would 
die for”. 
 
Shortage of serial entrepreneurs 
Furthermore, six entrepreneurs as well as four expert interviewees have indicated a lack of 
successful serial entrepreneurs or ICT industry veterans that can function as mentors to 
aspiring entrepreneurs. As reason for this the overall youth of the Kenyan ecosystem, which 
after all is less than 10 years old, has been given.  
 
Shortage of management talent 
Two expert respondents and one entrepreneur of a more mature ICT related venture have 
further mentioned that there is a shortage of middle management talent that is needed in 
the process of growing an enterprise.  
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“Its really hard to find management talent for growing ICT businesses. Even mid-
management positions like a product manager are relatively hard to find given the 
talent pool” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
 
Technical skills of developers 
Five interviewees have mentioned a problem around the available level of programming and 
software development skill accessible and find it difficult to fill software-developing 
positions, especially for tasks that require more advanced coding skills. This is mainly related 
to the lack of practical experience on behalf of computer science students as well as the 
relatively late stage at which many of the programmers that are currently on the market got 
exposed to programming.  
 “Many of the people who study tech have started coding or interacting with 
computers more intensly at an age of 18 / when starting universities. There is a lot to 
catch up. I think it is reasonably unfair to compare this with developers from other 
countries who started coding at 10” (mWork entrepreneur 2, 2015).  
 
“They lack practical experience, a lot of the most advanced coding, or the skill set that 
you need for that is best learned through practice. But in this space there really are 
not that many opportunities to learn how to code in a practical setting. What you 
learn in university is often theoretical and wont replace the need to have some 
practical experience” (Entrepreneurship Support Organization Manager 5, 2013). 
 
Educational institutions 
Three entrepreneurs and two experts suggested a lack of entrepreneurship focus in the 
Kenyan university education system. Here this research distinguishes between Information 
Technology related studies such as computer science or software development and business 
studies.  
For the former, this research finds that management insight in general or entrepreneurial 
education does not seem to be offered in Nairobi’s technical degrees. Interviews with two 
computer science students from Nairobi University as well as with Experts such as mentors 
at the Growth Hub confirm this finding. 
“Throughout my education in school and my later computer science degree at the 
university of Nairobi know-how of entrepreneurship or general business 
administration education was not provided. I would have loved that, but it was just 
not available” (mWork entrepreneur 2, 2013).  
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Role of expatriates in the scene 
An interesting theme that emerges both in the conducted case study research as well as in 
the conducted interviews is the role that expats play in Kenyan technology 
entrepreneurship. The research finds that expatriate entrepreneurs and managers play a 
central role in many well functioning start-ups as well as in venture capital firms and as 
mentors and managers of incubators. Given the youth of the ecosystem and the resulting 
lack of human capital with relevant experiences for functions around building and investing 
in ICT empowered enterprises the inflow of western human capital is an important enabler 
towards strengthening the EE.  
Especially the role of expatriates in new ventures in the local ecosystem seems to be 
pronounced. Here the case study research shows the example of Shop Soko and Duma 
Works where expat entrepreneurs are shown to draw upon the resources of their home EE 
to circumvent some of the shortages of the local Kenyan EE. In both cases the US American 
founders drew upon incubation services provided by their prestigious US American 
universities and were able to not only obtain knowledge, but also to secure first funding, 
mentoring, facilities and networking through these institutions. The importance of 
expatriates in the local ecosystem was confirmed in five expert interviews. 
“Most of the successful start-ups are currently run by expats. Now this is good and 
bad, because this builds a local start-up scene, while we would of course hope for 
more Kenyan entrepreneurs to be successful. Hopefully this will come in time”  
(VC investor 2, 2013). 
 
5.1.4 Ecosystem dimension: Finance 
This section of the EE is structured into three subsections. First the access to capital at an 
early and a later stage of the venturing process is discussed. Hereafter the topic of grant 
funding and its effects on Kenyan ICT startups is discussed. 
 
Early stage financing gap: 
In early stages of the development of a venture, the stage where market research is 
executed and business model and prototype developed, the most common sources of 
capital are either savings by the entrepreneur himself, his family and friends, angel investors, 
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crowd funding or seed funds of venture capital firms that invest in very early stages of 
business development.  
The research conducted in the Kenyan digital EE indicates a lack of availability of such 
sources of capital. The resulting early stage funding gap forces the entrepreneur to work 
several side jobs, which is found to impair his ability to focus on building the enterprise. 
Almost every entrepreneur in the sample has indicated that she does not possess sufficient 
savings to be able to focus on the enterprise full time. A possible explanation, beyond the 
generally low level of income and private wealth in Kenya is the youth of the entrepreneurs 
in the scene, most of which are coming straight from university.  
“Of course I do not have enough savings to be able to finance myself through until my 
startup generates sufficient funds for me to make a living. I have so far met very few 
in this space who have. Most of us come straight from University and those who have 
worked for bigger companies before have hardly had sufficient salaries to save 
money” (mWork entrepreneur 10, 2013). 
 
Also family and friends seem to offer little ability or willingness to invest in their relatives’ 
business. Here most interviewed entrepreneurs have stressed the lack of resources owned 
by their parents and three entrepreneurs have further stressed the discontent of their family 
with their entrepreneurial career path as a reason for them not to support the early 
venturing phases.  
“My parents would be able to invest at least some money in my company or support 
me until I have a prototype with which I could go and pitch at events. However, they 
really don’t get tech. […] They don’t know what I am doing here and are not happy at 
all about my career choice. They wish I would apply for a government job” (mWork 
entrepreneur 1, 2013). 
 
Three entrepreneurs, three experts from the VC industry and two managers of incubators 
have also stressed a lack of an angel investing culture in Kenya. The absence of such a 
culture has been related to several factors. First of all, the older generation seems to be less 
technologically savvy with little high-wealth individuals possessing a tech background. 
“There is absolutely no angel investing culture in Kenya. And where should angel 
investors come from? They haven’t had large exists of tech businesses in this space, 
where former entrepreneurs could reinvest in and mentor other start-ups. Neither are 
there wealthy ICT conglomerate managers that would be suitable” (VC investor 3, 
2013). 
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Secondly, four respondents named the alternative option of investing in real estate projects 
in Nairobi as being the currently preferred alternative to investing in tech startups.  
“Most rich people want to invest in real estate or agribusiness. It is easy to make 
money in Kenya in these areas; they have relatively little risk and offer a high return. 
Why wouldn’t they rather invest there? […] They also don’t understand the often 
complex digital revenue models” (Kenyan technology manager, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, two interviewed experts of the local EE have complained that there are very 
few VC firms in the Kenyan EE that provide support in the early stage of start-ups.  
A manager at the VC firm Accion that is active in Nairobi finds that “There is a lack of 
horizontal money at the seed stage. So I think there is Savannah fund and ourselves that are 
doing investments at the seed stage outside of incubators. […] There are plenty of people 
that are willing to invest in you if you have two years of revenues, you’re close to break even 
and there is no risk in the model. Hey, obviously” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
 
As shown by the cases of mWork businesses such as Juakali and as mentioned by several 
digital entrepreneurs and EE experts,  this shortage of capital at the early stage leads to a 
lack of focus on the part of the entrepreneurs since they need to work several jobs to earn a 
living and thus cannot fully focus on the enterprise.  
“It is hard to focus on your enterprise when you have to take any sort of e-lance 
programming gig to make a living” (ICT Entrepreneur 2, 2013). 
“Many of the start ups are distracted, since their team members need to work 
another full time job. […] That is a source of frustration for many and creates serious 
problems” (NGO entrepreneurship expert, 2013).  
 
Lack of VC deal flow 
As 5.1.2 shows there are several VC firms, private equity firms and accelerator programs that 
invest in tech entrepreneurs in Kenya in 2014. However this research finds that despite this 
relatively strong presence there still seem to be relatively little VC investments going into 
local start-ups. This research finds two competing narratives that explain this.  
On the part of entrepreneurs a common conception is that venture capital firms, which are 
mostly from a western origin and are to a large degree run by western VC managers have 
inflated expectations of making fast profits, little insight into the local context of Kenya, the 
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local culture and the problematic nature of conducting business here. Three entrepreneurs 
have also mentioned that western VC managers are “too risk averse”. 
 
A second narrative is that despite the availability of funds to invest in local ventures there is 
a lack of projects in the Kenyan context that meet the VC’s investment standards. Commonly 
cited reasons for this is a lack of quality of underlying business plans as well as a lack of 
entrepreneurial know-how and relevant experience on the part of local entrepreneurs. In 
more detail respondents stress that they are often offered ‘products rather than businesses’, 
by teams that are often strongly tech focused and do not possess the necessary 
management skills to create a business model nor have management team members on 
board who execute this function. Four interviews conducted with VC firm managers, active 
in Nairobi, have confirmed this perception, as well as two further EE experts. Interestingly, 
four entrepreneurs have also mentioned the lack of market focus and entrepreneurial skills 
on the part of entrepreneurs in their ecosystem at some point during the interview. 
“The technology usually works fine but oftentimes it is the business component of it 
which really is solely lacking.  And I feel like what’s happening a lot is that people 
come and are like ‘I have this product and please help me build a business model for 
it.’ I cannot invest in teams like this” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
“We have the money available but not a lot of fundable projects. There is a general 
lack of general business skills, a lack of an understanding of how hard it is to work in a 
start-up, a lack of knowledge of what is a digital business model and what is just a 
technical product. […] People do often not know how to pitch to investors” (VC 
investor 2, 2013) 
 
An additional problematic that seems to play into the relationship between VC professional 
and the entrepreneurs they invest in, or plan to invest in, are concerns about the 
entrepreneur’s commitment to the venture. Several accounts both from entrepreneurs and 
investors give examples of cases where entrepreneurs chose to work on several projects 
rather than committing to one project, even though their current living situation should 
enable them to make a living for themselves. 
“Sometimes I am frustrated with the way that entrepreneurs are running their 
business. Even the ones we invest in. Despite the fact that they should have sufficient 
means to make a living they still have other gigs on the side. This would never happen 
in the USA, it’s unprofessional” (VC investor 3, 2013). 
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Further two experts from the VC industry mention that it is hard for Kenyan entrepreneurs 
to close a deal with a VC firm since a lack of shared understanding pertaining to the meaning 
of the term entrepreneurship, the conduct of business and common values held hinders the 
establishment of mutual trust. Further a lack of Kenyan entrepreneur’s knowledge in how to 
pitch to investors also surfaced.  
“I notice a general lack of understanding of how the relationship between an investor 
and a start-up we want to invest in works. The mentality that I am going to be so 
guarded and careful about sharing information even with an investor is a red flag in 
itself” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
“I think it is really hard for even a gifted Kenyan entrepreneur to close a VC deal in this 
context. The (VC) firms active in Nairobi are all from a western context, at least the 
ones I know. Now these two parties from two completely different parts of the world 
try to form a partnership that is essentially very dependent on trust, effective 
communication and shared goals and […]also work practices. It is understandable 
that this is hard across cultures” (VC investor 4, 2015).  
 
With regard to VC financing, three VC professionals further indicated that the way of 
operation in the local context pertaining to investment standards and the mode of operation 
resemble closely those applied in the west. This, however, brings about problems given the 
highly distinct EE in Kenya. An example are fund management costs, which were allocated 
based on the expected costs in a western context, but were not sufficient in the local EE, 
where entrepreneurs required a relatively higher degree of training. In addition, the legal 
fees for writing company memorandums were significantly higher than in western contexts.  
“I would like to see some adaptation in the way we do business. You cannot simply 
copy what works in the Valley to Kenya. But this is what I see here in a lot of ways. […] 
This is somewhat natural since the ecosystem is still young and there are little 
experiences so far which could be used to create new practices” (VC Investor 2, 2013). 
 
Grant funding by government, international development stakeholders and impact funds 
In the course of the interviews with different EE experts the importance of non-profit impact 
funds and international development agencies for financing new ventures in a Kenyan 
context has surfaced multiple times. Here the interviewees’ opinion on the impact of such 
funding is divided, with many interviewees stressing the overall hurtful nature of “soft 
money” to the formation of local entrepreneurial human capital. In this vein, three 
interviewees complain that the rigor of selection suffers through the involvement of non-for-
profit parties. In the case of grant giving bodies four interviewees question the capabilities of 
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such parties in selecting the right teams and further to provide the bouquet of services 
needed by the new ventures.  
“The government has no business lending money to start-ups. Get guys who 
understand the market and the problematic and let these guys run with it. If you go to 
88mph, their business is to work with start-ups. Put the money through them. 
Because the government does not only lack the knowhow but also the capacity to 
engage with the start-ups longer, i.e. in following up on their performance” 
(Entrepreneurship support organization manager 1, 2013). 
 
In addition, three interviewees argue that some of the existing accelerator programs and 
grants have a fixed amount of investment volume to distribute or a pre-established number 
of startups to include in the cohorts they work with. Given a situation where the quality of 
many startups may be relatively low and the context for entrepreneurship complicated this 
may lead to the undesirable outcome that companies that objectively do not meet quality 
standards still get financing. 
“If you screen about 200 companies for entering into your cohort, I don’t think you 
necessarily have to take 15 companies. If only five are good, then only take five. 
That’s the kind of mentality that I’d like to see pushed. Where we have these kind of 
standards that are maintained and not where we’re trying to fill this box because 
were working against some grant, where we tell people that we will work with 30 
companies a year that we will send through two cycles and we are measured against 
that” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
 
Another trait of impact funds that was mentioned by an interviewed finance sector specialist 
(International NGO Manager 2, 2013), is that these impact funds can often only select 
companies that fit the specific mission set by their financing agency instead of simply 
selecting the most promising company. “I think too many of the impact VCs active in this 
space are focused on specific sectors, such as micro finance or agriculture. For [firm name] 
we can really only invest in a company if you are energy or financial services related. But 
especially with digital and ICT enabled businesses they are applicable to many different 
sectors” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, while the amount of money handed out at competitions and through other 
grant supported financing is found “unlikely to crowd out VC investors” (GSMA, 2014) it is 
found to have a negative impact on entrepreneurs, who are distracted by preparing for the 
many competitions and who are used to getting money relatively easily by presenting an 
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idea and a kind of prototype. One Interviewee has thus coined the phrase of 
“comprapreneur” that seems to have caught on in the jargon on the local ecosystem. He 
explains the term as follows: 
“Within the tech scene here we have created a word for these people. The 
‘comprapreneur’ who just runs from pitch-fest to pitch-fest with a half-ready 
application, some cool story, but no actually feasible end-to-end business model. He 
then wins some kind of prize money that he can use for whatever he deems fit. Now 
tell me, how are we going to get tough, resilient entrepreneurs from such a system?” 
(Entrepreneurship support organization manager 1, 2013). 
 
Because of the preceding arguments, opponents of grant funding argue that the current 
distribution of “soft money” is detrimental to the overall entrepreneurship ecosystem. They 
argue that grant funding culture is one reason for what they call a low level of quality of 
Nairobian start-ups and also a cause for a lack of entrepreneurial skills.  
“I think there is too much easy funding out there. [This is the reason] why there are so 
many bad companies here. I say let these companies die and set the entrepreneurs 
free to work on other ideas that have more potential […]” (International NGO 
manager 2, 2013).  
 
“Failing in the course of entrepreneurship is a crucial lesson. Something a real 
entrepreneur has to have experienced to toughen up and be able to deal with the 
market. You cannot protect the entrepreneurs from that. Not if you want a successful 
breed of entrepreneurs. This is exactly why I am against grant funding” 
(Entrepreneurship support organization manager 1, 2013). 
 
However, advocates of grant financing for ICT entrepreneurs maintain that at the onset of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem in a developing country the existing structures may not yet be 
sufficient to appeal to private sector investors and thus require non-profit support until they 
have evolved to a stage where they can meet such demands. 
Along this line of argument respondents have stressed the benefit of grant funding for initial 
stages of business model validation and the collection of experiences of entrepreneurs. 
Further, six experts have stressed that they see the entrepreneurship competitions as an 
integral part of creating the current “technology entrepreneurship hype” around Nairobi’s 
tech scene, providing both international exposure and local excitement for ICT technologies. 
The mWork case studies further exemplify positive cases of entrepreneurial grant money 
usage, where capable entrepreneurs are given resources to develop applications that are 
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likely to create jobs and positive development impact. Shop Soko’s development of an m-
enterprise management smart phone application made possible by a grant of the Vodafone 
institute, or the Duma Works development of a skills testing technology are such examples. 
While both companies seek to be for-profit social enterprises they argue that it would have 
been impossible to develop their firms without significant funding from different grant giving 
bodies (mWork entrepreneur 4, 2013; mWork entrepreneur 3, 2013).  
 
5.1.5 Ecosystem dimension: Policy  
As discussed in section 1.3 the Kenyan government has since 2007 invested heavily in ICT 
infrastructure and has chosen the digital economy as a strategic sector of focus for the 
development of the Kenyan economy. In order to transform Kenya “into a regional ICT hub 
and a globally competitive digital economy” (ICT Authority, 2014) the Kenyan ICT board was 
established in 2008. The special role and high hopes the government places on the digital 
economy are manifested in the country’s ‘Vision 2030’ (2007), the Jubilee Manifesto (2013) 
and the ICT Master Plan (2014) and were communicated as an emphasis in president 
Kenyatta’s electoral campaign in 2012. 
 
The ICT Board was found to engage in several activities that span direct financial support for 
start-ups, organization of events and conferences around tech in Kenya, consumer 
information projects, interaction between large ICT corporates and the government as well 
as interaction with other tech hubs (ICT Authority, 2014). While this research was not able to 
evaluate the different programs and their effectiveness in detail one may still argue that the 
government shows elevated interest in fostering the ICT industry and has identified 
technology entrepreneurship as an important component.  
 
Financial support for ICT entrepreneurs 
The Tandaa grant program is a key program of the Kenyan ICT Authority, where the 
government provides early stage finance to ICT entrepreneurs. The total $4 million three-
year grant program, which was provided by the World Bank, administered $689,526 to 15 
grantees in 2010 and $1.28 million to 30 grantees in 2012. Applicants were granted $50,000 
for companies and $10,000 for individuals (Kenya ICT Authority, 2014). The grant considers 
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applications that use 'Digital Content', which they define as “any content that can be 
consumed from an electronic device, e.g: PC, mobile phone, game console or digital TV. Such 
content is easily and effectively distributed through the Internet and can consist of services, 
entertainment, data or information” (Kenya ICT Authority, 2014). 
This research has brought to the surface criticism of the way the grant was administered and 
its overall impact. In the first round of Tandaa grants in 2010 the ICT Board administered the 
prize money in one lump sum, without any follow-up monitoring processes or additional 
resources provided. According to several interviewed experts as well as to media accounts, 
this round of grants has not brought about any successful ventures.15  
“The Tandaa grant winners were just given a cash prize without a follow-up and 
without milestones, they received a check and that is it. How can anyone think a 
successful venture could come from this? Entrepreneurs in every - but especially our - 
environment need a multitude of resources” (Entrepreneurship support organization 
manager 1, 2013) 
 
In the second round of the Tandaa grant in 2012 the ICT board awarded the prize sum based 
on the attainment of four pre-determined milestones. However, interviews with a Tandaa 
grantee of the second round shows that the administration of the grant in this round can be 
criticized in several ways.  
First of all, the involved selection criteria for grant administration seem far more lenient 
than  private sector financing standards, since no relevant questions pertaining to the 
business model at hand were asked and a mere ‘idea for a product’ was sufficient to 
convince the jury. Secondly the milestones set are inappropriate, since they over-emphasize 
the product development phase and do not contain a component of market research or 
business model validation. Finally, the selected start-ups were not provided with resources 
beyond financial means, which at this stage of the ecosystem does not seem appropriate in 
meeting the entrepreneur’s needs. Based on the way the Tandaa grant program is 
structured, the question arises in how far the body responsible for this possesses sufficient 
business and entrepreneurship insight, as well as whether the body is aware of the situation 
encountered by Kenyan ICT entrepreneurs.  
The interviewed grantee describes her Tandaa grant experience as follows: 
“As a computer science graduate from Nairobi University […] I applied for the grant 
with the idea to create a SMS-based platform that would connect job seekers to 
                                                     
15 http://www.kachwanya.com/kenya-ict-board-tandaa-where-did-the-money-go-part-1/ 
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potential employers in the informal sector. Upon receiving the grant I was given in 
total four milestones to which the payment of each a quarter of the total grant was 
tied. The milestones were as follows:  
 Contract signing 
 Showing application prototype  
 Showing the completed app 
 Monetization and evaluation plan 
Given the technical nature of the milestones I started coding straight away to attain 
the next financing milestone, which I needed to make a living. After attainment of 
milestone three, the completed app, I went live with the application and realized that 
success was not coming. I then talked to several people at iHub who asked me about 
the business model and I just had no idea. […]  
They then advised me to take a two-month business entrepreneurship course at the 
Growth Hub. […] This was the first time I was asked questions in the way of who are 
your customers? What need are you addressing? Is there a market for that need and 
how big is the opportunity? Where does the revenue come from?” (mWork 
entrepreneur 2, 2013). 
 
Governmental services 
Deficiencies in the area of government administration processes, rule of law, contract 
enforcement and corruption in the context of Kenya have been a recurring theme in the 
course of the research. Naturally, these are hindering the climate for technology 
entrepreneurship. This research finds abundant examples of entrepreneurs who have 
encountered security issues on the streets of Nairobi, expatriate and local entrepreneurs 
alike. Within this dimension especially the efficiency of communication with the government 
surfaced as problematic. An example that reoccurred in five entrepreneur interviews is the 
attainment of visas, be it for entrepreneurs coming to the country or for Kenyan companies 
that seek to hire from abroad.   
 “The process of getting a visa is a nightmare. As an entrepreneur coming to Kenya 
you basically have two options, either get a work visa or get an investor visa. A work 
visa is literally impossible since it is hugely expensive. The requirement for an investor 
visa is that you show that you have at least $300.000 USD in a Kenyan bank account. 
Irrespective of the international transfer costs, what kind of start-up has that kind of 
money? And most digital enterprises do not need such a large cash amount” (mWork 
entrepreneur 3, 2013). 
 
“Getting work visas is extremely hard. Even though I volunteer for a respected 
company in the venture capital sector I did not get such a visa, but instead was 
advised by my company to come on a tourist visa, since obtaining a work visa would 
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be complicated and expensive. However, as a tourist you can only stay a maximum 
amount of time in the country and are not allowed to work here, even if you are not 
paid. One day the Kenyan police raided our office and took us foreigners to the 
immigration office. After being extremely scared, finally some Kenyan colleague of 
ours settled the issue by bribing the right person. The whole thing is very frustrating” 
(VC investor 3, 2013).  
 
5.1.6 Ecosystem dimension: Markets 
Low available income; low trust in new products, low tech-savviness 
The existing base of consumers is arguably one of the most important factors determining 
the opportunities within an entrepreneurship ecosystem. In this dimension several 
challenges to technology entrepreneurship show up in the Kenyan context. As the preceding 
case study findings of the mWork cases show, the potential consumer base seems to be 
characterized by a low available income, relatively little openness towards technological 
innovation and low tech-savviness of potential users. Given these circumstances Kenyan 
entrepreneurs have been shown to find it hard to establish viable monetization models that 
can reach scale, since a large proportion of consumers can often barely spare any funds for 
things that are not bare necessities. The case study of MobiAgent shows that poor 
consumers, the dominating market segment, are price sensitive to the point that they are 
not willing to accept just slightly higher prices caused by  market intermediaries, even if they 
offer additional utility through process improvements. This finding was confirmed in six 
expert interviews including VC investor 3 (2015), VC investor 4 (2013) and Entrepreneurship 
Support Organization Manager 3 (2013). Several interviewees also mention that is it hard to 
reach especially poor consumers with ICT enabled products given that those consumers 
possess little tech savviness and thus often do not understand the value proposition that is 
offered. Several entrepreneurs therefore complain that they would need large upfront 
investment necessitated to explain the product and its benefits to new consumers, hence 
increasing the risk involved in entrepreneurial endeavors.  
The multiple case study analysis conducted further gives insight into the business models of 
promising ventures, which either generated revenues by focusing on the needs of local 
businesses (Sendy) or charging local businesses (Duma Works). Other firms focus on 
international clients for monetization (either B2C for Shop Soko and B2B for biNu). A final 
revenue model that seems promising is to focus on community stakeholders, the 
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government or international development stakeholders to establish monetization, as the 
following interview shows: 
“We decided we wanted to charge a very low, almost symbolic, amount of money for 
our services to the family of the school child. We tried 40KSH a month (approximately 
39 cents Euro) but even with that we failed to convince the parents. In the end we 
decided to focus on school boards and convince them to pay per school child, which is 
what we are experiencing success with at the moment” (ICT entrepreneur 1, 2013). 
 
Lack of nationwide distribution channels 
Finding a scalable, nationwide distribution channel for physical products that is able to reach 
B2C consumers has been mentioned as very problematic by three entrepreneurs and two 
experts. This is hardly surprising given the lack of companies that possess a nationwide 
infrastructure of branches that is used by a large number of consumers, such as the as large 
retail chains.  
“If you have a product that has a physical component the problem of how to reach 
B2C consumers outside of Nairobi or large cities is quite real. […] Except for banks and 
gas stations, Safaricom is really one of the only corporations that possesses a set of 
branches that is capable of servicing a large group of customers nationwide” (VC 
investor 4, 2015).  
 
Local ICT Sector 
The local ICT sector is clearly dominated by one telecommunication company, Safaricom. 
The company not only owns the largest network with a market share of roughly 80% of voice 
traffic in 2014 (Businessdailyafrica.com, 2015), it also owns the country’s dominant mobile 
money platform m-Pesa, possesses a country wide network of agents and shops and also the 
most valuable and trusted brand in East Africa according to the Brandafrica (2014) ranking. 
This research finds several aspects that indicate that the telecommunications provider holds 
a “gatekeeping” position for ICT enabled products and is currently not seeking active 
engagement with other ecosystem stakeholders, which is found to pose an obstacle to 
innovation and entrepreneurship in the EE.  The telecommunications organization owns 
several resources that give it a very strong competitive role in the Kenyan ICT sector.  
First of all, the company has a unique access to the market since it possesses an extensive, 
country-wide network of Safaricom shops and m-Pesa agents. The company is therefore able 
to reach even remote customers in rural areas, which is especially valuable for products and 
services that contain a physical component, given the lack of distribution channels that was 
 172 
mentioned earlier in this section. The company uses this for cross-selling promising 
products, such as with KoppoKoppo where the company sells solar lamps nationwide that 
are paid for in instalments via their m-pesa platform (koppokoppo.co.ke, 2014).  
In addition, the company owns the largest provider network in the country, which means 
that entrepreneurs working with USSD based technology have to collaborate with Safaricom 
in order to get access to their system and to then access the company’s customers. In the 
case of products that focus on SMS or Internet enabled smartphones no integration with 
Safaricom’s technical backend is needed, since SMS bundles can be bought from several 
suppliers and Internet applications can be sold via the operating systems’ app stores.  
The mobile money platform m-Pesa further has been mentioned abundantly as a central 
pillar of ICT services in Kenya, since it offers the possibility to execute financial transactions 
and pay for ICT services. Further, two ecosystem experts and four entrepreneurs stress the 
importance of the company’s intangible assets such as substantial market insights into the 
different demographics, income levels, ICT usage behavior of Kenyans ect. This data is 
especially valuable in a Kenyan context where there is generally very little governmental 
census. 
“Here in Kenya very often we have to work with data on citizens that is from 2006. It 
is impossible. If you think about what kind of organization has reliable data on 
financial transactions, population numbers, incomes ect., it really is only Safaricom. 
[…] [This is because] telecommunications has scaled so much, people have to register 
their mPesa accounts their with their ID. mPesa financial transactions could give very 
valuable insight into income levels, purchasing behavior, willingness to pay for 
different product categories ect.” (VC investor 4, 2015). 
 
“If you ask me for the reason why Safaricom is such an extremely successful company, 
it’s because of their marketing knowledge. They have been there from the very 
beginning. These people get the market. They understand the consumer, their habits 
and how to talk to them in a way that they understand. And they also have the 
resources to do just that. […] They know if something (a business opportunity) will 
work or not, they are in the best situation to evaluate what problems could be solved 
with ICT technology” (mWork entrepreneur 2, 2015).  
 
In addition, almost every entrepreneur and expert in the sample who mentioned Safaricom 
has stressed the strength of the company’s brand. The comparisons of the brand are “to a 
national Icon” and “important for national identity and pride” (Julia Mannske, 2014). 
Especially in a context where the consumer has been characterized as low on trust for new 
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products, the trust enjoyed by the company that has brought mPesa to the people has been 
stressed as a crucial asset.  
“The brand of Safaricom is extremely strong. When Safarciom talks, Kenya listens. It 
really is like this. They can get people to adopt new behaviors, people are proud of the 
maker of mPesa […] people trust Safaricom” (mWork entrepreneur 1, 2013). 
 
Safaricom as a “Gatekeeper” to the Kenyan ICT market 
As the preceding section shows, Safaricom possesses assets that make it a key actor in the 
Kenyan ICT EE . When asked, all entrepreneurs and interviewed experts agreed to Safaricom 
assuming a ‘gatekeeper’ role to the ICT industry in Kenya. The research finds, however, that 
there seems to be relatively little interaction between the telecommunications giant and the 
EE, little initiative to seek such contact and share information on behalf of Safaricom and a 
strong mistrust on behalf of the entrepreneurs concerning business relations with this 
company.  
 
Lack of interaction between Safaricom and entrepreneurs 
Five entrepreneurs and three experts have mentioned that it is hard to initiate contact with 
Safaricom and that a structured program for interaction with other ecosystem stakeholders 
is currently lacking.  
“I have the impression that they guard their position carefully and do not engage with 
other stakeholders for fear of harming their monopoly-like position. This is very 
unfortunate since there could potentially be such fruitful discussion if one would sit at 
one table and discuss the wider challenge and draw upon the insights and creativity 
of a wider group to create solutions. In the end this would very much also benefit 
Safaricom, I think” (VC investor 1, 2013). 
 
In this vein two experts criticize that Safaricom does not share their census data and market 
insights in order to initiate  a broader discussion on ecosystem wide challenges and foster a 
culture of “open innovation” and mutual problem solving.  
“In other countries professional organizations or the Telco providers actively seek to 
have a dialogue with entrepreneurs and other ecosystem actors. Naturally this kind of 
open innovation approach benefits the Telcos as well. Unfortunately this is not 
happening here. Safaricom is jealously defending their position as market incumbent 
and seems to see relatively little promise in such engagement” ( VC investor 4, 2015). 
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Furthermore, Safaricom has been criticized for not sharing the API (Application Programming 
Interface) for their m-Pesa platform. This means that ICT entrepreneurs cannot integrate m-
Pesa directly into their application. 
“We cannot integrate m-Pesa in our application without the APIs. So if we ask a 
customer to make a payment he needs to leave our application, go back to the 
application menu, open m-Pesa, wire the money and then come back to our 
application and enter the confirmation code. […] The whole thing is kind of ridiculous. 
This is how things work. You create a platform and then provide the APIs to the 
market so that entrepreneurs can build solutions around your platform, which 
naturally benefits you as well” (mWork Entrepreneur 8, 2015). 
 
“The API problem of mPesa is really frustrating. I don’t know whether Safaricom just 
does not want other applications to be able to integrate seamless payment into their 
product or whether they just don’t get the tech right” (VC investor 3, 2013). 
 
Mistrust towards Safaricom 
In total ten entrepreneurs have mentioned their mistrust towards Safaricom and their 
wariness of interacting with this market incumbent. Several anecdotal evidences are given of 
where Safaricom has allegedly infringed intellectual property, whereas entrepreneurs seem 
especially concerned about ‘stealing their business idea’.  Six entrepreneurs have further 
stressed that they do not expect Safaricom to acquire successful businesses or partner with 
early-stage promising enterprises but, given their powerful position, simply copy the 
business model and push the first mover out of the market. Therefore, three entrepreneurs 
have mentioned their strategy to “stay under the radar” as long as possible.  
“There is a big problem with intellectual property theft. Especially for USSD 
applications or applications that have to go to the (feature phone) Appstores of telco 
providers. I do not trust telco providers in Kenya. They have been known to infringe 
intellectual property rights by copying business models that were previously pitched 
to them in private. They simply declare the idea faulty during the meeting, sending 
you home and then doing the business without your involvement. I have personally 
experienced a situation where I pitched an app to Safaricom. While the app itself has 
not been created by Safaricom, I have found another app with the same name as 
mine” (ICT entrepreneur 5, 2013).   
 
“Thing is with Safaricom they don’t really acquire; it’s not really in their infrastructure 
to acquire a company and we are afraid that what they are going to do is to copy the 
tech or something” (mWork entrepreneur 3, 2013).  
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Furthermore two entrepreneurs and one expert have mentioned that having such a 
powerful incumbent in the ecosystem is discouraging entrepreneurial behavior, since it 
decreases the perceived chances of being successful due to the risk of being easily pushed 
out of the market if Safaricom copies your business model. 
“Safaricom really is so powerful in the ICT sector here. And having to compete with 
such a goliath that commands such powerful resources really can take the breath out 
of entrepreneurs” (VC investor 4, 2015). 
 
Safaricom as an enabler 
Despite the generally critical tone of interviewees regarding the role that Safaricom plays in 
the ecosystem, several interviewees also mentioned an enabling role of Safaricom and its 
achievements in ‘building the market’ in terms of establishing consumer trust in and 
awareness of ICT products, providing stable telecommunication and pushing access to 
affordable smart phones.  
In addition, an interview with the founder of Eneza, a mobile learning platform that was able 
to secure a partnership with Safaricom early on, stressed the multiple advantages that the 
start-up company had through the partnership with the industry incumbent.  
 
The process of technology entrepreneurship in Kenya 
In order to enrich the information pertaining to the six dimensions of the EE, respondents 
were asked to describe the process of entrepreneurship, meaning the exhibited behavior of 
local entrepreneurs when establishing an ICT business in Kenya. Two dominant themes 
surfaced from these descriptions. 
 
The first theme is the description of local technology entrepreneurship processes as less 
strategic, with comparably shorter and less thorough market research and business model 
validation phases, compared to western technology entrepreneurship processes. This has 
been mentioned directly by three experts and two (foreign) entrepreneurs. Explanations for 
this evolve around the inability to forgo revenues due to the need to earn income, a lack of 
management and entrepreneurship know-how, the pressure of family and friends who are 
less acquainted with the nature of technology entrepreneurship and in some cases require 
support, as well as a lack of market information and past experiences that would be helpful 
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in executing these first stages in the entrepreneurial process. Finally one respondent has 
related the perception of entrepreneurship as a means of “self-employment” and thus the 
resulting focus on generating an income rather than building a firm.  
“Here there is just still a strong ‘food-to-mouth mentality’ compared to the kind of 
very professional approach to entrepreneurship that we have in the states, especially 
in tech entrepreneurship. Here (Kenya) I feel like people will always opt for getting the 
money now rather than later” (mWork entrepreneur 8, 2015).  
 
“In this context it is definitely a luxury for someone to be able to say I forego revenues 
for a year to then have a functioning and growing company later. It is simply a 
concept that is less acknowledged“ (VC investor 1, 2013). 
 
“People here do not understand the importance of a thorough market research, and 
market opportunity and business model validation. I have the impression that people 
build tech products and then think that is a business. They often simply do not have 
the required skills, but it should be said that market information is also less available. 
It is not like in Sweden where census information and data on consumer income and 
purchase behavior is relatively accessible. (VC investor 5, 2015)” 
 
The second theme which surfaced is the tendency of Kenyan entrepreneurs to engage in 
multiple entrepreneurial endeavors at the same time, rather than to focus entirely on one 
enterprise, or to work side jobs on the side.  This has become clear through the interviews 
with entrepreneurs and has been mentioned by several experts directly. Reasons for Kenyan 
entrepreneurs to be engaged in multiple rather than one business evolve around the 
relatively unstable and unpredictable market environment in which it may be unwise to ‘put 
all eggs in one basket’. Furthermore the necessity to earn an income that covers living 
expenses, especially at early stages of the venture have been named as reasons for such a 
behavior.  
 “We Kenyans are hustlers, you never know what will come tomorrow and you can not 
trust in the peace of today for tomorrow’s income. It is simply unwise to focus all 
attention on one project” (mWork entrepreneur 1, 2013). 
 
“There is definitely a problem of focus that I experience with myself and many 
entrepreneurs in this space. How long will it take until the new venture will generate 
revenues? How long until it generates profits from which you can actually make a 
living? Until then you have to have many gigs, but they often consume most of your 
time and leave very little resources to actually build your business” (ICT entrepreneur 
2, 2013). 
 
“The lack of focus is an issue. This is not how you can build a successful ICT enterprise 
[…] this would simply not happen in the US” (VC Investor 3, 2013). 
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5.2 Discussion of findings in the wider discourse of the Silicon Savannah 
In order to increase the credibility of the presented qualitative research this section 
compares this research’s findings with two previous studies, which independently analyze 
challenges in the Kenyan ICT EE . While these studies were compiled independently of this 
research and published after the main research period of the current study had commenced 
the comparison shows that overall this research’s findings are very well aligned with both 
previous studies. The two previous studies are non-academic and were compiled by the 
GSMA Association (2013) and the Vodafone Institute (2014). They do not discuss the process 
of the local phenomenon of technology entrepreneurship or the cultural context in which 
the phenomenon takes place. The following figures 12-17 show which propositions were 
raised by this study (first column) and which ones were also found independently by either 
the GSMA or the Vodafone Institute (second and third colum)16 
 
Cultural dimension 
Both available reports do not touch upon the  social norms and values around technology 
entrepreneurship in the Kenyan ICT EE . Both reports mention the current hype around ICT 
technology and the interest in related development opportunities on the part of 
international development stakeholders, local policy makers and interviewed ecosystem 
participants.  
 
Figure 12: Findings and confirmation in previous studies (Culture) 
 
                                                     
16 For more information on the findings of the GSMA and the Vodafone Institute report 
please refer to section 2.6 
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Supports dimension  
The available reports both mention the lack of affordable support professions, as well as 
problems with wider support infrastructure, pertaining to logistics and energy supply 
(GSMA, 2014) and in addition to that the Vodafone report also includes the lack of non-
digital distribution channels (Mannske, 2014). While the locally strong presence of tech hubs 
and incubators is stressed and their role as catalyzers of entrepreneurial efforts in the local 
tech ecosystem is emphasized by both reports, the reports do not provide a more detailed 
analysis on the ways in which these incubators provide value. 
 
 
Figure 13 Findings and confirmation in previous studies (Supports) 
 
Human capital dimension 
This research’s findings in the human capital dimension are largely in line with the findings of 
the two previous reports. Both reports stress the youth of the ecosystem and the lack of 
Human capital available for technology entrepreneurship. Further the reports stress the high 
importance of expat entrepreneurs in building the EE in Nairobi.  
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Figure 14 Findings and confirmation in previous studies (Human Capital) 
Finance dimension 
The research’s findings are in line with the previous studies, which find that early stage 
company funding is scarce, be it either personal savings or angel investments. Further the 
competing narratives of entrepreneurs and VC providers as well as the positive and negative 
aspects of grant financing of ICT start-ups are raised.  
 
Figure 15 Findings and confirmation in previous studies (Finance) 
 
Policy dimension 
Both reports find that the Kenyan government views the ICT sector as being of strategic 
importance and confirm the diffilcult climate for technology entrepreneurship due to 
institutional shortcomings. The GSMA report also advises the government to support the 
inflow of external human capital via improving the visa situation. The two reports do not 
touch upon the ICT Board’s activity of financing ICT ventures in Kenya.  
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Figure 16 Findings and confirmation in previous studies (Policy) 
 
Markets dimension 
The close to monopolistic telecommunication market structure and the gate keeping role of 
Safaricom is mentioned by both reports, as is the strong focus of  local entrepreneurs to use 
ICT technology to tackle social problems. Little discussion is provided about the general 
market context or viable entrepreneurial strategies in the current ecosystem. 
 
Figure 17 Findings and confirmation in previous studies (Markets) 
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5.3 The unique nature of the phenomenon of technology entrepreneurship in 
Kenya  
 
This research shows ample evidence of the particularities of the context for technology 
entrepreneurship in Kenya compared to contexts in the Global North and the way that these 
determine the creation of new ICT enabled enterprises. Characteristic for the local 
technology entrepreneurship phenomenon are: a relatively low prestige of the ICT 
entrepreneurial career path, a lowered propensity to take risk due to a low-trust 
environment and the responsibility to provide for extended family members and two 
particularities specific to the process of starting up a new venture, namely little attention to 
early founding phases and “hyper diversification”.  
 
The country’s colonial past and the kleptocratic rule of Daniel arap Moi from 1972-2002 
have contributed to a situation where today there are few examples of successful 
entrepreneurs that could have shaped the perception and prestige of this career path. Some 
interviews indicate that the local meaning of the concept of ‘entrepreneurship’ in Kenya may 
therefore lean more towards “self-employment”, that is providing an income in the context 
of low alternative opportunities for employment, as opposed to the “aspirational” notion of 
an intrinsically motivated entrepreneur who continuously expands his firm or continuously 
establishes new enterprises long after her material needs have been fulfilled (Drucker, 1968, 
Isenberg, 2011, Miller, 2005).  
The following two particularities relate to an individual’s perception and tolerance of risk, 
both of which have been stressed as being at the core of the entrepreneurship phenomenon 
(Gartner, 1989). The research indicated an institutionalized low-trust environment in the 
Kenyan (ICT) entrepreneurship context, where respondents mention a strong fear of being 
defrauded by business partners, due to little trust in the other party’s integrity or 
contractual claims, which are governed by insufficient national legal institutions (see also 
Weeb, 2009). This mistrust is especially evident in interactions with a high power-distance, 
such as with large corporations, or high-ranking officials. Research on trust and 
entrepreneurship shows that an institutionalized low-trust environment increases the risk of 
failure and serves as a significant discourager to starting-up a venture (Welter, 2012). 
Arguably, in such a context the resources, skills and experiences possessed by founders as 
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well as the processes employed when starting a firm need to differ significantly from 
institutionally high-trust contexts.  
Secondly the cultural norm of having to provide for extended family members in relation to 
the ambition of becoming an entrepreneur is important. Respondents indicate that family 
members in the local context are often expected to generate support in form of financing, 
jobs and connections for a wide array of family members. This need to provide a stable flow 
of resources increases the appeal of corporate job positions and decreases the 
entrepreneur’s tolerance of risk and ability to forgo profits in early venturing phases. In the 
case of technology entrepreneurship this may be especially important as most ICT 
entrepreneurs in the study had received a university-level education and indicated that they 
were trough this indebted to their families who had often financed their education.  
 
Two particularities of the process of starting an ICT venture in Kenya have surfaced 
throughout the study. The first particularity evolves around relatively little attention to early 
phases of venture creation, namely to market research and the validation of the business 
model, as well as a relatively lower inclination to forgo revenues and profits from the firm in 
early stages. Explanations for this have been found to evolve around the inability to forgo 
revenues due to the need to finance living expenses, a lack of insight into technology 
entrepreneurship know-how and experience, the socio-cultural norms pertaining to 
entrepreneurship and the need to support family members, as well as a lack of market 
information and past experiences that would be helpful in executing these first stages in the 
entrepreneurial process. Here the local tendency to understand entrepreneurship as “self-
employment” and the resulting focus on generating an income rather than building an 
expansive firm may play into this. The second particularity is the tendency of Kenyan ICT 
entrepreneurs to be distracted by pursuing multiple entrepreneurial endeavors at the same 
time or working side jobs. In addition to most of the reasons underlying the above-stated 
characteristic, this behavior seems to also be a reaction to the very high risk of failure in this 
context. Given the relatively unstable and unpredictable market and institutional 
environment, entrepreneurs seem to think it unwise to ‘put all eggs in one basket’. 
Interestingly this pattern has already been observed in other academic research on non-ICT, 
and micro-scale entrepreneurship in an African context by Koop, de Reu and Freese (2002), 
who termed this the “Octupus organizational form”.   
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While these two processes may seem like deficiencies taking a northern-centric lens; they 
may just as well be considered legitimate responses to the current context faced by local ICT 
entrepreneurs. What is more, they may actually be effective ways to approach the high risk 
and uncertainty present in the local context. Nevertheless, as the presented interview 
quotes show, many Kenyan ICT EE  stakeholders, local and foreign alike, adopt a north-
centric technology entrepreneurship understanding and therefore discussions on the need 
for and value of such divergences is  strongly underdeveloped. Currently, due to the lack of 
insights into the local phenomenon, a situation prevails in which practitioners and policy 
makers alike, even if unknowingly, ‘copy what works in the west’. Nevertheless, we must not 
simply assume that concepts such as clustering, business incubation, venture capital etc. 
work in GS contexts simply because they did so in the GN. This lack of understanding of the 
underlying phenomenon, the why and how of technology entrepreneurship in the Kenyan 
ICT EE  has been shown to significantly impede collaboration between different ecosystem 
stakeholders, in particular between internationals and local Kenyan ecosystem participants.  
 
5.4 Main growth barriers in the “Silicon Savannah” and ICT EE s in the GS 
  
The analysis of the Kenyan Silicon Savannah yields a set of barriers to early ecosystem 
emergence along the dimensions of HC, culture, finance, and markets. In line with previous 
EE research this research stresses the centrality and idiosyncratic nature of local factors that 
determine an ecosystem’s situation and that therefore limit the value of applying barriers 
and enable of one context to other domains. However, I argue that the insights obtained in 
Kenya’s “Silicon Savannah” may provide lessons for other ICT EE s that are currently setting 
up across GS contexts, for two reasons. First of all we currently know extremely little about 
why and how technology ecosystems emerge in GS context and, secondly, because ICT 
entrepreneurs in these contexts can be expected to face similar challenges (e.g. venturing in 
a largely informal economy (Webb, 2005), in a sector that itself is still in its formative years 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), and venturing in an ecosystem where much of the required 
conditions for entrepreneurship have to be established “from scratch”). Therefore, the 
following section discusses the most important barriers and enablers to EE emergence in 
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Kenya as well as their applicability to a GS context more generally. In line with the preceding 
the barriers and enablers are presented line with the corresponding ecosystem dimension.  
Human capital  
The current study shows that the Kenyan Silicon Savannah possesses a relatively small talent 
pool of people who possess the skillset required for successful technology entrepreneurship. 
Currently only few people combine the management and entrepreneurial know-how, 
leadership skills as well as technological know-how and relevant ICT industry insights that 
are needed for building an ICT enabled venture. Serial entrepreneurs and experienced ICT 
professionals seem to be almost entirely lacking. The reason for this shortage was shown to 
lie in the overall youth of the ecosystem and the relative absence of knowledge-intensive 
industries or research institutions, where relevant skill-sets and experiences could be 
acquired. In contrast to more mature ecosystems, where aspiring entrepreneurs have 
learned the traits of technology management and leadership in years of practice before 
starting their own venture, entrepreneurs in the Kenyan ecosystem are shown to often 
pursue entrepreneurship directly after finishing their education due to a lack of alternative 
employment opportunities. While it is hard for educational institutions to substitute 
practical experience in the area of management or software engineering, several 
interviewees also indicate that currently too little emphasis is placed on the provision of 
entrepreneurship know-how and practical management skills to business and technology 
sciences students. Instead, interviewed students complain that universities  seem more 
focused on preparing students for professional careers and could do more in promoting 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the study shows that promising candidates for technology 
entrepreneurship in Kenya are currently demotivated from pursuing an entrepreneurial 
career path due to the given socio-cultural environment of relatively low prestige and 
legitimacy for entrepreneurial careers, pressure to provide for their family, as well as a 
relatively high risk of failure imminent to a context with significant barriers to 
entrepreneurial success. 
 
For a nascent ICT EE  in the GS, the quest for building a HC resource base that is able to 
successfully catalyze technology entrepreneurship may be one of the hardest challenges. As 
argued previously, technology entrepreneurship HC is best created through practice, but in 
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light of a lack of structures to gain such practical experience in nascent ICT EE s the question 
of where those first embryonic structures should come from arises. The same chicken and 
egg logic applies to social norms around the entrepreneurial profession: If successful 
entrepreneurial endeavors are needed to form positive social norms accordingly, but top 
talent is currently demotivated to engage in entrepreneurial endeavors, then how should 
such norms form? Therefore, the shortage of available human capital for technology 
entrepreneurship is a challenge that other just emerging ICT EE s in GS contexts are likely to 
face as well.  
 
Finance 
In the area of finance, the current study finds an early financing gap that is caused by a lack 
of traditional sources in early venturing processes, such as personal and family savings, angel 
investors, and early stage investment funds.  
While the importance of strategic resources supplied by venture capital and equity investors 
for the growth of new ICT ventures (Avnimelech et al., 2007) and wider ICT EE  has been 
stressed in multiple studies (i.e. Malecki, 1997; Norton, 2001), this research finds that also at 
a later stage of the investment funnel there is a lack of such deal-flow in the Kenyan ICT EE . 
In other GS ICT EE s the lack of equity investments has been attributed to insufficient VC 
capital available (Kantis & Federico, 2012). In Kenya, however, respondents have indicated 
that equity capital seems sufficiently available and  interviewed equity finance stakeholders 
indicate that an insufficient quality of underlying business plans linked to a lack of know-how 
and experience of local entrepreneurs causes the lack of deal flow. Beyond this, however, a 
more fundamental mismatch between the western VC model and the local market context 
of Kenya surfaces, where poor consumers and local constraints to business conduct keep 
many potential businesses from satisfying the VCs requirement of high-margin and high-
growth potential. Additionally, a cultural distance between local founders and mostly 
western VC managers, embodied in dissonant values, goals, work practices and 
communication style, has emerged in the course of the research and seems to hinder the 
establishment of the trust-intensive equity investment partnerships.  
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This study shows that in order to address the evident financing gap, grant funding provided 
by institutional stakeholders has emerged in a Kenyan context. There are apparent benefits 
of such financing at the onset of an entrepreneurial ecosystem in a developing country, 
where the existing structures may not yet be sufficient to appeal to private sector investors 
and thus require non-profit support until they have evolved to a stage where they may meet 
such demands. The mWork case studies exemplify positive cases of grant money usage, 
where capable entrepreneurs are given resources to develop applications that are likely to 
create jobs and positive development impact. Shop Soko’s development of an m-enterprise 
management smartphone application made possible by a grant of the Vodafone institute, or 
the Duma Works development of a SMS based skills testing recruiting approach are powerful 
examples. However, the study also brings forward several significant shortcomings of grant 
financing. These evolve mainly around detrimental effects on the ‘entrepreneurial gene-
pool’, as indicated by Isenberg (2010, 2011), the grant financing body’s inability to provide 
non-financial resources usually supplied by strategic investors (Avnimelech et al., 2007), and 
shortcomings in the selection processes, grant administration and determining of the 
volume of total funds to be administered. These shortcomings were shown through several 
mWork case studies, e.g. the financing of Micro Forrester, which received ten-thousands of 
dollars to work on a business that provided little potential from the onset as well as through 
the lax administration of the ‘Tandaa grant’ by the Kenyan ICT Authority. Further, multiple 
stakeholders, entrepreneurs, financiers and incubator managers alike, complained that the 
availability of too loosely available grant money had damaged both entrepreneurial rigor 
and reputation of the wider entrepreneurship ecosystem. Given these detrimental effects on 
the HC, the availability of such funding may have effectively contributed to the indicated lack 
of VC deal flow. 
  
The question of how to provide adequate financing for young ICT EE s in the GS is as pressing 
as it is difficult to answer. The early financing gap that has been observed in a Kenyan 
context is likely to occur as well across the GS, given the low level of savings compared to GN 
contexts. Also the lack of Angel investments and entrepreneurial recycling (Mason and 
Harrison, 2006) that have been considered important drivers of ecosystem growth (Isenberg, 
2011; Mason and Brown, 2014) are not likely to occur in early-stage ecosystems since there 
have not yet been Exits of tech business founders, or wealthy ICT conglomerate managers, 
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that combine the expertise and wealth required for such processes. If the context-specific 
high risk of failure and the inability to deliver the high-growth, high-margin that is required 
by the equity finance market render the VC model difficult in GS context, the question arises, 
which form of financing is best able to meet local ICT ventures’ demands. The easy answer 
seems to lie in public sector finance. As the research shows, however, grant financing of ICT 
ventures can impact the wider EE negatively. It remains to be seen whether providing public 
sector start-up financing somewhat loosely to provide inexperienced entrepreneurs with a 
kind of “training ground” that is otherwise absent, outweighs in the long run the detrimental 
effects that have been mentioned by Isenberg (2011) and have been confirmed in the 
current study.  
 
Market 
The market environment for ICT enabled products and services diverges strongly from 
countries in the GN with a consumer base that is characterized by poverty, price sensitivity, 
and a low willingness to try new products. While already shown in the example of mWork 
cases, such a market environment poses a significant obstacle to ICT entrepreneurs. As 
shown in the study, successful ICT entrepreneurial strategies seem somewhat limited to 
focusing on social problems and monetizing through institutional stakeholders, or focusing 
on less price-sensitive local business or middle class clients and, lastly, serving international 
consumers.  
Furthermore, the empirical research shows that the telecommunications market structure in 
Kenya in 2013 was characterized by a very strong incumbent that seems to effectively stifle 
ecosystem growth through a lack of cooperation with other ecosystem stakeholders and a 
very strong competitive position. The telecommunication company Safaricom has since its 
inception played an integral part in building ICT infrastructure, fostering ubiquous access to 
mobile technology and has, in close cooperation with the Kenyan central bank and the DFID, 
introduced the country-wide mobile payment system M-Pesa. 
Other emerging ICT EE  in the GS are also likely to face the challenge of poor consumers, 
causing similar entrepreneurial strategies to be promising in their context. As the following 
model on ecosystem emergence shows the need to establish initial market structures 
necessitates the enablement of a private sector cooperation through government and 
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development stakeholders. However, such necessary trailblazers may in later phases of 
ecosystem development become overly powerful incumbents that stifle the climate for 
entrepreneurship and in particular may discourage individual entrepreneurial ambitions. 
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5.5 Main growth enablers in the “Silicon Savannah” and early ICT EE s in the GS  
 
The current study identifies a set of enablers that, despite the significant challenges, have 
supported the emergence of the ICT EE  structures currently visible in Nairobi.  
A central factor in ecosystem emergence is played by Nairobi’s entrepreneurial support 
system, especially by the agglomeration around the Bishop Magua Center, and the open 
technology hub, iHub. The multiple entrepreneurship competitions, tech hubs, accelerators, 
incubators and interest groups have together achieved a global attention from a wide range 
of stakeholders, leading to an inflow of financial and human capital and have catalyzed the 
emergence of a closely-knit technology entrepreneurship scene in Nairobi. Finally, they 
constitute an important broker of entrepreneurial know-how and information on technical 
developments and as such foster both innovation processes and the ecosystem’s human 
capital base.  
 
The support infrastructure was found to be key in building foundations of the EE dimensions 
HC and culture, and seems to indirectly contribute to the establishment of the dimensions of 
finance and policy. The entrepreneurial support system plays a crucial role in closing the 
evident HC gap through both providing relevant skills and education (i.e. the Growth Hub’s 
entrepreneurial 3-month crash course in technology entrepreneurship) as well as through 
fostering the inflow of foreign HC.  
In particular, the import of international HC for technology entrepreneurship was shown to 
be vital at the early stages of ecosystem emergence and has been exemplified in the mWork 
case studies of Shop Soko, Duma Works and Sendy as well as through multiple expert 
interviews and mentioned by GSMA (2014) and Mannske (2014). Not only was this import 
shown to help bridge the existing HC shortage in the short run, but, given the need to learn 
entrepreneurial skills through own experience and from experienced entrepreneurs, this 
import plays a key role in building a local HC base in the medium turn. The provided case 
studies and interview excerpts show clearly that international HC that is networked into 
more mature ICT EE s essentially opens access to resources available in such systems, such 
as education, mentoring, access to finance and knowledge of international consumer 
markets. Furthermore, expatriate human capital seems to play a prominent role not only as 
entrepreneurs, but across different ecosystem dimensions. Emerging in this study are 
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foreigners in the roles of managers of technology entrepreneurship incubators and mentors 
at educational facilities or in the financial dimension as providers of capital in impact funds. 
This research’s findings suggest that such expatriates are often intrinsically motivated to 
create social impact rather than being driven mainly by financial gain. Arguably the 
availability of an open technology hub and wider EE infrastructure is an important enabler to 
the importing and keeping of such international HC. It serves as an easy access point for 
foreign nationals to network into the local technology entrepreneurship scene, either 
through taking part in the daily social events or through direct facilitation by the iHubs 
community networking manager. The support institutions further provide a platform that 
enables the activation of the imported human capital, through facilitating space and 
connections required for mentoring local entrepreneurs or to form entrepreneurial teams. 
Finally, such places provide free and stable high-speed Internet access as well as western-
style food, both of which are not easily found in Nairobi. Further, the availability of the 
entrepreneurial support system advances the forming of favorable socio-cultural norms for 
the relatively non-prestigious career path of (ICT) entrepreneurs. Firstly, respondents name 
the possibility to meet likeminded individuals who share the enthusiasm for tech and 
technology entrepreneurship key in nurturing and maintaining their own beliefs in the value 
of the entrepreneurial career path and their entrepreneurial ambitions. Secondly, it provides 
entrepreneurs with socio-cultural legitimacy within their social context as they are able to 
work from such institutions rather than from a café with high-speed Internet access as many 
did before. As one respondent mentions working from a public café was often mistaken as 
“hanging-out with your laptop drinking coffee” rather than actually doing respectable work. 
Finally, in light of the suggested importance of trust for entrepreneurship (Welter, 2012) and 
the encountered low-trust environment that surfaced throughout several interviews and 
was indicated in the literature by Kiggundu (2002) and Pope (2001), this research finds that 
the closely connected technology scene increased trust among actors within this scene. 
Respondents have indicated that due to reputational accountability a lower perceived risk of 
entering in business relations with members of the tech community prevails in comparison 
to non-members of the community, which in turn was related to increasing the propensity of 
doing business with each other. While not directly shown in this study the Kenyan support 
infrastructure can be expected to have indirect effects on the dimensions of finance and 
policy, as it has contributed to building a hype around the possibilities of technology for 
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development and providing an access point to the technology entrepreneurship scene. This 
seems to have benefitted the financial dimension in attracting impact funds, venture capital 
and finance provided by development stakeholders. Further, as literature on policy 
approaches stress it is vital for policy actors to develop a profound understanding of the 
unique nature of their EE and to do so by constant interaction with knowledgeable 
ecosystem stakeholders (Vogel, 2013). Here individuals that are key nodes in the 
entrepreneurial technology scene, often managers of hubs or organizers of 
entrepreneurship competitions etc., can be expected to be in a great position to co-design 
such iterative policy approaches17. Compared to more mature ecosystems, nascent 
ecosystems that have a clear central meeting space, such as the iHub, enable policy makers 
to engage in meaningful dialogue more easily.  
 
Finally, interesting market strategies for the success in GS ICT EE s have surfaced in the 
study. In the context of poor consumers and abundant social problems many tech 
entrepreneurs focus on solving developmental issues and monetize through governmental 
and developmental stakeholders. Therefore, the “social return of investment” is a deciding 
factor in many local business plans.  The commission of ICT-products and services on behalf 
of such stakeholders therefore can be considered an important way of establishing early 
market demand. Entrepreneurial strategies of targeting the needs of less price-sensitive 
consumer segments, such as local business clients, or international clients through selling 
local produce via e-commerce have further become evident. 
 
5.6 Development trajectory of ICT EE s in resource-scarce contexts 
In any debate around EEs it is crucial to consider the dynamic nature of such systems (Mason 
& Brown, 2014). EEs pass through different phases of development and face different 
challenges at different points in time (Feldman & Braunerhjelm, 2004).  Following this insight 
the current research shows that many of the encountered challenged in the nascent ICT EE  
are indeed caused by its youth as well as  context factors specific to the GS . The literature 
review has shown that currently we know next to nothing about how ICT EE  systems in the 
GS evolve or what challenges they face. However, it is important to have an understanding 
                                                     
17 See section 2.4.4 for literature on iterative policy approaches to EE fostering and section 
6.2.3 for further discussion  
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of the growth trajectories of such systems in order to be able to identify the ecosystem’s 
stage of development and the resulting challenges faced. This also enables us to have an 
idea of what comes next and to prepare to meet those challenges. This research develops a 
stages model of ICT EE  development in the GS that is conceptualized building upon the 
findings from the present study as well as through theoretical abduction (Tavory and 
Timmermanns, 2014) from literature on how industries emerge (i.e. Gustafsson et al., 2015) 
and literature on the emergence and functioning of entrepreneurship ecosystem in GN 
contexts (i.e. Mason and Brown, 2015). 
 
The proposed phase-model of ICT EE emergence in the GS spans four phases:  
 
1. Establishment of nationwide ICT infrastructure  
2. Institutionally facilitated corporate entrepreneurship to build embryonic structures 
of a market for ICT products and establishment of the groundwork for an 
entrepreneurship support infrastructure 
3. The birth of first ICT EE  structures with significant barriers to entrepreneurship  
4. Formation of first ventures, creating spin-off effects that help build the conditions for 
further entrepreneurship 
In the first phase significant investments need to be mobilized to achieve a connection to the 
global grid of ICT infrastructure. Crucial concerns in this process may be, e.g., the 
privatization of the telecommunications sector and collaborations with international 
development agencies to supplement the required investments18.  
 
In the second phase telecommunication and mobile Internet connectivity is established and 
such services are largely available to consumers. An ‘Schumpeterian view’ would now call 
upon entrepreneurs to seize the opportunities that arise through this new platform and to 
tackle unmet consumer demand through the introduction of new products and services.  
However, in this phase all six dimensions of the EE paradigm are so underdeveloped that 
individual technology entrepreneurship is hardly feasible at this point.  Here, most GS 
contexts are characterized by a relative absence of the “breeding ground” that has been 
called a prerequisite for EE emergence in previous studies (i.e. advanced knowledge 
                                                     
18 see Ndemo, 2015 for a discussion on the challenges faced in Kenya at this phase and how 
they have been addressed. 
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institutions, proximity to established industries, presence of venture capital, government 
spending ect.)19. Therefore, at this stage it is recommendable to institutionally enable 
corporations  to build a basic market and to establish those structures that are bare 
necessities for ICT products and services. After all, a collaboration of corporate and 
institutional stakeholders can call upon a significantly stronger resource-base than individual 
entrepreneurs.  
The example of Kenya showcases these two stages, where first policy actors collaborated to 
establish ICT connectivity, the telecommunication sector was privatized and then, 
significantly, multiple stakeholders collaborated to empower the corporation Safaricom to 
build the market for mobile telecommunication and mobile payments in Kenya. Especially 
for the establishment of M-PESA researchers stress the close collaboration of policy makers 
(Kenyan Central Bank), development stakeholder (UK DFID) and corporations (Vodafone) 
that was required to successfully introduce the service20. From a regulatory perspective, this 
obliges policymakers to impose relatively lenient regulations, which is why Alexandre (2011) 
argues that at this phase of ecosystem development “regulation needs to follow innovation” 
in cases where the benefits of ICT-related products outweigh the potential risks of under-
regulation. Given the necessity for ICT-enabled products and services to handle payments 
and the lack of alternatives to cash-based payments in many resource-scarce contexts, the 
prioritization of a mobile payments mechanism stands as a prerequisite for ecosystem 
emergence21. Finally, in this phase first community-building efforts of potential 
entrepreneurs and ICT EE  stakeholders emerge and discussions around the value, nature 
and technique of employing ICT to carry out particular activities are getting started (Mezias 
and Kuperman, 2001; Munir and Phillips, 2002). This is the stage that Gustafsson and 
colleagues (2015) called the “emergence of activity networks” and “formation of industry 
identity.” The findings presented earlier indicate that in resource-scarce countries these 
processes can develop around entrepreneurial support infrastructure, such as open 
                                                     
19 See Mason and Brown (2014) for a review of preconditions for EE emergence. 
20 For more information on the establishment of m-Pesa in a Kenyan context view Huges and 
Lonie (2007). 
21 See section 2.2.1 ‘Mobile Money’ for further discussion on the wider economic benefits of 
mobile money systems and Anderson and Drejer, (2008) for a discussion on systemic 
innovations.  
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technology hubs, accelerators, and incubators as well as entrepreneurship competitions. 
Therefore, such institutions in part substitute the role that e.g. advanced research 
institutions or large organizations play in the emergence of EEs in Global North contexts and 
as such bridge an important institutional gap in GS contexts. The foundations of such 
institutions should therefore be established as early as in phase two of ecosystem 
development. 
 
In the third phase, the preconditions of basic consumer ICT literacy and widespread use of 
telecommunication and mobile payment services have been established. The previously 
launched community-building processes of the entrepreneurial support system have given 
rise to a closely networked tech scene. However, given the still very early stage of ecosystem 
development and lack of wider ecosystem conditions, the environment is far from conducive 
to new venture creation. The Kenyan technology ecosystem stood at this phase at the time 
of the empirical field visit in 2013, and as previously discussed, stark challenges in the 
dimensions of human capital, culture, finance, and markets prevailed. Nevertheless, the 
study also indicates that enabling processes set in motion by the support infrastructure lead, 
over time, to the establishment of a sounder human capital base as well as to the formation 
of conducive sociocultural norms around technology entrepreneurship. Moreover, the 
available entrepreneurship support institutions were central in creating hype for technology 
in Kenya, which was important for the inflow of financial resources and provided a space for 
financers and policymakers to interact with members of the tech scene. Enabling factors 
comprise the inflow of foreign human capital, the development stakeholder’s provision of 
entrepreneurial grant financing, and their creation of market demand through the 
commission of ICT-enabled products and services.  
 If the challenges of the third phase are managed and the enablers continue to create 
the conditions for entrepreneurship, over time more and more technology ventures will 
manage to establish themselves. The successful establishment of first technology ventures 
advances market emergence in institutionalizing new transactional patterns (Leblebici et al. , 
1991) and demonstrating market viability (Phaal et al. , 2001). Further, identity-building 
processes that give sociocultural legitimacy to the entrepreneurs begin to take place (Aldrich 
and Fiol, 1994).  
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 With increasing venture formation, eventually the fourth phase of ecosystem 
emergence is attained. In this phase, a critical mass of technology ventures has formed, 
creating spin-off effects that bring enhancements along all ecosystem dimensions. These 
effects create self-reinforcing virtuous circles of entrepreneurship activity that lead to the 
creation of an ecosystem that, in turn, nurtures further entrepreneurial activity (Isenberg, 
2011; Mason and Brown, 2014). For example, the human capital base is upgraded through 
training and experience, and serial entrepreneurs emerge when former key employees leave 
their organizations to establish their own new ventures (Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). 
Financial capital, mentoring, and access to networks become available when successful 
entrepreneurs act as angel investors following a successful exit (Feldman, 2001). In this vein, 
Mason and Brown (2014) stressed the size of entrepreneurial exits as an important leverage 
factor. Ideally, exits should leave entrepreneurs and senior management wealthy enough, so 
that they can reinvest their wealth in other ventures and focus full-time on the creation of 
more entrepreneurship. The pivotal role of emerging serial entrepreneurs and angel 
investors as drivers of ecosystem growth has been shown empirically in earlier studies 
(Drexler et al. , 2014). Furthermore, these emerging entrepreneurial success stories build 
socio-cultural legitimacy for the career path of entrepreneurship in general, shaping social 
norms around risk, failure and wealth creation and inspiring new generations of 
entrepreneurs (Isenberg, 2011). With a critical mass of clients, a support network of 
professional and technological services arises. These span law firms with expertise in 
intellectual property, venture capital firms, management consultants, and technology-
marketing firms (Kenney and Patton, 2005). Additionally, the market becomes easier to 
penetrate as ICT products become more established. Finally, experienced entrepreneurs 
often take on public positions or advise policymakers in the creation of entrepreneurship-
friendly legislation (Isenberg, 2011).  
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 Conclusion on the opportunity of mWork in Kenya 
6.1.1 Summary of main findings 
This research finds four potential realms for mWork in a Kenyan context, namely MMW, 
market research, mRecruiting and the use of mobile phones as a market intermediary, which 
in total span ten Kenyan and two international case studies. Only a few of the analyzed cases 
managed to successfully establish themselves in a Kenyan context and seem to be 
economically efficient. The within-case and cross-case analysis brings forward a wealth of 
challenges that explain this result. The challenges are grouped into three main areas, namely 
technological context challenges, challenges on the user side and wider entrepreneurship 
ecosystem challenges. Technologically, the limited possibilities of the feature phone 
significantly limit the type of tasks that can be economically efficiently executed. This was 
especially evident for the cases in the MMW segment, since these can often be executed 
more efficiently in bulk and on more advanced devices. Secondly, the current cost structure 
of mobile data and mobile money transactions limits the economic viability of handling a 
high frequency of small payments, which are inherent to many mWork business models. A 
further challenge on the consumer side is that people at the BOP have a very low disposable 
income, little openness to technological innovation, and limited technological skills and 
learning potential. Central to the failure of many mWork businesses were wider 
entrepreneurship ecosystem challenges, such as the relative inexperience of local 
entrepreneurs and lack of early stage capital.22 The multiple case study analysis, however, 
also brings forward strategies that mWork firms drew upon to succeed despite the outlined 
challenges. These revolve around finding alternative sources to B2C monetization, such as 
focusing on the needs of local business clients and the middle-class, serving international 
clients, or monetizing through development stakeholders that reward social impact of the 
businesses. Further, successful mWork companies were shown to ensure scalability of their 
business through employing feature phones, but extending the limited capabilities of the 
device either by employing simplifying back-end technologies, using add-on devices, or 
pushing the need for more sophisticated technology down the operational process funnel. 
                                                     
22 See chapter six for a detailed analysis of wider EE challenges 
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Finally, the important role of foreign entrepreneurs taking on leading positions in the 
successful mWork cases surfaced.  
Looking at the mWork firms by segment, the cases in the MMW segment were, with the 
exception of the case study Sendy, not able to overcome the current context specific 
challenges, and they were shown to lack both economic and operational feasibility. Towards 
the end of the study, a crowd-journalism company emerged, which appeared successful but 
could not be conclusively evaluated. In addition, the research evaluated MMW concepts as 
suggested by previous scholars, based on the evident context challenges and success 
strategies, and came to the conclusion that they hold little promise in the current Kenyan 
context. 
In the segment of market research, the company biNu employs a complex back-end 
technology to provide low-end camera phones with simplified mobile web access. User 
interviews showed that the company is able to provide people at the BOP with human, social 
and political capital through lowering the threshold towards using web services. The paid 
market-research surveys that biNu users can complete were indeed used by seven out of 
eight interviewees, who on average earned between 0.5USD up to 3USD as monthly 
supplement income from the application. Hence, the development impact is considered 
positive. 
Further, the current study analyzes the potential of mobile phones to improve recruitment 
processes by offering a viable alternative to the currently dominant personal network hiring 
practices. The research finds that the mobile recruiting firm’s ability to execute skill 
verification and provide trust credentials are critical for success. Nevertheless, the cases of 
Duma Works and JuaKali show that achieving such verification on the scalable feature phone 
platform is difficult given the platform’s technical limitations. Duma Works had, at the time 
of the study, recently introduced a way of SMS multiple-choice screening that allowed basic 
applicant testing via feature phones and offered the use of more advanced devices towards 
the end of the interview process funnel (i.e. by asking a last-round candidate to use an 
Internet café for final tests). While this operational model seems promising and initial 
numbers on Duma Work’s job matching activities are encouraging, this study was not yet 
able to determine whether or not this approach suffices to cause a shift from currently 
practiced personal network recruiting. Should they succeed, however, the development 
impact of recruiting mWork applications could be significant in GS contexts. After all, the 
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currently practiced personal network hiring, as well as existing information inefficiencies in 
the labor market, have been considered causes for unemployment and detrimental to the 
overall economic development in previous studies (GSMA, 2014a; Gachugia et al., 2014). 
The mWork segment of “market intermediary” has emerged as a connector on both the 
national and international level. The national level intermediary case study delivers proof for 
the operational feasibility of an SMS based sales intermediary model, where users can act as 
sales agents, offering products to their social network in a Kenyan context. However, the 
case company failed due to a strong price sensitivity of poor consumers, which did not allow 
for market intermediaries, as well as due to operational issues, such as supply chain and 
product liability problems. Regardless, this type of mWork use could still provide value for 
other product and service groups, since it helps to overcome search costs on behalf of BOP 
consumers in resource-scarce countries and low trust in new products that is inherent to 
nascent industries (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). The international market intermediary segment 
of mWork draws upon low-end smart phones to enable local artisans to sell to western 
consumers via an open e-commerce platform. The conducted case study shows the 
technological and operational viability of this mWork segment. However, a lack of 
commercial success led the company to change track towards a more classical e-commerce 
approach. Reasons for this stem from a large gap of product design and production 
conventions between the mainly American consumers and Kenyan jewelry producers. Also, 
the appeal of the product photos and descriptions as created by local artisans on low-end 
smartphones proved to be insufficient in meeting western e-commerce consumers’ 
standards. The research shows that the international market intermediary case is able to 
provide local artisans with significantly better prices, as well as relevant skills and 
empowerment training. Finally, the use of low-end smart phones as enterprise management 
tools can support small-scale entrepreneurs at the BOP in growing their business with 
inventory management, financial planning, accounting and logistics. While this use of mobile 
phones could be an effective tool in creating employment through growing small-scale firms, 
this research was not yet able to evaluate it, since it was not fully developed at the time of 
the research. 
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6.1.2 Theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications for the M4D stream within the ICTD literature are fourfold. First 
of all, this study answers the calls for research hat provides a more in-depth and more 
critical evaluation of M4D initiatives, their feasibility and their promise for development 
(Svensson and Wamala, 2012 p.34; Duncombe, 2010, 2011;) and, therefore, contributes to 
reducing the “techno-deterministic” mindset that the M4D stream has been critiqued with 
(Thompson and Walsham, 2010; Heeks, 2010; Gomez et al., 2012).  The research’s findings 
show that while previous discussions on behalf of development stakeholders or professional 
associations have provided relatively enthusiastic appraisals of M4D initiatives, a more 
detailed appraisal of local context challenges and development impact does indeed bring to 
the surface unanticipated results. For instance, the mRecruiting initiative Duma Works has 
been appraised enthusiastically in the GSMA (2014a) report’s evaluation of the concept and 
technical feasibility. However, this research finds that mRecruting firms’ value in the context 
of Kenya is contingent on their ability to execute applicant skill-testing, which given the 
current dominance of feature phones is difficult to realize. This study’s multiple month case 
study research into the different mWork uses delivers insight not only into the general 
concept of the initiatives and their technical feasibility, but also into the economics 
underlying the initiatives, as well as the contextual factors for adoption and use, and 
challenges faced in the relevant context.  Such research has been called for by scholars such 
as Hellström (2009; 2010) and by InfoDev (2012a).  
Secondly, while the M4D stream has investigated multiple areas of application of the mobile 
phone for their potential development contribution, such as mHealth, mAgriculture and 
mGovernment, the potential of the mobile phone to tackle unemployment remains both 
theoretically and empirically relatively unexplored. This research therefore coins the term of 
mWork to describe such uses. The conducted multiple case study research finds a variety of 
cases and potential uses for the field of mWork that have not been previously suggested and 
discusses the feasibility of those that have been suggested in the literature, given the 
constraints of the Kenyan context. Specifically, the research brings to light the use of mobile 
phones as national and international market intermediaries and as a tool for market 
research. It finds promising mWork applications such as the logistics firm Sendy and the 
crowd journalism application HiviSasa. Finally, it shows the potential use of smartphones as 
mobile enterprise solutions for small-scale entrepreneurs (Shop Soko). In the segment of 
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mRecruiting, this research highlights the need for skills verification as an essential 
component to overcome the currently practiced personal network recruiting. At the same 
time, the research shows the difficulty of achieving this milestone with the current 
technological endowments in Kenya and as such adds to the available discussion in GSMA 
(2014a).  
Overall, the study reveals that the state of mWork in Kenya at the time of the empirical 
research was somewhat early, as only a few firms had successfully established themselves in 
the market. Therefore, as the third contribution of the study, it provides a discussion of the 
challenges and success strategies encountered in the context to explain this outcome. The 
challenges to mWork in Kenya are largely as anticipated by previous research on M4D 
studies. Some examples include the difficulty of establishing a sustainable business model in 
light of poor consumers and significant experimentation needed to venture into a new 
sector (Hellström, 2010; InfoDev, 2012a; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), technology-first mindsets 
by M4D practitioners (Banks, 2013; Smertnik, 2012), a lack of ICT skills of users (Isabalija, 
2011) and the affordability of telecommunication services (Hellström, 2009).  The latter 
aspect was especially important for the segment of Mobile Mirco Work, where the mobile 
payment pricing scheme that charges per transaction resulted in overall high costs, given the 
need to execute numerous transactions of small volume. Further, the technological 
constraints of the feature phone are in line with GSMA (2014a), who found the trade-off 
between scalability of feature phones and the higher potential of smart phones. Finally, the 
multiple case study shows that the immature ICT entrepreneurship ecosystem overall poses 
significant challenges to the establishment of mWork firms. A main conclusion of this 
research is therefore that a discussion around M4D initiatives, as well as wider ICTD 
initiatives, should be linked to a discussion of the local context for technology 
entrepreneurship. Importantly, this study also provides insight into ‘what works’ in the local 
context. The successful strategies presented here, such as extending the technological 
possibilities of the scalable feature phones through either add-on devices (Sendy) or by 
postponing the need for more advanced devices to a later stage in the process funnel (Duma 
Works) have not been suggested in previous M4D debates and merit further attention. 
Lastly, this research contributes to the understanding of how mobile technology 
interventions actually engage with broader developmental goals by applying Heeks and 
Arun’s Assets (2010) framework for assessment of ICTD. Various scholars have asked for 
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more thorough investigation of the actual impact that M4D projects bring for development, 
specifically using perspectives that are based in theories that have currency in the 
development field (Heeks, 2010; Thompson and Walsham, 2010; Gomez et al., 2012). The 
conducted qualitative methods that were guided by this model were indeed able to grasp 
the multidimensional view of development. Even though the actual impact assessment 
forms only a small portion of the overall research, since most cases were not yet mature 
enough at the time of the field visit, the study finds that mWork relevant interactions with 
mobile technology can provide users with social, human and political capital, in addition to 
financial capital, as shown in the case of biNu. This finding is in line with the findings of 
mobile phone interaction in the M4D stream as for example Gomez et al. (2012) show in 
their meta-analysis of the M4D stream. 
6.1.3 Practical implications 
ICT entrepreneurs, as well as development practitioners, will find the investigation and 
discussion of what mWork approaches are available, what context contingent constraints 
have to be considered, and what strategies could potentially be drawn upon in order to 
overcome these constraints particularly valuable. In light of the early stage of the 
phenomenon of ICT technology in Kenya, inductive and context relevant research, as 
provided by this study, is strongly needed. The outlined challenges along the technological 
and economic dimensions and the wider entrepreneurship ecosystem can provide Kenyan 
entrepreneurs with pivotal insight into the design of sustainable business models. To this 
end, the detailed account of firms that have succeeded despite these challenges, and the 
detailed description of the ways in which this was achieved, will be especially helpful. 
Arguably, some of the surfaced strategies, such as extending the limited capabilities of 
feature phones through add-on devices or pushing the need for more complex technology 
towards the end of the process funnel, are applicable to a wider scale of M4D initiatives. 
Policy makers and development stakeholders alike are deeply interested in creating 
employment and in the potential of employing ICT technology to achieve that (InfoDev, 
2012a). This study raises awareness for the field of mWork, suggests previously neglected 
segments, such as national and international market intermediaries, and provides decision 
makers not only with insights into the challenges and opportunities inherent to the different 
mWork segments, but also into the potential impact on “development”. The combination of 
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the two aspects is especially important to policy makers who need to understand both the 
feasibility, as well as the potential impact on development, before making investment 
decisions. Here, the findings of both the positive impact for business models in the segments 
of international market intermediaries and market research, and the potentially sizable 
impact that mRecruiting firms could have on recruiting environments in resource-scarce 
contexts, are critical for policy makers. Further, the outlined challenges that mWork firms in 
the context of Kenya face provides important insights into which areas need development 
intervention. Following a more detailed evaluation of the barriers and enablers that ICT 
entrepreneurs face in the Kenyan context, chapter six of this thesis provides a concrete set 
of recommendations for policy makers and development stakeholders that seek to support 
Kenyan ICT entrepreneurs.  
Arguably, since other countries in Sub-Sahara Africa are making fast advancements in their 
ICT infrastructure, the provided analysis of mWork in East Africa’s ICT vanguard Kenya can 
provide valuable input into what potential realms of work creating applications are available, 
what drawbacks may be expected, how they may be overcome and what impact on 
development they may provide. As Hellström (2009; 2010) stresses, it is important to 
document and share such aspects of M4D initiatives in order to enable practitioners in other 
contexts to design better initiatives.  
6.1.4 Limitations and further research 
As discussed in more detail in 6.2.4, the study at hand is constrained by the context factors 
of a one-person, Ph.D. level, qualitative research project. The early stage of the overall ICT 
entrepreneurship ecosystem at the time of the empirical field visit in 2013 is pivotal for the 
assessment of the research’s findings and development of future research implications. The 
study shows that many of the underlying reasons for the failure of mWork firms or the 
discontinuation of mWork approaches were indeed caused by factors related to the 
immaturity of the wider ecosystem. Therefore, a conclusive assessment of the potential 
offered by mWork cannot be made at this point. Given the relatively fast pace of change in 
the technology sector, as well as first signs of Kenya’s ecosystem maturation in 2015 (Ndemo 
and Weiss, 2016), such as the first million-dollar technology venture exit (Disrupt-africa.com, 
2015), the contextual situation for mWork firms can be expected to have changed 
significantly and therefore calls for a re-evaluation of the potential offered. How have the 
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altered conditions changed the outlook for the identified mWork segements? Are there now 
new segments of mWork that provide the potential to reduce unemployment? How will the 
expected further spread of (low-end) smart phones alter the outlook of mWork? A follow-up 
on the potential of mRecruitment would be especially interesting, as this study was not able 
to conclusively determine its development potential, since it was found to be contingent on 
the firm’s ability to successfully execute applicant skills testing. Do the suggested SMS 
multiple choice quizzes and the delay of the need for more sophisticated technology indeed 
provide sufficient skills validation? Other segments, such as national and international 
market connectors, seemed to provide a sufficient level of technical and and economic 
feasibility in the given context, and therefore should remain on the radar of M4D research. 
Finally, several interesting case studies have emerged after the on-site empirical research 
phase in 2013 and hence could not be evaluated conclusively. Particularly, the actual 
submission pattern of HiviSasa and an analysis of the news-content could determine the 
application’s ability to provide poor people with political capital. Currently, it is not clear 
whether the content submissions are mainly made by a few individuals using PCs, or 
whether the content is indeed sent in through feature phones by a mass of people at the 
base of the pyramid. In the latter case, this could provide substantial political capital to 
people at the base of the pyramid. For example, it could create opportunities to speak about 
societal problems like tribal discrimination or to denounce corrupt officials. 
 
6.2 Conclusion on Kenyas “Silicon Savannah” 
 
6.2.1 Summary of main findings 
The research finds that the Kenyan context for technology entrepreneurship is currently 
somewhat hostile to the emergence of new ICT ventures. Multiple barriers were identified 
across the six ecosystem dimensions. Building a HC (Human Capital) resource base that is 
able to successfully catalyze technology entrepreneurship is especially challenging. In 
contrast to mature ecosystems in economically developed countries, where aspiring 
entrepreneurs often have learned the traits of technology management and leadership 
through years of practice before starting their own venture, entrepreneurs in the Kenyan 
ecosystem often pursue entrepreneurship directly after finishing their education. Given a 
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lack of opportunity to gain practical experience in emerging ICT EE s in the GS, this begs the 
question of where those first entrepreneurs should develop relevant skill-sets.  
Furthermore, the research finds that promising candidates for technology entrepreneurship 
may be demotivated from pursuing that career path due to unfavorable socio-cultural norms 
around entrepreneurship. Again, if successful entrepreneurial endeavors are needed to form 
positive social norms, but top talent is currently demotivated to engage in such endeavors, 
then how should such norms form? In addition, an early financing gap is shown to be caused 
by a lack of traditional sources, such as personal and family savings, angel investors, and 
early stage investment funds. Despite the importance of strategic resources supplied by 
equity investors for new ICT ventures, this research finds there is a lack of such deal-flow in 
the Kenyan ICT EE . Unlike in other ICT EE s in the GS, where VC capital is sparsely available 
to start-ups (Kantis & Federico, 2012), this study finds that in Kenya such capital seems 
sufficiently available. However, insufficient quality of underlying business plans, linked to a 
lack of knowledge and experience of local entrepreneurs, as well as  misunderstandings 
between mostly western equity financers and local entrepreneurs, seem to cause the lack of 
deal-flow. The research findings further indicate a fundamental mismatch between the 
western VC business model and the local market realities for ICT products and services in 
countries in the GS, due to the stark growth trajectories and profit requirements that 
western equity investors are looking for. The emergence of public sector financing to close 
such financing gaps surfaced in the study. The study finds a tension between the apparent 
benefits of providing such capital and the detrimental effect of supplying financing relatively 
leniently on the ‘entrepreneurial gene-pool’. Finally, the Kenyan market context provides a 
challenge due to a consumer base that is characterized by poverty and a low willingness to 
try new products, as well as to the almost-monopolistic market structure of the 
telecommunications sector, which was shown to stifle entrepreneurial ambitions. 
Despite this multitude of challenges, the research has found enabling processes that have 
played a central role in the emergence of currently visible ICT EE  structures in Nairobi.  
The entrepreneurship support infrastructure was found to be key in building foundations of 
relevant HC and the formation of supportive cultural norms. Further, it seems to indirectly 
contribute to the establishment of the dimension of finance and policy. Examples of this 
influence evolve around garnering worldwide attention, nurturing local entrepreneurial 
ambitions, as well as creating socio-cultural legitimacy. This lowers the threshold costs to 
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starting a new venture, connects diverse stakeholders and thus catalyzes innovation 
processes and facilitates the ability to attract and sustain international entrepreneurial HC. 
The closely-connected technology entrepreneurship community that has formed around 
such institutions surely has multiple positive veins of influence, but in particular, it was 
indicated to be an effective tool for increasing accountability and trust in an institutionalized 
low-trust context and hence significantly increasing the propensity of businesses to engage 
with each other. Additionally enablers such as the inflow of experienced foreign HC and the 
commission of ICT product and services on behalf of public stakeholders emerged. 
 
Based on these empirical insights, and deducing from available literature on how industries 
(Gustafsson et al., 2015) and ecosystems (Mason and Brown, 2014) emerge, the research 
brings forward a conceptual model of ICT EE  ecosystem emergence in the GS. This model 
proposes a trajectory that explains the emergence of the Kenyan ICT EE , despite the lack of 
“fertile breeding grounds” that state-of-the-art EE theory sees as a prerequisite.  
 
The model argues that institutionally-enabled corporate entrepreneurship needs to initially 
ensure a countrywide ICT infrastructure, mobile payment services and market emergence 
processes to provide the basic prerequisites for technology entrepreneurship. 
Simultaneously an entrepreneurial support infrastructure, such as open technology hubs, 
need to be introduced at this very early stage, since they play a key role in catalyzing early 
industry emergence processes such as the “emergence of activity networks” and “formation 
of industry identity” (Gustafsson et al., 2015; Mezias and Kuperman, 2001; Munir and 
Phillips, 2002). Significantly, this means that such institutions, in part, substitute the role that 
for example advanced research institutions or large organizations play in the emergence of 
EEs in Global North contexts, and as such, they form a pivotal component in the emergence 
of ICT EE s in the GS. In the third phase, the ecosystem possesses ICT infrastructure, some 
basic market structures for ICT products and services, as well as a lively and closely 
connected technology entrepreneurship community. Given the immaturity of the ecosystem 
and the challenges imposed by the GS context, the environment at this stage is still hostile to 
technology entrepreneurship, as shown by the example of Kenya. Should the barriers along 
the dimensions of HC, Culture, Finance and Markets be managed successfully, then the 
emergence of the first successful ICT ventures will advance market emergence by 
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institutionalizing new transactional patterns (Leblebici et al. , 1991) and demonstrating 
market viability (Phaal et al. , 2001). Further, identity-building processes that give cognitive 
and socio-political legitimacy to the entrepreneurs will take place (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). 
The ecosystem will then eventually reach the fourth stage of ecosystem emergence, in which 
a critical mass of ICT companies has been established and spin-off effects create self-
reinforcing “virtuous circles” of entrepreneurship (Isenberg, 2011; Mason & Brown, 2014). 
EE theory shows how this effect gradually brings improvements to each of the ecosystem 
dimensions and finally contributes to a context that is conducive to technology 
entrepreneurship.  
The research further provides insights into how the particular nature of the Kenyan context 
for technology entrepreneurship impacts why, how and where new ventures are formed in 
Kenya. Here the author argues that the local characteristics of entrepreneurship diverge 
strongly from those of the global north and provides some examples of such divergences. 
Finally, the research discusses what approach to ecosystem fostering seems most promising 
in a Kenyan context. 
6.2.2 Theoretical implications 
This study brings forward theoretical implications for the fields of developmental 
entrepreneurship, as well as for the EE perspective on entrepreneurship. In more detail, this 
study provides insights into the emergence and functioning of ICT entrepreneurship 
ecosystems in a less developed country context by empirically investigating the regional 
front-runner, ICT EE  of Kenya. It also provides rich insights into the barriers faced at an early 
stage of ecosystem emergence in such a context and further provides insights into how 
these can be overcome. Given the front-runner role of the Kenyan ICT EE  in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, other ICT EE s that are setting up in a similar context can be expected to face similar 
circumstances.  
First-of-all, the research at hand contributes towards an  ‘opening-of-the-black-box’ by 
unveiling particularities of the phenomenon of technology entrepreneurship in Kenya. The 
research provides sufficient evidence for the distinctiveness of the context of technology 
entrepreneurship in Kenya, and therefore for the resulting distinctness of “why, how and 
where” new ICT ventures emerge in this context. Based on the evidence brought forward by 
the current study, the author argues in favor of a new theory of technology 
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entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa. The findings pertaining to the unique nature of and 
context for technology entrepreneurship  may provide future grounded theory research with 
valuable points of departure. Here the research suggests technology entrepreneurship in 
Kenya can be characterized as having relatively little prestige as a career path, caused by 
historically low levels of entrepreneurship and the novelty of ICT technology. ICT 
entrepreneurs in Kenya are also seen to have a lowered propensity to start a new venture, 
which is due to both an institutionally low-trust environment and the frequent responsibility 
to provide for extended family members. In addition, two particularities specific to the 
process of starting-up a new ICT venture in Kenya are suggested, namely a “fail fast and 
cheap” mentality of paying little attention to early founding phases, and a “hyper 
diversification” of entrepreneurial efforts, as a hedge against the high risk of failure inherent 
to GS contexts.  
Secondly, the study has provided insight into the functioning of the Kenyan ICT EE  as an 
example of an emerging ICT EE  in a GS context. Here, the study not only confirms many of 
the barriers and enablers brought forward by the GSMA association (2014) and Mannske 
(2014), but it also provides a significant amount of propositions that have not been 
previously suggested23. What is more, the current study discusses the identified factors in 
greater detail than its forerunners and, in addition, provides a holistic picture of the factors 
and actors that collectively determine the Kenyan ICT EE  functioning, as well as their 
interrelatedness.  
Thirdly, the study contributes to the understanding of growth trajectories of ICT EE s in the 
GS. Given the dynamic nature inherent to EEs (Mason and Brown, 2014; Feld, 2001), it is of 
utmost importance to further the understanding of the development trajectories of such 
systems in order to build a sounder theoretical base for the EE view on entrepreneurship 
and to be able to provide meaningful advice to policy makers. In the call for papers for the 
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal’s ‘special issue on entrepreneurship ecosystems’ that is 
due for early 2019, leading entrepreneurship scholars ask: “What are the processes that 
characterize the creation of new entrepreneurial ecosystems? How do the roles of specific 
participants, such as universities, accelerators and VCs, interact with early stage ventures in 
ecosystem creation?” (Autio, 2015; p.2.) Significantly, the developed stage model for EE 
                                                     
23 See section 5.1, figure 12 for an overview of developed propositions, 5.2 for a comparison 
of developed propositions to extant research, section  
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emergence in the GS suggests how the different components of the ecosystem must come 
together chronologically in order to function. Current state of the art EE theory is unable to 
explain the emergence and development of ICT EE s in the GS, as it assumes the necessity of 
“fertile breeding grounds” for ICT regional innovation systems, clusters or EEs to emerge. 
However, these are scarce in GS contexts. The model for ICT EE  emergence developed in 
this research shows that the absence of such “fertile breeding grounds” does indeed cause 
significant challenges in the early phases of ICT EE  emergence. Nevertheless, the model is 
also the first to explain how locally available enabling processes can be drawn upon to 
establish the conditions for technology entrepreneurship in countries of the GS.   
Finally, through successfully applying the relatively new theoretical EE perspective to 
understand a local entrepreneurship phenomenon, the current study has strengthened the 
theoretical base of this theory. In line with Isenberg (2011) and Mason and Brown (2014), it 
is the author’s conviction that the EE view is a needed extension to currently popular cluster 
theory, as it is more apt in grasping the holistic picture of the factors that collectively 
determine the emergence of new enterprises in a region. Especially for research in domains 
where current theory is not applicable and little previous theoretical research exists, this 
perspective is extremely helpful in structuring the large amount of relevant information.  
 
6.2.3 Practical implications and recommendations 
This research’s findings have strong practical implications and are addressed at 
governments, development stakeholders, and practitioners in resource-scarce countries that 
seek to move their young ICT EE  toward maturity.  
 
A new policy approach to fostering technology ecosystem emergence in the GS 
It is — and should be — a common recommendation to governments to involve local 
practitioners in the design of their entrepreneurship policy, because these are the actors 
who know about the unique challenges and enablers present in the ecosystem (Isenberg, 
2010, 2011). As the current study has shown, taking a holistic and multidimensional 
ecosystem perspective requires decision makers to account for hundreds of different 
factors. This can only be achieved through intense and ongoing interactions with ecosystem 
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stakeholders from the respective dimensions. The need for such bottom-up information and 
co-design of policies is especially pivotal in resource-scarce contexts, where a current lack of 
knowledge of approaches that work in such contexts might tempt policymakers to copy 
generic policy prescriptions that “worked in the West”. A key finding of the current study is 
that in Kenya many achievements in kick-starting the ecosystem were driven by practitioners 
themselves, who took the initiative to open technology hubs and other support institutions. 
Therefore, the entrepreneurial revolution started from the bottom-up with minimal 
infrastructure in place. This “grassroots” movement is not only noticeable in Kenya, but is 
evidenced by the now over 90 technology hubs in Africa24 and parts ways with a top-down 
and policy driven approach that was previously believed to instigate innovation and suggests 
that a new approach is in formation. As a consequence, policymakers must to adapt to this 
dynamic and acknowledge the leaders of these grassroots movements as invaluable 
resources that need to be listened to and engaged in the co-design of entrepreneurship 
policy. Processes therefore need to be put in place that enable the engagement of 
practitioners in the design and continuous refinement of their ecosystem-fostering strategy. 
Examples for such processes include establishing an open-door culture for ecosystem 
participants to talk with policymakers as well as regular fixed-day meetings and roundtable 
discussions that bring together experts from all ecosystem dimensions. Once such processes 
are in place, policymakers can start launching ongoing rounds of intervention and feedback 
that facilitate the emergence of an environment that breeds high-growth technology 
entrepreneurship. In light of this bottom-up informed policy approach the recommendations 
made by the current research are supposed to inform a debate on how to design a holistic, 
iterative and ongoing strategy for ICT EE  growth in Kenya and should not be viewed as input 
for traditional, top-down interventions.  
 
Get the foundations right — ICT infrastructure, mobile payment, telecommunications market, and 
entrepreneurial support infrastructure  
The finding that technology ecosystems need, at the very minimum, ICT infrastructure, a 
way of handling payments, and a functioning telecommunications market is hardly 
surprising. What is surprising is the central role that this research found entrepreneurial 
                                                     
24 See latest count on  http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/tech-hubs-across-africa-which-will-be-legacy-makers 
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support institutions to play in catalyzing early industry emergence processes and 
establishing the conditions for entrepreneurship, particularly for developing human capital 
and creating interest in technology entrepreneurship. The establishment of support 
infrastructure, therefore, such as open technology hubs, entrepreneurship accelerators, and 
competitions, need to be undertaken very early in the ecosystem emergence process, both 
through private and public sector efforts. 
 
Enable the enablers — entrepreneurship support infrastructure, inflow of foreign human capital, and 
public sector market for ICT products 
In addition to the pivotal role of entrepreneurship support infrastructure, the inflow of 
foreign human capital has proved constructive in overcoming human capital shortages in the 
short term and in building a sounder human capital base in the medium term. A structured 
program to increase inflow and the exchange of relevant human capital between the local 
and more mature ecosystems would further leverage such effects. Such a program could 
proactively invite entrepreneurs and facilitate the processes through arranging visas, 
accommodations, and the like. Moreover, an exchange scholarship program for local talent 
to gain working experiences and networks in other ecosystems would also be beneficial. In 
light of the identified HC shortage at early EE phases, such foreign HC should not be viewed 
with a protectionist lens, but rather welcomed as an import of an extremely valuable, scarce 
and essentially free resource. In this vein, diaspora Kenyans active in ICT industries abroad 
may prove valuable and may be willing to provide mentoring or even angel investments for 
emerging Kenyan ICT ventures, when invited to do so. The example of Taiwan in the 1980s 
shows that such social remittances have significantly contributed to the emergence of 
Taiwan’s EE (Kshetri, 2013; Isenberg, 2010). Such human capital development interventions 
need to be made alongside ongoing educational reforms. While the question of technology 
entrepreneurship education is difficult across contexts, it is especially challenging when the 
local phenomenon and the context for technology entrepreneurship itself are not yet 
sufficiently understood. This research finds that educational initiatives driven by ecosystem 
practitioners themselves seem to provide actionable skills. An example of such a non-
governmental educational initiative is the several-month ‘crash course’ in technology 
entrepreneurship provided by The Growth Hub (Growthafrica.com, 2015). Government, 
development stakeholders and private sector organizations could leverage the impact of 
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such initiatives, for example, by providing cost sharing or subsidies. Of course, such 
initiatives have to be complementary to further building the country’s wider knowledge base 
in the meantime.  
The commissioning of ICT-enabled products and services on behalf of governmental, NGO, 
or international development is an additional enabler. In Kenya these have surfaced as being 
key for early market emergence and the emergence of first technology ventures. Even 
Kenyan ICT ventures that do not explicitly focus on social problems can be considered to be 
“high-impact” since ICT products and services often present efficient solutions to market 
needs, contribute to the spread of technology and create important entrepreneurial “spin-
off” effects for the wider ecosystem. Therefore, public and developmental stakeholders are 
advised to increase their commission of ICT products and services especially in the third 
phase of ecosystem development. Such initiatives can be compared to the important role 
that the US government’s spending on the defense sector played in the emergence of Silicon 
Valley (Leslie, 2000). The inherent matching process between entrepreneurs and 
international development stakeholders should be facilitated wherever possible. 
Development stakeholders may therefore need to establish competences and an interface 
for directly engaging with local ICT entrepreneurs. To support the emergence of an ICT 
market, some governments have provided tax incentives for private sector companies who 
buy from new, local ICT ventures. Further, governments have supported early market 
development for ICT products and services through modernizing their own structures (see 
Drexler et al. , 2014; p. 77-80).  
 
Create kick-starter firms that set spin-off effects in motion 
The model presented in this research argues that the formation of first technology ventures 
is critical to ecosystem emergence because they set powerful spin-off processes in motion, 
which, over time, automatically eradicate some of the barriers to new venture emergence. 
For the provision of entrepreneurial financing, this means that despite the ambiguous 
impact of non-market-based sources of financing that has been suggested in this study and 
in extant research their benefits outweigh their drawbacks in early stages of EEs in resource-
scarce contexts. The study has shown, in line with Mannske (2014) and GSMA (2014), that 
traditional sources of early-stage entrepreneurial financing are either not present or 
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unattainable, which is why alternatives need to be provided. Importantly, scholars that have 
so far argued against the provision of grant financing, such as the prominent example by 
Isenberg (2010; 2011) have ignored the dynamic nature of ecosystems and the different 
needs in different stages of ecosystem development. This research finds that the provision 
of entrepreneurial finance on behalf of public stakeholders is indeed necessary in phases 
two and three of our ecosystem development model in resource-scarce contexts. In addition 
to the competitions and grants that were available in Kenya, it is therefore proposed to 
introduce an entrepreneurial stipend program financed by public stakeholders. In such a 
program, entrepreneurs receive a monthly stipend to cover their living expenses during the 
first phases of the venturing process accompanied with relevant mentoring in order to 
produce viable businesses for market-based investors to invest in. This is especially 
interesting as it could tackle the locally observed founding process characteristic of paying 
little attention on early venturing phases and distraction on behalf of entrepreneurs, as well 
as the need for prolonged trial and error in the business model validation phase that comes 
with venturing in a sector that itself is still emerging. A major example from the GN is 
Germany’s EXIST technology entrepreneurship scholarship program. It is administered 
through university incubators and has been shown to positively influence network formation 
and the integration of universities in regional entrepreneurship ecosystems (Koschatzky, 
2003; Exist.de, 2016). In this spirit, developmental finance organizations should provide 
investment capital and resources for operational costs to existing early-stage investment 
funds and accelerators to address the seed capital shortage (see GSMA, 2014). These funds 
are already capable of selecting promising ventures and providing nonfinancial resources 
and hence are in a better position to administer seed capital than for example governmental 
stakeholders or donor agencies themselves (Avnimelech et al. , 2007). This research’s 
findings pertaining to the disappointing administration of the Tandaa Grant in 2013 through 
the Kenyan ICT Authority further support this recommendation.  Further, Israel’s Yozma 
Fund is an example of where publicly funding new venture investment funds has significantly 
aided the development of a local VC industry and associated EE growth (Avnimelech et al. , 
2007, 2009; Wonglimpiyarat, 2015). Simultaneous efforts to support human capital 
formation and employ support infrastructure to provide non-financial resources, as 
proposed earlier, will offset at least some of the detrimental side effects of such 
interventions. Finally, policymakers can enable spin-off effects by providing tax breaks for 
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angel investments and entrepreneurs and by further removing bureaucratic obstacles to 
new ventures. To achieve the latter, other countries have installed offices or contact staff 
that provide swift governmental services, such as business registration, operational permits, 
and employee visa arrangements, to technology firms.25 
 
Anticipate the challenges and prepare to meet them 
A dynamic perspective recognizes that ecosystems face different challenges at different 
phases and enables participants to prepare for what is coming next. Two main challenges 
that nascent technology ecosystems may encounter on their way to maturation have 
emerged. First, the suggested early empowerment of a private sector enterprise to create 
embryonic telecommunication market structures can later lead to the existence of a 
powerful incumbent that stifles competition and entrepreneurial efforts. Policymakers 
should address this from the beginning, when, for example, negotiating licenses with such a 
corporation, and find ways to incentivize the incumbent to interact with the ecosystem at 
later stages (also see GSMA, 2014). Second, as evidenced in the “Silicon Savannah”, the 
inflow of foreign ecosystem participants leads to a culturally very diverse entrepreneurship 
scene. The research presented here indicates that dissonant underlying assumptions around 
the goals and processes of entrepreneurship between local and international stakeholders 
cause friction that disturbs ecosystem functioning. It is therefore important to facilitate a 
dialogue about the value of local venturing processes and the need to integrate the various 
approaches. Continuous efforts in that direction may lead to the institutionalization of 
better venturing processes that benefit from internationally proven practices while also 
being locally responsive. 
 
6.2.4 Limitations and further research 
Several limitations constrain the study at hand and imply the need for further research.  
First, the applied qualitative research approach was employed to derive insights into the 
“why and how” of a relatively under-studied phenomenon, since currently known theory 
seemed inapplicable to the particular research context (Eisenhardt, 1989).  As a result, the 
                                                     
25 See, for example, Berlin-partner (2016). 
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sample of in total of 45 formal interviews with ICT entrepreneurs, mWork experts and EE 
experts is limited and inhibits the possibility to generalize to the entire ecosystem and 
similar ones in other GS countries. Furthermore, the study at hand is subject to limitations 
that arise from the resource and time constraints implied by the context of a dissertation 
thesis. In more detail, the time that was available to conduct this study was limited, as were 
the resources to conduct empirical research in the costly research context of Nairobi. 
Additionally, the study was conducted mainly by a single researcher, which according to Yin 
(1994) introduces a bias in data collection and analysis. These constraints are especially 
important when employing the multi-dimensional EE paradigm and as a result, the 
researcher was not able to treat all ecosystem dimensions with the same level of detail. 
Therefore, for instance, the research could not appraise the entire portfolio of 
entrepreneurship-policy of the Kenyan government or develop particular themes in a higher 
level of detail. Moreover, also in light of the nascent stage of research on the topic of 
technology entrepreneurship in the relevant domain as well as the development trajectory 
of the also still young technology ecosystems in Sub-Saharan Africa, further grounded theory 
research is required. The here presented findings should ideally provide valuable points of 
departure for such research.  
This research advocates the use of the EE paradigm as a tool for further research to gain an 
understanding of local phenomena of entrepreneurship. However, seeing the breadth of the 
concept, such research should, when possible, be conducted in interdisciplinary teams. In 
this way researchers can give special attention to their particular area of study and, through 
collaboration, maintain an overview of the bigger picture and important interaction effects. 
This could not only improve the quality of the developed theory, but also generate insights 
that are more relevant to policy makers, who require information on all dimensions, and 
their interaction, in order to develop meaningful policy. In this spirit, anthropological and 
sociological research is urgently needed to understand more about the contexts’ cultural 
dynamics. This research provides potential starting points for such explorations, e.g. of the 
increased uncertainty avoidance of potential ICT entrepreneurs caused by feelings of 
responsibility for their extended family members, the role of networks around 
entrepreneurship support institutions in establishing trust in an otherwise institutionalized 
low-trust context, and the dissonant cultural values and venturing practices between 
international and local practitioners that impede venture creation. Especially the latter 
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finding pertaining the dissonant underlying assumptions around the goals and processes of 
entrepreneurship between local and international stakeholders were shown to cause friction 
that disturbs overall ecosystem functioning. Further exploring these differences and 
conceptualizing potential ways that incorporate the opposing views may facilitate the 
institutionalization of venturing processes that benefit from internationally proven practices 
while also being locally responsive. 
 
In addition, further research on the question of entrepreneurial financing mechanisms that 
are appropriate in the context of resource-scarce and young ecosystems is pressing, because 
this research indicates that neither non-market-based financing nor the Western venture 
capital model provide a fully satisfactory fit. Are there local cultural practices that could be 
drawn upon to develop a financing mechanism that is more appropriate to the context? 
What are ways to draw in more local investors?   
This research has employed Isenberg’s (2011) model of the EE, which, given its generic 
nature, was deemed appropriate even in a GS country. Further theorization should develop 
a ICT EE  map that is customized to the context of countries in the GS. Here, the important 
role of development stakeholders and ICT infrastructure, as well as market, institutional and 
HC obstacles should be considered.   
Currently we still know very little about why and how EEs in the GS come into being and 
evolve. The presented model for ICT EE  emergence in GS contexts was created partially 
through theoretical abduction in iterative circles between the empirical data and relevant 
literature. Therefore, it will be important to validate the model through empirical studies in 
other GS contexts to see if it actually holds across GS contexts. Further, the developed model 
is a first attempt to capture the complex processes and context factors at play. Hence, the 
proposed phases are still relatively broad and require refining. Researchers may want to 
compare different ICT EE s across the GS in longitudinal studies to determine which 
challenges are inherent to each stage of ecosystem development and how to overcome 
them. Although the model focuses on very early stages of ecosystem development, the 
Kenyan ecosystem in 2016 seems to be approaching maturation. How does maturation 
integrate into the model? What learnings does Kenya’s maturation provide for strategies of 
fostering nascent ecosystems? What new challenges and enablers arise at this phase?  
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Further research should also pay special attention to the later stages of the presented 
model. These later stages are built on concepts of “virtuous circles of entrepreneurship” 
through “entrepreneurial spin-off” effects (Isenberg, 2011; Mason and Brown, 2014). 
Nevertheless the concepts stem from realms of theory (i.e.  clustering, RIS and EE theory) 
which implicitly assume a GN and resource-rich context. While Drexler (2014) shows 
examples of entrepreneurial spin-offs in a Latin American context, the extent and the 
applicability of such effects remains to be validated in an African context. For example, the 
Kenyan market environment may not offer a context for the high-growth and high-return ICT 
ventures for which these theories were developed. Therefore, large entrepreneurial exits by 
founders and resulting re-investments may not take place, causing growth trajectories to 
diverge from those encountered in western ICT EE s. What is more, the developed model 
argues that both large entrepreneurial exits as well as formally new ventures that manage to 
grow to a large scale leverage spin-off effects (Mason and Brown, 2014; Mayer, 2013). Large 
exits, however, require several rounds of growth capital so that entrepreneurs can grow 
their business to a stage where substantial value has been created, and they demand the 
presence of large corporations or potent investors to act as buyers (Mason and Brown, 
2014). Moreover, the rapid growth of firms may require the collection of equity on public 
capital markets (Mayer, 2013). Are these conditions sufficiently established in Kenya and 
other resource-scarce contexts? And: Do phenomena that work in resource-rich contexts, 
such as crowding-in of investors, work in resource-scarce contexts?26 
  
                                                     
26 See Avnimelech and colleagues (2007) and Wonglimpiyarat (2015) for a discussion of the 
conditions that made Israel’s Yozma initiative successful.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Entrepreneurship Ecosystem map (Isenberg, 2011) 
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Appendix 2: infoDev Mobile2Work challenge winners (2012).  
Source: www.infodev.org  Retrieved 09/09/2012 
 
 
  Runner up: Diabetic Retinopathy 
 
 
Winner: Smart Rickshaw’ mobile app 
 
Targeting rickshaw drivers of BOP section from developing countries as micro-workers to 
provide real time traffic, landmark and tourist hot spot updates & act as advertisement 
medium; which will help in uplifting their living and at same time addressing the problem 
of Traffic Congestion & Mobile Recycling. 
Third Place 
 
To create a system, which will promote afforestation initiatives in different corners of the 
world, by encouraging residents to plant trees in their community.  Micro-workers around 
the globe will receive tasks to plant trees. There will be a simple reporting solution which 
will allow Micro-workers to send a photo of each newly planted tree with geo-tagging 
(location coordinates) from their smartphones. Micro-workers will be paid per each newly 
planted tree from either authorized state bodies or international environmental 
organizations, other organizations or people who donate trough online tree planting 
platforms. Moreover, there will be continuous payments for watering the trees.  
This is a win-win-win situation: Micro-workers get jobs. Organizations and individuals spend 
money efficiently. The Planet becomes greener! 
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